


DR. J. J. POORTMAN

VEHICLES OF CONSCIOUSNESS III





VEHICLES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

III

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VEHICLES
OF
CONSCIOUSNESS

THE CONCEPT OF HYLIC PLURALISM
(OCHĒMA)

by

J. J. POORTMAN

Former Professor of Metaphysics
in the Spirit of Theosophy
in the University of Leiden,
The Netherlands.

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G. van der Leeuw's aim in writing his book *Phänomenologie der Religion* (1933) was to come to an "understanding of the historical material".¹ He did not want, in his phenomenology, to put forward any theories,² but rather wanted "the phenomena to show themselves". In this way, what was at first relatively concealed became relatively visible—it was, in other words, gradually revealed. All historians try to reconstruct and, if this method is followed with care, the result should be a comprehensive structure in which the sense and meaning of the whole are made clear and at the same time transcend individual subjectivity and individual objectivity.³ Again, in his *Sacramentstheologie* of 1949 (B 225), van der Leeuw made a sharp distinction between the second, phenomenological part and the first, historical and exegetical part, in which he dealt with the relevant biblical texts, and the third or theological part.

I intend to make a similar distinction here. Later, in Chapter 166, I shall discuss the extent to which this phenomenological method can make an essential contribution to our understanding of the *sense* of hylic pluralism. I have already, in the English Volume II, provided the most important points, in chronological surveys, of what I wanted to discuss in greater detail in the as yet unwritten Dutch Volumes III, IV and V and we are now ready to look more closely, although once again in summaries, at the *content*.

This content may correctly be termed phenomenological. I propose to review a number of data concerning the way in which hylic pluralism has been regarded by man, either insofar as this has been a universal point of view, concerned more or less directly with hylic pluralism (psychohylism is an example of this) or insofar as it has been due to the effect or application of hylic pluralism with regard to one specific context (an example of this being ideas about angels or demons). A comparison between these data drawn from different periods and societies may also result in an "understanding of the historical material" without any need to put forward explanatory theories.

Unlike the historical summaries of Volume II, what are provided in this volume are *cross-sections* of the historical data. The transition between the first and the second categories is thus formed in two ways. In the first place, I shall discuss cases drawn from Volume II in which

1 B 90, p. vii.

2 p. viii.

3 *op.cit.* pp. 79-80.

I have not dealt with one period as a whole (the pre-Socratics being an example of this), but in which I have investigated the occurrence of hylic pluralism among a specific group of men (such as physicians, physicists and biologists) over an extended period perhaps of several centuries. In the second place, I shall deal with cases of the occurrence of hylic pluralistic views to which I have, in the historical sections, devoted attention extending throughout the whole of history. (Poets are a good example of this.) In other words despite the fact that a number of as yet unmentioned historical details will be included in the text of this volume from time to time as they arise, the chronological approach will tend to be abandoned here whenever definite *concepts*, such as the sublime *pneuma* or parapsychological questions, are being considered.

It should, however, not be forgotten that the historical and the phenomenological points of view are not so very far removed from each other and that they cannot be discussed in isolation from each other. This is revealed clearly enough in the books of van der Leeuw. The point of departure for a phenomenological consideration must be the precise historical data and, even though phenomenology is especially concerned with content and relationships between various meanings, it can still be regarded as a part of historical research. On the other hand, it is not possible to conduct true historical research without at the same time being fundamentally concerned with an "understanding of the material" and without being very attentive to the various phenomena that "show themselves", before any theories are put forward.

These phenomenological cross-sections, which are particularly concerned with the *content* of hylic pluralistic convictions that have been held by various men at different times, are not only necessary, but even indispensable to the final examination that I shall make of the sense, in other words, of the truth of hylic pluralism. In this way, the problem will be dealt with in the proper order—the cross-sections provided in this volume certainly belong to the third and last part of this work (Ochēma VI in the original Dutch version), whereas the historical summaries of the English Volume II (Chapters 51 to 89) are only included in Part III because the original Dutch Volumes III, IV and V have not yet been written.¹

91 PSYCHOHYLISM

"Animae num corpus quaddam natura adjunctum sit", "Is a certain body not (always) by nature added to the soul?"—this is the striking

1 See also above, Section 52.

title of a number of pages in the Latin translation of Ralph Cudworth's *True Intellectual System of the Universe*.¹ It will perhaps be remembered that I introduced a new term for this idea, namely that the soul or *psyche*, even when it is not really expected—we are after all thinking *not* so very much of the fact that living man is composed of soul and body—in other words, especially after death, has at its disposal another body consisting of matter or *hyle*. This new term, which I introduced as early as Volume I, was psychohylism.² In the preceding chapters of this work, I have quoted a number of statements by sometimes very well known figures such as Leibniz³ with his "souls never leave their bodies entirely", Fechner⁴ who asked "Can the soul ever-completely do without a corporeal bearer?" and H. Conrad-Martius who also asked "Are there pure souls?"⁵

The point at issue is, of course, this—can spiritual substances exist completely independently or not? Thomas Aquinas thought that the angels and the souls of human beings after death could. All those whose standpoint is that of psychohylism, however, think not. Baader⁶ believed that "all life is body," Herder could "not conceive of a soul without a body"⁷ and Renouvier was convinced that the "monad is never incorporeal".⁸ On the other hand, there was no place in Descartes's anthropological dualism for anything of this kind—in the Cartesian philosophy, the spiritual principle and the body which existed in space were quite heterogeneous and had so little contact with each other during life—in fact, only at one point, the pineal gland—that there was no place for any body of fine matter after death.⁹

Psychohylism is also encountered in completely different societies. The Chinese philosopher Chu Hsi (1129-1200) thought that "all life is spiritually corporeal".¹⁰ In India too, the same conviction was widely held and the Jains, a very ancient sect, thought that "the soul is never completely separated from matter until its final release". The systems of philosophy known as the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta were based on the same presupposition, namely that the soul was accompanied by a coarser or finer body until it had achieved redemption.¹¹ A few more

1 B 22, II, p. 429 ff.

2 See above, Vol. I, Section 4; see also above, Vol. II, p. 11.

3 See above, Vol. II, pp. 11, 144; see also B 91, V, p. 51: "Souls are never... entirely separated from a body".

4 See above, Vol. II, pp. 11, 170.

5 See above, Vol. II, pp. 11, 209.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 107.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 146.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 155.

9 See above, Vol. II, p. 123.

10 See above, Vol. I, p. 273.

11 See above, Vol. I, p. 194 ff.

subtle characteristics are moreover revealed in Indian thought. The philosophers of the school of Ramanuja († 1137), a later Vedantist, believed that even emancipated souls were still connected with bodies. Clearly, the predominating idea here—an idea that is also expressed in another context in Indian philosophy—is that, if all *upādhis* or limitations were to be done away with, the *jīva* or individual soul would cease to exist and would be equal to the one unlimited Ātman itself. In other words, whatever changing finer bodies the individual soul may possess, its unchanging companion is the *sūkṣma-śarīra*.¹

In the same way, this idea is also encountered in classical antiquity. Proclus accepted the existence of a number of finer bodies (*ochēmata* or *chitōnes*) of the soul which could be assumed or taken off according to whether the soul was rising or descending through the spheres. In addition to this, the soul also possessed an *ochēma* which was innate or given by nature (*ochēma sumphues*) and which never left it. In so doing, Proclus combined to two opposing views—that of the changing vehicle and that of the one, constant vehicle.²

It is clear from this that there are two possible kinds of psychohylism. The first is absolute and complete—the soul *always* has some *ochēma*. The second, however, is a belief in changing vehicles, in which case the psychohylism is partial or relative. In this kind of psychohylism, the soul can exist purely immaterially, entirely on its own, but, from a certain level downwards, it makes use of one or more vehicles of fine matter and finally of the ordinary body of coarse matter. Another view is also revealed here—the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism, according to which only *one* body is able to accompany the soul under the circumstances of ordinary life and the spiritual substances can look after themselves. From this epsilon standpoint, there is also a scale in the direction of the delta standpoint, according to which bodies of the soul of *fine* matter also occur *on occasion*—this is the partial version—and also in the direction of the gamma standpoint, according to which the soul *always* has an *ochēma* of fine matter or is itself of fine matter.³

We may conclude from the foregoing that the concept of psychohylism is very close to that of hylic pluralism itself. All the same, hylic

1 See above, Vol. I, pp. 191-192, 194.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 53; see also Vol. I, p. 29. Even before Proclus, Jamblichus had already been teaching that, according to certain Platonists, that the soul *always* found itself surrounded by a "material covering, but one which is more subtle"; see B 174, p. 217.

3 See Vol. I, p. 41. Origen also believed that the soul was never without some body; see above, Vol. II, p. 82.

pluralism is a wider concept because it is concerned not only with the human soul, but also with the cosmos and even with possible *worlds* of fine matter.

The concept of psychohylism is also very closely connected with that of "spiritual corporeality", but it should be remembered that psychohylism is referred to by this term above all in Protestant circles and in Protestant theology. It undoubtedly originated with C. J. Dippel,¹ whose ideas I discussed briefly in Section 72 (Volume II), where I went into the whole problem of spiritual corporeality. Discussing Oetinger, Auberlen said that "no soul, no spirit can appear without a body or be perfect".² The idea of "intermediate corporeality" also came about as a result of this notion of "spiritual corporeality" within this trend in Protestant thought and was used to indicate the state of the soul between death and the resurrection.³

We are, however, bound to make a distinction between the concept of psychohylism and a number of other concepts and draw attention to certain philosophical implications contained in this. The doctrine that matter is living and that the atoms, for example, also possess a certain consciousness is called *hylozoism*. Clearly, this is seen from a different point of view—that of matter itself and especially of non-organic matter. Psychohylism, on the other hand, takes the human soul as its starting-point.⁴

What is the position with regard to hylemorphism, the doctrine that form (*morphē ousia* and matter (*hylē*) always accompany each other? Psychohylism is, of course, very similar and would seem to be a species of hylemorphism, but the latter is wider—according to hylemorphism, according to which it is for example, also possible to speak about the matter of a conversation, in other words, its subject. Psychohylism, on the other hand, relates to the real being or the hylic and not to the ideal being or eidetic.⁵ If this distinction is not preserved, there is always a tendency to make what I have called Plato's mistake⁶ and this has in fact resulted in the acceptance of *many* unchangeable and perfect beings and the linking together of Plato's immaterial ideas

1 See above, p. 106.

2 See B 7, p. 147.

3 See also Vol. I, p. 32. Schleiermacher also maintained that there could be no question of an immortality of the soul in the real sense of the word "without corporeal life" (see above, p. 109, note 10). J. H. Gunning insisted too that there was no power without matter, without a body and if necessary a new body (*Blikken*, III, p. xvii).

4 See above, Vol. I, p. 13.

5 See above, Vol. I, p. 19.

6 See above, Vol. II, pp. 36, 95.

and Thomas Aquinas' immaterial angels. In my opinion, this is a confusion, a metabasis eis allo genos. This confusion becomes all the more obvious as soon as matter—and fine matter—is regarded as everything that acts effectively,¹ that influences events and is in movement.

In the Middle Ages, these questions were discussed in the great controversy between the Augustinians and the Thomists to which I referred in Chapter 69. Theologians such as John Scottus Eriugena, Isaac of Stella (1169) and John Peckham also taught psychohylism or, to use the Protestant form, a "spiritual corporeality". According to the first, the soul creates for itself an intelligible body² and the angels also possessed spiritual bodies.³ Isaac of Stella said: "As such, the soul is not corporeal, but it is not capable of being without a body".⁴ John Peckham believed that the soul made use of a body after death.⁵

These thinkers clearly went quite a long way in speaking openly of a second body. Others who also belonged to the same movement, however, were content to accept a *materia spiritualis*, a basis or possibility of matter, without believing that this was bound to assume the form of a body.⁶ This, however, provided the embryo for the doctrine of psychohylism.

As I said in Section 69, this controversy was above all concerned with the correct interpretation of hylemorphism. According to Aristotle, only God was form without matter and the Augustinians continued to believe in this and therefore regarded at least a *materia spiritualis* (not an extended body of fine matter) as necessary in the case of the angels and of the souls of men after death. Yet, despite his clear preference for the philosophy of Aristotle, Thomas was a less strict hylemorphist and believed that not only God, but also the angels and human souls consisted of form without matter and were thus completely immaterial.

Clearly, in the case of the Augustinians and the Thomists, there was no agreement about the doctrine of hylic pluralism plus psychohylism—the first accepted both, the second opposed these doctrines and were followed in this opposition by Descartes.⁷

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 7.

2 See B 39, under the heading "Leib".

3 See B 131, p. 33, note 10.

4 See B 155, p. 413.

5 See H. Spettmann (see also above, p. 93, note 2), p. 93.

6 See above, p. 92.

7 In India, Vācaspati was fundamentally opposed this doctrine; see above, Vol. I, p. 196.

The "pansomatism" of the Slavic thinkers¹—such as, for example, N. A. Berdyayev²—is, on the other hand, very much in the direction of psychohylism and in practice really amounts to the same thing.³

92. TRICHOTOMY

In this section, I should like to draw attention to another problem which is also closely connected with hylic pluralism as a whole and with psychohylism as an important aspect of hylic pluralism. This is the question of the alternative between a trichotomy and a dichotomy with regard to the factors of which man consists.

Soul or mind and body, the psychical and the physical aspects—these are, of course, *two* extremely well known factors. But it has frequently been observed that this inclination, especially on the part of psychologists and philosophers, to speak of these two factors does not include the third factor, the *spirit*. G. Heymans and others have sometimes been criticised for having neglected this third factor, the spirit, or for having combined the two factors, spirit and soul.

This has not always been the case. Many thinkers, not only in the more distant past, have accepted a *trichotomy* of spirit, soul and body.⁴ Let us now briefly examine this phenomenon, in order to see how and in which cases this view has been held and when and where the change to a dichotomy has taken place. A very detailed examination of this question would be preferable, of course, but this is not possible here. We are, however, bound to say something about this, since, whenever the spirit is diametrically opposed to the body or matter, the soul, the factor which lies between them,⁵ is in many cases regarded as consisting of fine matter and as forming a vinculum or link between the immaterial spirit on the one hand and the body of coarse matter on the other.

In the *Phaedrus* and above all in the *Timaeus*, Plato accepts three parts of the soul (*merē*)—a higher, guiding factor which is inclined towards ideas and two lower and more emotive factors, the first of which is noble and controlled and the second subject to desires. (If

1 See B 95, p. 371.

2 See B 95, p. 240.

3 See also C. A. van Peursen, *Felten, waarden, gebeurtenissen* (1965), p. 110—corporeality as a necessary part of spiritual knowledge and therefore also of the spirit.

4 See, for example, B 90, p. 285.

5 The intermediate factor is, it should be noted, sometimes called the spirit (e.g. *pneuma*) and the other, higher factor the soul (see, for example, Vol. I, p. 16), but this is a purely terminological consideration and of less importance to the question under discussion.

the body is included, of course, this means that there are four factors in all.)

A similar division can be found in the case of Aristotle, who distinguished between three factors of the soul—a vegetative soul, which the plants also possessed, a sensible or aware soul (*aisthetikos*, *sensibilis*), which the animals also had, and a soul which is capable of movement. The latter occurs in the cases of the higher animals and of man, in whom *nous* or reason is also found.¹ (This, of course, makes five factors in all.)

Later, the number of factors has often been limited to three—the spirit, the soul and the body. Something of this kind is already encountered even in the Old Testament, in which a distinction is made between *rûah*, spirit, and *nepheš*, soul.² In the New Testament too, there is no question of four or five factors—in the case of St. Paul in particular, even the existence of three factors is disputed. I have, however, shown, with reference to 1 Thess. 5. 23, that the “natural body” of 1 Cor. 15. 44 (the words of the text are *sōma psuchikon*!) cannot mean the ordinary body, but rather indicate an independent psychical body, as distinct from the ordinary physical body on the one hand and the pneumatic body which is resurrected on the other. Following H. Lietzmann, it is therefore possible to speak of a trichotomy in the teaching of St. Paul with regard to the spirit, soul and body.³

Other, later Christian teachers who accepted this trichotomy were Origen,⁴ Clement of Alexandria⁵ and Apollinaris of Laodicea (ca. 310-390),⁶ together with the gnostics, who, on the basis of a consideration of one of the factors, made a distinction between hylic and psychical or pneumatic men.⁷

Once again going through history with seven league boots, we may point to the trichotomy of the philosophers of the Renaissance, such as Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), Cardanus⁸ and so on, as well as Francis Bacon, all of whom believed in a spiritual or rational soul existing at a higher level than the lower, animal soul⁹ as Grotius also did.¹⁰ Other figures who have accepted a trichotomy are V. Weigel,¹¹

1 See, for example, B 177, p. 183, 237; B 128, pp. 31, 37.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 58 f.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 76; see also Vol. I, p. 44.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 82.

5 See Spanneut, B 251, p. 168.

6 See B 174, p. 486.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 76-77.

8 See B 184, II, p. 276; I, p. 166.

9 See above, Vol. II, p. 118.

10 See above, Vol. II, p. 212.

11 See above, Vol. II, p. 130.

Schelling,¹ the romantics generally,² K. F. Göschel³ and finally A. Günther⁴ who was originally in favour of a trichotomy, but later withdrew this doctrine.

There have also been notable opponents of this teaching. No less a figure than Augustine himself declared that no one should appeal as Origen had done to Paul as an authority on the doctrine of the trichotomy.⁵ According to Spanneut, Tertullian had rejected the trichotomy out of fear of Platonism.⁶ All the same, the Platonic influence on Augustinianism was very strong. In the work to which I have referred already in this context, H. Spettmann discussed in some detail the *Medienlehre* as he called it. In its doctrine of a sharp antithesis between form and matter, Aristotelianism did not need any intermediate link, yet, Spettmann maintained, there were clear signs in Aristotle's thought of a tendency in this direction, since he found it difficult to go on insisting on a pure hylemorphism otherwise.⁷ As Spettmann said, the neo-Platonists "lovingly fashioned" the doctrine of a medium later on. The same author mentions by name a whole list of medieval authors in whose writings this idea is to be found—an idea, he adds, which "prevailed up to the time of Thomas Aquinas".⁸

With Thomas, however, there was a change of attitude. He regarded the angels and the souls of human beings as purely immaterial substances, whereas, for a strict hylemorphism, only God was form without matter. He did not think that a *materia spiritualis* was necessary as their foundation. This is in accordance with a pronouncement made by the Council of Vienne in 1311, which was based on a statement made by the Council of Constantinople of 553 and was in turn confirmed by the declaration of the Fifth Lateran Council in 1513. According to these statements, the soul is the form of the body man is a "unified being", there is no question of his having several souls⁹ and any trichotomy of *nous*, *psyche* and *soma* was, as such, condemned.

Roman Catholicism, which is not entirely opposed to hylic pluralism, has from time to time asserted—usually appealing to the psychology

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 164, note 2—the dialogue "Clara", p. 45.

2 See Ricarda Huch, B 215, II, p. 89; "the soul as mediator between the spirit and the body".

3 See above, p. 168.

4 See above, p. 101.

5 See Rüschke, B 137, p. 63.

6 See B 251, p. 159.

7 op. cit., p. 29; see above, p. 93, note 7.

8 Although Augustine was of the opinion that there was no trichotomy in St. Paul's teaching, his own point of view has been rendered by Verbeke (B 174, p. 215, 505; see also B 155, p. 386) as accepting "a pneumatic intermediary between the soul and the body".

9 See above, p. 94.

of Cardinal Mercier—that there is no question of going against the teaching of the Church in accepting that the “spiritual soul (the *nous* or *pneuma*) is man’s substantial form”. *in addition*, then, it is possible to accept a psyche of fine matter.¹

All the same, it cannot be denied that these conciliar pronouncements have had a harmful effect on the doctrine of the trichotomy. At the same time, Thomas Aquinas’ idea of the human soul and of the angels as purely spiritual substances had, in my opinion, a considerable influence on Descartes’ doctrine of anthropological dualism.² This aspect of Cartesianism, which I have called the epsilon standpoint, is, as we have already seen,³ the very opposite of psychohylism and of any trichotomy, which can, in contrast to Descartes’ dualism, be termed a trialism. Clearly, there can be no place at all, in such a sharp antithesis, for any third factor of fine matter in the form of a vinculum or connecting link between the spirit and the body. The very widespread acceptance of anthropological dualism in the modern age must therefore have been one of the reasons for the decline in interest in hyllic pluralism.

All this is also connected with the question of the drawing of a *different dividing line*. Is the division between the mind and the body really the most important of all, with the result that we need not be too alarmed when the spirit and the soul are identified with each other? Or is there good reason for drawing this dividing line elsewhere—not between the mind or consciousness and the body, but rather between the one immaterial spirit, the suprasubject or one *Átman* which is common to all, on the one hand and the soul plus the body, the psychical plus the physical aspects on the other?⁴ If this is so, then the whole picture is changed. If the psychical and the physical factors are shown to be closer to each other, then we may assume that it is also possible for the soul to possess qualities that are related to the material or even for the soul itself to consist of fine matter. This would clearly bring all kinds of consequences in its wake—it would, for example, raise the question as to whether there is any possible interaction between the psychical and the physical elements. There should, in this case, be no objection, for example, to the proposal that energy is transferred from the one to the other.⁵ A discussion of this and related points must, however, be delayed until later in this work.

1 Taken from a private letter.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 122 ff.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 3.

4 See B 114, p. 291 ff; B 237, p. 114; see also below, Section 136.

5 See B 114, p. 338 ff.

It is clear, then, that there are many different aspects to this alternative of dualism or trialism, dichotomy or trichotomy. I should like to make only two observations about this.

Anthropological dualism is, in my opinion, basically a "pregnant dualism",¹ a tendency to make the contrast between the two poles as sharp and as simple as possible. This clear accentuation and simplification is discernible in the dichotomy between soul or mind and body and in the modern antipathy towards all trichotomy. If, however, this restrictive view is abandoned, we have a whole scale of terms, with a gradual transition between them and there is furthermore no real reason for confining ourselves to a simple trichotomy.

I have also used the term "trialism", as opposed to dualism, instead of "trichotomy". If this scale of values is accepted, we then have, instead of a dualism or a trialism, a *pluralism*² of factors, unless we prefer to speak of three factors, in other words, of a trichotomy or trialism for practical rather than for fundamental reasons. In the case of Plato and of Aristotle, there was, as we have seen, a division into more than three factors.³ Proclus too taught that there was a whole series of factors (*ochēmata* or *chitōnes*). This is precisely why I did not, from the very beginning of this work, use the term hylic dualism, which would have indicated ordinary matter plus one species of subtle matter, but rather preferred to use the more general term hylic *pluralism*.⁴ An integral part of the whole texture of Indian thought is the acceptance of a series of factors of the soul existing alongside the ordinary body. What is more, if this philosophy is examined accurately—this is something that is not always done—these factors are all thought of as consisting of fine matter.⁵ In this way, it is clear that the doctrine of a dichotomy *and* that of a trichotomy are no longer valid.

A second observation has also to be made in the same context. In itself, it would seem to be reasonable to accept a soul of fine matter as a *vinculum*, link or intermediate bond between the immaterial spirit and the body of ordinary matter. C. H. van Os' conviction that the difficulty is simply changed by accepting the existence of a link between the spirit and the ordinary body⁶ is in this case clearly correct. It is possible to understand the interaction between a soul consisting of

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 152 f.

2 It is, in this case, even possible to speak of a "polytomy".

3 See above, p. 8.

4 See Vol. I, p. 8.

5 See Vol. I, p. 182.

6 See above, p. 215-216.

fine matter and a body of ordinary matter, but not that between a soul of fine matter and an immaterial spirit. The argument that a *vinculum* or link is above all useful or practical is therefore hardly tenable and it is necessary to look elsewhere for a solution to the problem.

All that I can say about that here is that the third factor, the spirit, may also consist of fine matter of an even more subtle species. In this case, the interaction between the spirit and the soul is possible and can be understood. The really immaterial aspect has then to be situated elsewhere—not in individual man, the *jīva* with its constant burden of *upādhis* or limitations, but in a quality that belongs only to the one Spirit, the one Suprasubject which is behind all infrasubjects, the one *Ātman* (which is of a much more profound and a very different reality, deeper than and different from the ordinary temporal, spatial and material reality, even if this is of fine matter). This would be so even if all the infrasubjects were, in a fundamentally paradoxically manner, to share in that one Suprasubject.¹

93. CHITON

The word that I chose for the title of this whole work is *Ochēma* (*ochēma*, vehicle). But, as I have pointed out several times already, this word indicates a very typical form of hylic pluralism—that of the vehicle of the soul consisting of fine matter—whereas hylic pluralism is, in itself, a very much wider conception.² One question which presents itself inevitably in research into hylic pluralism, however, is this. Have other typical images perhaps been used to indicate either the same meta-organism or astral body or a different aspect of hylic pluralism? The answer to this question is, yes, there have been other images, the most important of which is the *garment* of the soul. This image has, in fact, played so important a part in the theme of hylic pluralism that I might well have given this work the title of Chiton (*chitōn*, garment, tunic, undergarment). I hope to show in this chapter that this is not in any sense a casual comment and that via the theme of the “garment” we have a new and quite general way of approaching hylic pluralism.

It is, of course, true to say that this theme of the garment is, like that of the vehicle or chariot,³ is one which has been used much more frequently and far more widely than simply in the special hylic pluralistic

1 See, for example, B 237, pp. 117-118.

2 See Vol. I, p. 5 ff; see also above, p. 225.

3 See above, Vol. I, p. 130.

sense. In the book of Genesis, for example, vehicles and chariots are nowhere mentioned. There are, on the other hand, repeated references to garments and clothes, beginning with Gen. 3.21.

We can of course ignore most of these references in the Bible and elsewhere to clothes, garments, textiles or fabrics, but the extended or figurative use of "garment" for the *ordinary body* is to some extent connected with our subject or does at least point in the direction of hylic pluralism. In his interesting treatise on St. Augustine and the neo-Platonic symbolism of clothing,¹ J. Pépin says: "Apart from the fact that it is a perfectly natural image, the idea that the body is like the garment of the soul seems to be as old as thought itself".²

It is also very interesting in this context that the standard Dutch dictionary gives the original meaning of the Dutch word for body, *lichaam*, as "covering" or "sheath" of the body. It is derived from and Old Germanic word *luka*, meaning "covering".³

Marcus Aurelius used the image of "garment" for the ordinary body, referring to *perikeimenon soi sōmatikon* "the body is a kind of covering of which we are bound to take care".⁴ It is a fairly obvious, even a rather popular idea that, whether it is regarded as immaterial or as consisting of fine matter, the soul remains in the body until death. In this case, we are concerned with the *ordinary body* seen as a garment or a covering. The next step, however, is that this garment can be thrown away or changed. For example, we read in the Bhagavad Gītā: "As a man, casting off worn-out garments, take the new ones, so the dweller in the body, casting off worn-out bodies, entereth into others that are new".⁵ This clearly refers to new physical bodies in a subsequent incarnation—there is no mention here of any "intermediate corporeality" as such. G. J. P. J. Bolland was not in agreement with this idea of reincarnation and wrote against it in his "Book of Proverbs" (*Boek der Spreuken*): "A man is not what he has and he "has" his body. But this does not make his body a jacket which is put on and taken off by the soul. Different birth remains birth of what is different".⁶ All this clearly has a bearing on the use of "garment" as an image for the ordinary body.

¹ See B 190, p. 293 ff.

² B 190, p. 293.

³ *Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal*, under "lichaam". The Dutch word *lijk* (corpse) comes from the same root.

⁴ See B 174, p. 167.

⁵ II, p. 22 (ed. A. Besant).

⁶ II, p. 934. In a footnote, Bolland quotes the Cabbala: "Man's flesh is only the garment...man is within" (*Zohar*, I, 20b).

It is also true that the image of clothing, covering, surrounding and so on is also frequently used in all kinds of much wider meanings. Onians, for example, has observed: "The different kinds of fortune are conceived as something bound or wrapped about a man".¹ In a footnote, he points to Isaiah 59. 17: "He put on righteousness as a breast-plate . . . he put on garments of vengeance for clothing, and wrapped himself in fury as a mantle". This "conception of attributes as clothing a man" occurs very regularly (*ibid.*).² The image of "girding" also occurs frequently in the Old Testament, where God "girds" someone with strength, with happiness or with some other quality. In the case of many people, "a head-ache or sickness" could be "conceived as a garment".³ In the Old Testament, for example, we also read that God "made clouds its (the earth's) garment".⁴

In his *Sartor Resartus* of 1831, Thomas Carlyle tried to provide a philosophy of clothing, but got no farther than such statements as "language is called the garment of thought" (p. 43 and "nature as a living garment" (p. 125). We can only conclude that, interesting though this may be, it is not hylic pluralism.

Let us now consider another aspect of this question which is far more closely related to hylic pluralism. Proclus not only used the term *ochēmata*, vehicles, for the subtle bodies (*leptotera sōmata*) of the soul—he believed that a whole series of such bodies existed—but also the word *chitōnes*, tunics.⁵ Since two items of clothing were usually worn out of doors in the ancient world, a *chlaina* or toga, outer garment or cloak and, beneath this, an undergarment or tunic, the *chitōn*, it is obvious that the image of this undergarment for the finer, more inward body of the soul is not unacceptable. In any case, it is impossible to deny that it was used in this sense by Proclus.⁶

It is quite possible to apply the same argument to this use of "garment" as we applied to the use of "vehicle" earlier in this work⁷ and ask whether, when this image was used elsewhere, in a different context, it was not *also* used to denote something consisting of fine matter, in view of the fact that man was more inclined in the past towards realism than he is today and less disposed to make use of pure symbolism.

1 B 233, p. 360.

2 See, for example, *Elckerlijc*, the late medieval Dutch morality play (cf. the English Everyman), 598 ff, in which "Knowledge" puts on the "garment of repentance".

3 *op. cit.*, p. 367.

4 Job 38. 9.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 52-53.

6 See Part I, p. 33; B33, p. 320.

7 See above, Vol. I, p. 137, Vol. II, 232 f.

After all, since the Stoics accepted the fine materiality of the soul, the use of a term such as garment or covering ought to have come naturally enough to Marcus Aurelius and the other Stoics as something that could be applied to the soul. Again, since the factors of the soul such as *buddhi*, *manas* etc. Which occur again and again in the Bhagavad Gītā are not thought of as being purely immaterial,¹ the use of a term such as garment for "intermediate corporeality", that situation between successive incarnations that is described again and again in Indian thought, would not have been incogruous. All the same, the word as such is not to be found in the Bhagavad Gītā.

The conclusion that we may draw from what I have said in the preceding paragraph is that, in the first place, the image or theme of a covering or garment for a body of fine matter has undoubtedly occurred in a number of cases. In the second place, it is possible to point to a number of borderline cases in which this has not occurred explicitly, but in which it is pretty obvious that hylic pluralism has in one way or another been implied.

I should like to begin by discussing the first situation. We have already seen that there is reference to the five *kośas* of the soul in one of the later Upanisads, the *Sarva-upaniṣatsāra*. *Kośa* means, of course, sheath or covering. This division into five goes back to an earlier and very well known Upaniṣad, the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, in which there is reference, not to five *kośas*, but to five *ātmans*, existing in layers, one inside the other. The first of these *ātmans* or *kośas* is the ordinary body and the others are increasingly subtle.² It is clear that this concept of *kośas* is the counterpart of another concept in Indian thought, that of the *upādhis* or *śartras* and these are all different ways of indicating the idea of the fine materiality of the soul and of the factors of the soul which occurs so frequently in India.

This idea of coverings or sheaths enclosing each other like a set of Chinese boxes which occurs so obviously in the case of the Indian *kośas* can also be found, for example, in Plato's *Timaeus* 30B, in which we read: *noun men en psuchē, psuchēn de en sōmati*—although it must be admitted that this statement does not have an explicitly hylic pluralistic character.³ The idea was, however, taken up again in the Hellenistic period, during which hylic pluralism emerged much more clearly, though it was given various names, for example, in the so-called Chaldaean

1 See above, Vol. I, 200 f.

2 See above, Vol. I, pp. 176-180.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 32 ff.

oracles and in the writing known as *De vita et poësi Homeri*.¹ There are also frequent references in the *corpus hermeticum*² to a *peribolaion* and to *periblēmata* or coverings of the soul. Festugière has given a number of examples, but it is not possible for me to discuss this in detail here.³ Plotinus' concept of the *pneuma* as something around the soul, *to pneuma to peri tēn psuchēn*, is also clearly related to this idea—I have already discussed this in a previous section on neo-platonism.⁴

Verbeke has also written, in connection with Plotinus, about a "celestial covering" and an "etheric tunic" of the soul,⁵ but I feel that it would be going too far if we were to conclude that every reference to "covering" or "surrounding" was an image of the garment pointing to the fine materiality of the soul. What is, however, interesting in this context is Dodd's explicit question as to which writer was the first to refer to the "pneumatic body" as a *chitōn* and his conclusion that it was not Plotinus, but Porphyry in the *De abst.* II, 46., in which he said that the body of flesh and blood was the *ultimate* garment.⁶ It gradually became habitual from then onwards to speak indiscriminately of *ochēmata* or of *chitōnes* of the soul.

The idea that predominated in the whole of this Hellenistic environment was—including that of the gnostics, for example—was that the soul ascended and descended through different spheres, each time, that is, at each successive stage, either taking off or putting on a more subtle body or garment.⁷ Pépin has called the ascent of the soul the "strip-tease of the soul!"⁸ If space permitted, many passages illustrating this could easily be quoted,⁹ but all that can be said here is that the *chitōn* or garment was a favourite image.

So much, then, for the use of this image for what is known elsewhere simultaneously as the *ochēma* or vehicle of the soul, in so far as this usage is absolutely *certain*.. There are, however, very many cases in which it is very doubtful whether this usage is really certain, but in which it is probable—or at least possible—that the original authors

1 See B 174, p. 315; see also above, Vol. II, p. 48-49.

2 See above, p. 48.

3 B 44, for example, p. 124, 130; see also B 33, p. 317.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 50-51.

5 B 174, p. 360.

6 See B 33, p. 308.

7 According to these views, the soul may, however, always be accompanied by an innate *ochēma* which is *not* set aside in the psychohylistic sense (See above, p. 4).

8 B 190, p. 301; see also B 237, p. 250, note 1.

9 B 190, p. 293, 300 ff; B 176, III, p. 419, 430; B 44, p. 130 ff; B 33, p. 187, 307, note 1, 314; B 210, p. 293 (*Istar* as *heptastolos* with seven garments) B 245, p. 17; B 24, p. 282, note 69.

(into whose thoughts we must, after all, try very hard to enter) had some hylic pluralistic idea in mind. What is more, these borderline cases are very numerous indeed and are just as interesting as those which are certain.

The modern scholars who have investigated the problem of the "garment" theme—Pépin,¹ R. Eisler,² Cumont,³ Kissling,⁴ Dodds⁵ and G.R.S.Mead⁶ especially—have as a rule begun—as I did—by pointing to the use of this theme for the ordinary body, mentioning, for example, a passage in Empedocles in which he calls the body the garment of the flesh, *sarkōn chitōn*.⁷ There is also a passage in Aristotle saying that, according to the Pythagoreans, any soul can clothe itself with any body.⁸

A further stage is reached when we recall that Hesiod referred to daemons and gods as being clothed or surrounded by a cloud.⁹ In this case, there can be no question of the ordinary body, just as in the case, discussed by Onians, of belief in a veil or mist of death which was held by certain tribes and peoples. Onians adds that "there can be no doubt of the substantive reality, the externality of this covering", which shows not that Onians believed in this himself, but that he thought it necessary to state that there was faith in it. In this context, he also discussed the question of "second sight".¹⁰

Similar ideas are also encountered frequently in the Old Testament. In Psalm 104. 2, for example, we read that the Lord covers himself with light "as with a garment" and stretches out the heavens "like a tent" or, in the older translations "a curtain". Robert Eisler made a very detailed study of precisely these ideas in his book on the "cloak of the world and the tent of heaven" (*Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*, 1910; B 210). Inevitably too, one is reminded here of a book by the Dutch author J. van Dijk on the history of comparative religion and especially on the world as the "garment of light"—*De wereld als lichtkleed* (1933). The part played by light in this context is something to which I shall have to return later.

Now, however, we must discuss, not in the cosmological context, but rather in the anthropological context, the text in Genesis in which

1 B 190, p. 293 ff.

2 B 210, p. 243, note 3 ff.

3 B 24, p. 282 ff.

4 B 85, p. 325.

5 B 33, p. 307 ff.

6 *Vestures of the Soul, Lucifer XI and The World Mysery* (1895).

7 B 210, p. 243, note 3; B 190, p. 293; B 33, p. 307.

8 *De anima*, A 3 407b, 22-23.

9 See above, Vol. II, p. 220.

10 B 233, p. 423.

we are told that "the Lord God made for Adam and for his wife garments of skins, and clothed them" (Gen. 3. 21). It is obvious that these were a primitive kind of ordinary garment of the type that the Neanderthal man is often depicted as wearing, made of skins of animals. As I have already said in some detail¹ a "last garment" of man has been perceived by a number of writers in these "garments of skins", in other words, man's ordinary body as a whole (the skin was something that he had in common with the animals) in contrast to other more subtle bodies or garments. In this, the point of departure was the idea of a descent through the spheres, in which case the whole interpretation is clearly hylic pluralistic. This explanation may seem to be rather laboured—as though these authors wanted to have a text which would justify their point of view—but the fact remains that these writers undoubtedly thought of this text in a hylic pluralistic sense.²

There are, however, other texts, both in the Old and in the New Testaments, where a hylic pluralistic interpretation is, in my opinion, less laboured. According to the parable of the wedding feast in Matt. 22. 8 ff, the guest who was not wearing a wedding garment was thrown out into the dark. There are, on the other hand, many texts in which there is reference to white garments as a sign of spirituality, in living men, those who have died or angels or spirits. The most familiar text in this context is that describing Jesus' transfiguration on Mount Tabor³ in Matt. 17. 1-8 (cf. Mark 9. 2-8; Luke 9. 28-36), in which we read that Jesus' "garments became white as light". It is to some extent obvious that, if man really does possess, or is able to acquire a very subtle body of very high quality (cf. the "sublime *pneuma*"⁴) these radiant garments will be interpreted as an allusion to that body. Elsewhere—for example, in neo-Platonism—it is a fact that there is reference to subtle *chitōnes* and, in gnostic teaching, there is constant mention of a "garment of light, a robe of glory".⁵

Apart from this "Song of the Garment of Glory", there is another gnostic text which refers to spiritual garments and in particular to a

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 63-64.

2 In his "Theologie der Kleidung" (*Universitas* III, p. 1409 ff)—which does not contain much of interest to us here—E. Peterson insists that, according to Gen. 3.7, Adam and Eve were not naked before the fall, but clothed (see p. 1409). This, then, must be the heavenly garment which Adam had before the fall (see Vol. II, p. 63), but I cannot come to this interpretation from this text. Elsewhere (in the *Benedikt. Monatschrift*, 1934, p. 349) Peterson went into greater detail in connection with Adam's garment in paradise before the fall and referred to Scheeben, B 147, II, § 1027 and § 1035.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 70-71.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 11.

5 See Vol. I, p. 30; B 33, p. 308, note 1; B 99, p. 133; B 100, X; B 93, II, p. 171

wedding garment. This is the "Wedding Song of Wisdom".¹ (In this context, it is important to recognise the possibility of a similar background in the New Testament.) White garments are also mentioned frequently in other texts. Examples of these are Rev. 19. 14—the armies of heaven "arrayed in fine linen, white and pure"; the appearance of the angel at the tomb, "his raiment white as snow", Matt. 28. 3 (cf. John 20. 12); and the angel in "bright apparel" who appeared to Cornelius in Acts 10. 31; see also Acts 1. 10—two angels in "white robes" at the ascension.

There is also the very interesting idea that these white garments can or have to be *acquired*. If there is any truth at all in all this talk about higher bodies, then they are bound to be present, as an embryo or a possibility, in everyone, but it is not necessary for them to be already realised. We may recall, in this connection, the belief of the ancient Egyptians that immortality was only certain in the case of the Pharaoh, certainly not in the case of ordinary men. Be this as it may, we may conclude that, if there is an allusion in all these texts to exalted bodies, there is always an indication that these bodies have to be *developed*. Grace plays a part in this—for example, in Isa. 61. 10, we read: "For he has clothed me with the garment of salvation, he has covered me with the robe of righteousness". According to Matt. 13. 43, it is above all the "righteous" who "will shine like the sun". Special emphasis is placed in the Apocalypse on the conditional aspect of this metamorphosis. In Rev. 3. 5, for example, we read that "he who conquers shall be clad in white garments" and, in 3. 18, "I counsel you to buy from me . . . white garments to clothe you (cf. the "white robes" in 6. 11). According to Rev. 16. 15, "blessed is he . . . keeping his garments. This "fine linen" is the justification of the saints (19. 8), who are apparently those "who have come out of the great tribulation" and who have "washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb" (7. 14). 22. 11 clearly has to be interpreted in a similar sense—the guest who comes without a wedding garment is "cast into the outer darkness".²

I think that this idea is very remarkable because it is analogous to the theme of the vehicle. I have already discussed the problem of the "chariot of fire" in 2 Kings 2. 11-12 and have suggested that one interpretation of this might be that Elijah went up to heaven in his own

1 See B 100, XI: The "Wedding Song of Wisdom".

2 J. Boehme was clearly referring to this text when he said: "And you are cast out of the wedding because you are not wearing an angelic garment"; see *Aurora*, Chap. 5, No. 14-18.

higher body, as it has always been rendered in Christian iconography that he sat in or on the chariot, even though this is not in the text.¹ This question is prompted by the fact that the vehicle theme is used elsewhere for the subtle body of the soul.

I have also asked similar questions in connection with the celestial chariots, the *vimānas*, in Indian thought—the Mahābhārata, for example.² What is particularly interesting here is that, whereas there was something wrong with the chariot with which the human soul was compared in Plato's *Phaedrus* because one of the two horses was refractory, Arjuna had been given the use of a celestial chariot "by ascetic merit".³ Now, exactly the same kind of ambiguity is present in the theme of the light garments in the Bible—they are a grace but they have to be acquired or preserved. The wedding guests of Matt. 22. 8 ff are then worthy of their meal.

When I was discussing Paul, I pointed to his teaching, in 2 Cor. 2. 1-5, about our putting on or being clothed with a dwelling in heaven, a "building from God, a house not made with human hands".⁴ Here too, then, we have the image of being clothed. We should not, of course, forget that Paul was originally a tent-maker and that the image of the tent, *hē epigeios hēmōn oikia tou skēnous*, which is translated in the Authorised Version as "our earthly house of this tabernacle" and in the Revised Standard Version as "the earthly tent", came naturally to him. There is an inevitable analogy with the tent or dwelling in heaven that is contrasted with this "earthly tent"—the pneumatic or soul body of 1 Cor. 15. Finally, R. Eisler (B 120) has dealt in some detail with this "heavenly tent", in other words, with the use of this image in a cosmological context.

In the "tunic without a seam" mentioned in John 19. 23 and contrasted with Jesus' other garments which were divided, it is possible to detect a reference to the innate, unchanging *ochēma* in contrast with the *chitōnes* which are taken off. Proclus thought that this was the case, but it is, in my opinion, rather far fetched.

In religious literature as a whole, references to clothing are very common. In some cases, a hylic pluralistic explanation is fairly well justified, in others not, while in many cases we have what I have called "borderline" examples. It would, of course, be quite impossible to discuss all of these instances in detail or even to mention them, so I

1 See above, Vol. I, p. 141, Vol. II, 64.

2 See above, Vol. I, p. 203.

3 See above, Vol. I, p. 205.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 73.

must confine myself to a few comments. There are several passages in the Jewish *Revelation of Enoch* (ca. 160 B.C.) which are entirely in the spirit of the *chitōn* image. Especially noteworthy is the statement (XXII, 18) that an angel will "gird (clothe) the righteous and pious of the world with the garments of life and wrap them in a cloak of life that they may live in them an eternal life".¹ The late medieval mystic, John Ruysbroeck, wrote about the "divine garment which Christ naturally possessed and which we receive through grace".² John of the Cross also wrote about the garment of the soul.³ In a vision, Teresa of Avila described the Virgin Mary: "She was clad in white and surrounded by a great radiance". A nineteenth century mystic, Lucie Christine, spoke about Christ's "white light-garment".⁴ The well-known visionary Swedenborg referred to "being dressed in new, radiant garments".⁵

Eisler has said that there is another idea is often encountered in iconography, namely that two angels appear when man "gives up the ghost", one staying by his head while the other unfolds a great spiritual garment to clothe him in glory.⁶ This is clearly different from the *eidolon*, which escapes on death⁷ and which is also received and is therefore parallel to this garment. Dr. s'Jacob has also pointed to "the cloth that partly envelops the soul on its celestial journey". For the explanation of this garment or cloth, we are reminded of the "glorious attire of the re-created soul".⁸

I should like finally to make a few remarks about certain themes which are in one way or another connected with the theme of the garment. In the theme of the *world* cloak,⁹ the cosmological aspect, the body of God, is brought into the picture.¹⁰ Connected with this, we have the theme of light¹¹ and a further part of this mysticism of light is the theme of the halo, to which I have already referred.¹² It is possible to ask here whether the halo does, not, as it were, belong to the garment or at least to the appearance of important persons in the

1 See B 233, p. 364; B 210, p. 295, note 3; B 44, p. 146.

2 *Werken*, III, p. 169; see S. Axters, *De vroomheid in de Nederlanden*, II, p. 252.

3 B 268, p. 237; see also above, p. 130.

4 L. Albrecht, *Das mystische Erkennen* (1958), Vol. I, pp. 87-88.

5 See B 210, p. 297; B 193, p. 507.

6 B 210, p. 297, note 2 (Vie de S. Pakome).

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 232.

8 B 216, p. 125.

9 See above, p. 17.

10 See below, Section 111.

11 See below, Section 104.

12 See above, Vol. II, p. 235-236.

religious sphere. This radiant light around the saint's head and the gleaming white clothes are clearly very closely connected.

This idea can be taken even further to include *garlands*, *crowns* and *girdles*. This too constitutes a subject in its own right which space prevents me from discussing fully here. The garlands mentioned in the Mahabharata do not, in the glorified state, wither¹ and the garments are not made dirty. Wisdom gives man a "beautiful crown" (Proverbs 4. 9); the twenty-four elders "cast their crowns before the throne" as a sign of adoration (Rev. 4. 10) and these elders were "clad in white garments, with golden (= radiant!) crowns upon their heads" (Rev. 4. 4). Man has to acquire the "crown of life" (Rev. 4. 4), the "crown of righteousness" (2 Tim. 4. 8) or the "unfading crown of glory" (1 Pet. 5. 4). If it is true that the "white garments" may contain a reference to a subtle body which has to be acquired, a "sublime *pneuma*", then the same must surely apply to these crowns and garlands.

Onians was not particularly alert to the occurrence of *hylic* pluralism, but he did point to the very large part played in the Greek mysteries, in the doctrines of the Hindus, in the religion of the Persians and elsewhere by the girdle, cord or belt.² (Among the Hindus, this was the *dvipa* or sacred cord and in ancient Persia it was a golden girdle.) It hardly needs to be pointed out that the girdle or belt is a part of the garment.

On the other hand, there is also the *aegis*, Zeus' goatskin. Onians has also discussed this.³ There is a link between *nephetē* or cloud and the Golden Fleece.⁴ Although Onians was not a *hylic* pluralist, he was still able to say that the "covering or wrapping was perhaps conceived as vaporous, as indeed, was the stuff of consciousness".⁵ It is, however, not possible to go into all the passages and all the connected themes that Onians discusses in this context.

Finally, I should like to comment on the "cloud" theme. The cloud—or vapour, steam or haze—is visible air and as such a very suitable indication, with the extension to which I have already referred,⁶ of fine materiality in another space, if this in fact exists as the ancients believed, although they did not make any distinction.⁷ Whereas, according to Hesiod,⁸ the gods concealed themselves in a cloud, Yahweh

1 See above, Vol. I, p. 206.

2 B 233, p. 545 ff.

3 B 233, p. 421 ff.

4 B 233, p. 421, note 8.

5 *ibid.*; see also above, Vol. II, p. 22.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 12.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 12.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 220.

made the "clouds his chariot" (Psalm 104. 3) and, in the Apocalypse, we read of an "angel coming down from heaven, wrapped in a cloud" (Rev. 10. 1) and of others going up to heaven "in a cloud" (11. 12). In the gospel of Luke, a "voice" comes "out of the cloud" (9. 35 and we are told that the "Son of man" will come again "in a cloud with power and great glory" (21. 27).

Whatever religious truth may be assigned to such texts, I am quite certain that, if sufficient attention is given to their hylic pluralistic aspects, they will be seen to contain meanings to which people living at the time when they were written were far more alert than contemporary readers.

94 ANGELS AND DEMONS

We must now briefly consider a special aspect of the occurrence of hylic pluralism in connection with angels and demons.¹

Generally speaking, whenever there is a tendency to accept man's continued existence after death in one state or other or in some other world, it is not unreasonable to postulate the existence of a category of beings who also dwell in that other, world, but who are different from men—or from men's souls—and who cannot be perceived in our ordinary world—or state—or who only make themselves known there under very exceptional circumstances. It was in fact precisely because of this—because these beings are so "minimally" positive—the philosophers of the Enlightenment dealt very summarily with them. Because of the insistence by the Enlightenment on what can be seen, touched and perceived by the senses, the subject of "other-worldly" beings has become one which arouses at best a sympathetic smile. On the other hand, whenever the question of the other world is taken seriously, for example, by those whose views are more traditional or by visionaries, the subject of non-human, other-worldly spirits almost always arises.

I have, for the sake of brevity, called them "angels and demons", but, according to the traditional doctrines, there are other names and groups—such as the *jinns* in Islam²—and they are generally placed in hierarchical order. The angels have a high position with a positively religiously value and their function is to mediate between men and a certain deity. The demons, on the other hand, are usually regarded as spirits of a lower order and they are annoying, obstructive, tempting or hostile to men.

1 See above, p. 1.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 112.

It is, however, important to note, in this context, that the term "demon" or *daemon*", which of course goes back to the Greek *daimon*, has come increasingly to be used in the pejorative sense. Originally, in classical antiquity, the "demon" or "daemon" was also a good spirit and sometimes even a god.¹ Socrates, for example, spoke with great respect about his *daimonion*.² We can trace the devaluation of the term back to early Christianity and, in particular, to the Fathers of the Church. This does not mean that the Church Fathers and other Christians of the period did not believe in these beings or even that they tried, in the manner of the thinkers of the Enlightenment, to claim that they did not exist. On the contrary, they sincerely believed, to some extent at least, in the existence and the power of the pagan gods and demons, but they also believed that Christianity had higher and more powerful forces at its disposal—in a word, they were convinced that these pagan beings fled before the sign of the cross.³

In this connection, the reader has only to consult a biblical concordance to see how important a part the angels (*angeloi*) and the spirits (*pneumata*) play in both the Old and the New Testaments. What we are, however, principally concerned with here is the possible occurrence of hylic pluralism in the context of angels and demons. We may say at once that hylic pluralism does in fact occur in this theme in a most striking form—very many writers (and literary movements) have dealt with the *bodies* of angels and demons. In this context, however, much vaguer forms of hylic pluralism are encountered than in those cases in which a body (an *ochēma*, a *chitōn* and so on) is explicitly mentioned. Secondly, we are also bound to ask, where is there normally less sign of a body of this kind than in the case of these beings? The body in such cases must undoubtedly be a body consisting of *fine matter*. What strikes one at once in this context is that the expression *leptos*, fine, is in fact used here.⁴

I have already discussed these ideas several times in this work in connection with the theme of angels and demons,⁵ but would like to draw attention to a few important aspects once more, at the same time summarising and even amplifying what I have already said.

In the first place, a clear distinction has to be made between cases in which angels are thought to assume a body similiar to the human

1 See J.A. Hild, *Étude sur les démons dans la littérature et la religion des Grecs*.

2 See B 176, I, p. 149; a great deal was written about Socrates' *daimonion* in later classical antiquity.

3 See Hild, *op. cit.*, p. 318 ff.

4 See, for example, B 159, p. 19; B 29, under "ange", I, col. 1249.

5 See the index.

body on special occasions, for the purpose of taking a message or carrying out some other task, and in the second place their permanent possession of a body of fine matter, which which they are thought to be inseparably united by nature.¹ The fact that the angels may, in themselves, be completely immaterial is not excluded in the case of the first—even Thomas Aquinas assumed that they made use of a body such as our own in order to carry out a special task² and several of the neo-Platonists, such as Plotinus, taught that the demons were able to *clothe* themselves with a body.³ To some extent, this has to be thought of in analogy with what is sometimes said to happen at séances—the materialisation of a tangible body or part of a body. Similarly, it should also be seen in accordance with the interpretation of Gen. 6. 2, that “God’s sons”, in other words, the angels, could be get children⁴ and with the persistent belief in the Middle Ages—one that was shared by many prominent theologians—that human beings could have sexual intercourse with certain lower spirits, the so-called *incubi* and *succubi*.⁵ The question as to whether the angels and demons in themselves either consist of fine matter or have, in their own particular sphere, a body of fine matter at their disposal or whether they are, on the other hand, immaterial is in fact extraneous to this.

What really interests us here, however, is permanent fine materiality. An number of examples of this can be found in classical antiquity, the Old and New Testament and elsewhere. It is obvious that, at periods during which both the human soul and everything belonging to a different world was regarded as consisting of fine matter and the beta standpoint was generally prevalent,⁶ non-human beings were also, as a rule, regarded as consisting of fine matter. This was the case, for example, in early Greek thought. It is, moreover, more apparent in certain of the texts that have come down to us. When Hesiod described the gods or demons as surrounded by a cloud, this can be seen as an early indication of a “general view” among the Greeks that they possessed an aerial body.⁷ According to Democritus, the gods made themselves known to men through the medium of small images or *eidōla*.⁸ Epicurus said quite explicitly that the gods possessed a body

1 For this distinction, see, for example, E. Gilson, *La philosophie de S. Bonaventure*, p. 193; G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Lexicon* (1961), p. 10.

2 *Summa Theol.* (B 166), I a, q. L, 1; see also B 29, I, col. 1231; see also Part I, p. 28.

3 See B 159, p. 18; *Enn.* II, 5, 6.

4 Lampe, *ibid.*

5 See B 179, VII, p. 13; B 159, p. 30; B 82, p. 493.

6 See above, Part II, p. 25.

7 B 159, p. 19; see above, pp. 7-8, 23.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 31.

consisting of subtle parts.¹ I have also already drawn attention earlier in this work to the probable view, in Indian thought, that the *devas* consisted of fine matter.²

There are many references in the classical antiquity of the West to this question. Kissling has shown that a *pneuma* of fine matter was also ascribed to the demons.³ Dodds followed him, commenting that the later classical authors were perhaps able to find a point of departure in Plato's *Laws*, 898 E.⁴ According to Verbeke, Porphyry believed that the demons had an *ochēma sōmatoeides* at their disposal.⁵ Hopfner has also quoted a number of passages,⁶ but the most systematic review of the bodies of the demons can be found in K. Svoboda's edition of the works of the Byzantine author, Michael Psellus (1018-1096).⁷

He also dealt with the ideas of Christian authors concerning the angels.⁸ What, then, is the situation with regard to the angels and with regard to Israel, the Old Testament and the New Testament? Here too, we can say that, insofar as the beta standpoint can be assumed, the angels and spirits have to be regarded as consisting of fine matter, even though this is not explicitly stated. As we have seen, the Old Testament tends very strongly in this direction.⁹ There is also one definite text in the Old Testament on which numerous authors, right up to modern times, have based their opinion that the angels possessed bodies of fine matter. This is Psalm 104. 4: "He makes his angels spirits (translated in the Septuagint as *pneumata*) and his ministers flame and fire".¹⁰ The angels were in fact very often represented in this way, for example, on icons, as flames of fire.¹¹ In any case, it certainly makes an impression of hylic pluralism, even if the angels are thought of as having an aerial body or as radiating light.¹²

What can we say in this context about the New Testament? In a previous section (§ 214), in which I discussed this question, I did not come to any definitive conclusion with regard to the standpoint of the

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 43.

2 See above, Vol. I, p. 222-223.

3 B 85, p. 325.

4 B 33, p. 315; Plato's Symposium 202-293 may also have applied in this case; see K.H.E. de Jong, B 218, I, p. 22.

5 B 174, p. 378.

6 B 70, p. 236 etc.

7 B 159; see also above, Vol. II, p. 103-104.

8 For the angels' bodies of fire or light, see also J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique* (1964), p. 314.

9 See above, Section 62.

10 See above, Vol. II, p. 62-63; B 29, I, col. 1197; see also Heb. 1.7.

11 Cf. the horses drawing Elijah's chariot, plate 3.

12 See below, Section 164.

New Testament authors, whether they inclined towards hylic pluralism or not. I did, however, draw attention to the fact that a personal and concrete *pneuma* certainly occurs again and again in the New Testament and that this is certainly in accordance with the general acceptance of a *pneuma* of fine matter at the period. If the unclean spirits are explicitly called *pneumata* in the text—in Matt. 8. 16, for example, but also in Heb. 1. 14—and the angels as ministering spirits, *leitourgika pneumata*, and if there is frequent reference to shining white garments¹ and a radiant light in connection with them, then we may be certain that there is a tendency towards hylic pluralism in the New Testament in the question of angels.

A further interesting point is that, whether the beta standpoint—that is, the view that everything is material or of fine matter—was dominant or not in the Old Testament, the idea of an immaterial deity gradually developed throughout the history of Israel. This means that it is possible that the point of view in the New Testament—and in later writings—was that God was immaterial and the whole of creation was material or of fine matter. In other words, the New Testament may have to be classified under the gamma standpoint. We may go further and say that the delta standpoint, according to which the soul is immaterial, but has an aspect which is of fine matter, equally cannot be excluded.

However this may in the case of the New Testament, it cannot be denied that these possibilities are present in the case of later Christian writers. As we have seen, many of them—Tertullian, for example, probably under the influence of Stoic philosophy—clearly adopted the beta standpoint.² In this case, there is no possible doubt that the angels were regarded as consisting of fine matter in themselves and essentially, in other words, quite apart from any occasional appearance. (Thomas Hobbes held a similar opinion.³) It is also beyond doubt in the case of other Christian authors such as Clement of Alexandria,⁴ Bernard of Clairvaux⁵ and so on, whose point of view was the gamma standpoint, that the whole of creation was seen as consisting of (fine) matter, *nisi Deus ipse* with the exception of God himself.⁶

In the case of the delta standpoint, according to which the soul is immaterial, but can have an aspect of fine materiality, the question is

1 See, for example, John 20. 12.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 80.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 119-120.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 80-81.

5 See Vol. I, p. 40.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 7.

much more complicated. The angels may be thought of as sharing in this or they may not. Bodies of fine matter can be ascribed to them, but only with hesitation to human souls. On the other hand, they may be regarded as so sublime that they have no association of any kind with matter, whereas the demons have.

I think it is important to bear three principles in mind here. What, in the first place, did the ancient authors mean by *ahulos*, immaterial? Did they mean immaterial in the absolute sense, or simply in the relative sense? There is good reason to suppose that they meant the latter in many cases.¹ The same applies also to *asōmatos*, without a body. This question is very important in connection with the permanent state of the angels. In both the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*² and the works of F. Rüşchés³ and J. W. H. Lampe's *Patristic Lexicon*,⁴ we read that the ancient writers used the term incorporeal in comparison with man's ordinary body, but not in itself—in comparison with God, they are corporeal. This must therefore be fine materiality. What is more, Proclus also used the term *ahulos* for his *ochēmata* or *chitōnes*, which were explicitly of fine matter, so that the intention must have been relative.⁵

The second of these three principles is this. Materiality may be ascribed to the angels, but only partially. In other words, we may assume that, although they do not possess a body, they are always tied to some place or another.⁶ The well-known controversy concerning the number of angels who can be on the point of a needle is, of course, related to this problem. One is inclined to remark here that spatiality is very close indeed to materiality and can be included under the heading of hylic pluralism. Another aspect of this same problem is that, although the angels do not possess, in any complete sense, a finer body, they do have a certain material foundation, a *materia spiritualis*.⁷

It is not possible for me to analyse the many different views of the most important medieval writers concerning the status of the angels in detail here, but one thing is perfectly clear—the sharp contrast between Augustinianism, which had predominated in the sphere of theology for several centuries, and Thomism, which was gradually coming

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 8-9.

2 B 29, I, col. 1199; see also Vol. I, p. 17, 18.

3 B 137, p. 41.

4 I, p. 10.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 53.

6 See, for example, A. Kuyper, *De Engelen Gods*, p. 48 and other earlier authors; see also Vol. I, p. 47.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 51, 87; see also B 131; B 133.

to occupy the leading position, was also extremely important insofar as the question of angels is concerned. According to the Augustinian tradition, represented, for example by Bonaventure, the angels, like the souls of men after death, inevitably consisted of form and matter,¹ but it was of purely secondary importance whether this nucleus of matter, this foundation, situated in the *materia spiritualis*, assumed the form of a body of fine matter or not. According to Thomas, on the other hand—and his conclusion had been anticipated to some extent by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215²—it was possible for the angels to consist of this second kind of matter and for them to have a permanent body. They were, in his opinion, incorporeal and immaterial. So too were human souls.³

I have already mentioned that this view had very important consequences for anthropological dualism (the epsilon standpoint) which was later taught by Descartes. According to the latter, the relationship between the human soul, mind or consciousness and the human body was that of "an angel driving a machine".⁴ But this is precisely what an angel according to Thomas Aquinas—incorporeal and immaterial. By doing away with the *materia spiritualis* of the angels and of human souls, however, Thomas widened the gap between living men and the angels and that between the human soul and man's ordinary body.

There is also another interesting aspect of Thomas' doctrine concerning the angels—they were, in his opinion, not individuals, but species.⁵ As I have already said,⁶ this is why Thomas' angels are very closely linked to Plato's ideas, which are, after all, essentially concepts of species. This is also connected with the fact that the angels are often thought of as eternal and unchanging. I cannot unfortunately discuss in detail the nature of these interrelated concepts or their development via Plotinus, Proclus and the Pseudo-Dionysius, but can say that what I have called Plato's mistake⁷—the confusion or treating alike of the eidetic relationships according to content and hylic factors

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 91.

2 This Council decided that the angels were spirits, a decision which was repeated by the First Vatican Council of 1870. Although it is generally accepted by Roman Catholic theologians that they are *pure* spirits, not constituting one nature with subtle matter, this is not a dogma which all Roman Catholics are bound to accept.

3 See, for example, B 212, p. 536.

4 See Vol. I, p. 50; see also above, Vol. II, p. 123.

5 See B171, p. 440.

6 See above, p. 5.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 36, 53, 94, and above, p 5.

existing in space (which may be a different space) and time—has been committed here. These hylic factors have both relativity and dynamism, whereas the eidetic relationships are in themselves perfect, eternal and unchanging.¹ In this way, a false dividing line has been drawn in respect of the angels (and of human souls)—their immateriality makes them, according to Thomas, unknowable and intangible, absolute. On the other hand, if they are seen as relative, as not perfect, but as existing at an only relatively higher level, as functioning in time and of subtle materiality and if there is a continuity between them and us, then there is a possibility that we can know them and be in contact with them.

Having made these general comments, I should like now to give a very short survey of several other opinions about the angels. In the first place, the idea that the angels had subtle bodies has long predominated in Eastern Christianity² which was not bound to accept the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, but only those of the Council of Nicaea of 787, which allowed far more latitude with regard to the angels. It is also remarkable that Cardinal Cajetan, who was well-known as a defender of Thomism, believed that the demons (perhaps explicitly in contrast to the angels?) had aerial bodies.³ Ralph Cudworth was an author with an indisputable interest in hylic pluralism and it is therefore not surprising that he gave considerable attention to the question as to whether the angels had subtle bodies.⁴ The whole business must have rankled a little in the minds of philosophers during the first centuries of the modern era, because even a thinker such as Geulincx, whose teachings would lead one to expect differently, wrote about the etheric bodies of the angels.⁵ Furthermore, as we have already seen, both Grotius⁶ and Leibniz⁷—in his polemics against Locke—praised the Fathers of the Church for teaching that the angels had subtle bodies.

Many thinkers clearly believed that, if the existence of the angels was to be meaningful, they were bound to have bodies—an idea reminiscent of the Stoic doctrine that everything that is active is material. This question played an important part in Protestant theology until about the middle of the eighteenth century. Mosheim, who translated

1 The one truth regarding historical progress can be included within this category; see B 114, § 15.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 104; see also B 29, I, col. 1249, 1264.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 100.

4 B 21; see also above, Vol. II, p. 119; Vol. I, p. 62.

5 See above, p. 212.

6 See above, p. 212; see also Vol. I, p. 40.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 143-144.

Cudworth into Latin and commented on his work,¹ drew attention to this in several of his detailed notes. Among others, he named J.C. Loërsius (1675-1743) and his treatise *De angelorum corporibus* (Utrecht, 1723 and 1731). Although there were writers who were opposed to the idea, such as J. Odé and the Roman Catholic theologian D. Petavius, one has only to look at the collection of lesser theological dissertations GK 152, III in the library of Bonn University to see that many theologians were more or less in favour of the idea. A number of titles are also given in G.J. Graesse's bibliography (B 59), and, among these, I have not been able to trace one treatise, that by A. Driessen (1684-1748 a professor at Groningen): *Angelorum corpora a suspicione 1. haereseos 1. scandali exculpata* (Groningen, 1740).

The late romantic philosopher and psychologist G.T. Fechner also displayed a great interest in the question of angels.² It is remarkable in this context that Fechner did not think of the angels as perfect beings, but as still seeking and striving. In other words, he believed that the existence both of angels and of human beings in this respect formed a continuity.³

In addition to his *Science of the Sacraments* (1920), C.W. Leadbeater wrote another work which is one of the fundamental texts of the Liberal Catholic Church—the *Hidden Side of Christian Festivals* (1920). In this book, he said: "These angels have bodies, and those bodies are built of matter as ours are, only they happen to be built of higher matter, answering only to higher vibrations".⁴

95 MATTER AND PNEUMA

We must now turn to a very general aspect of hylic pluralism. Throughout this study, we have been constantly concerned with such questions as matter, materiality, fine materiality and so on. Even though we are considering the phenomenological side of the subject in this part of the work, we are bound to give special attention to this concept here.

What is meant by "matter" or *hyle* is, in the first instance, clear enough. Whatever we take as our point of departure—*hulē* or wood, (raw) matter or material, *materia* (which is, remarkably enough connected with matter, "mother"), "stuff", *étouffe*, or "dust"—*het stof* in

¹ See above, p. 30, note 4.

² See above, Part II, p. 171-172.

³ What is more, according to Bonaventure, angels were changeable and could be illuminated and could themselves illuminate; see B 133, p. 114.

⁴ See *The Hidden Side of Christian Festivals*, p. 256.

pneuma that is encountered in, for example, the pneumatic hammer or tyre. We then come to the *pneuma* consisting of fine matter (although, of course, other classifications are always possible and one category may well merge into another). These are the physiological, the psychological and the sublime *pneuma*. The physiological *pneuma* is always very closely connected with the ordinary body, but it is not physiological in the ordinary sense of the word insofar as it concerns the idea of a *pneuma* that is subtler than, for example, subtler than the air in the lungs. The psychological *pneuma* refers to a fine materiality which is emancipated from the ordinary body. Finally, there is what I call the sublime *pneuma*, which is characterised by qualities which give the impression of being exalted or sublime.¹

I propose to provide summaries, in the chapters that follow, of hylic pluralistic ideas that are connected with these three species of *pneuma*. If various aspects of this have already been discussed in the preceding sections, the summary may well be quite short, but it should at the same time have the effect, as a summary, of throwing fresh light on the problem and it also provides the opportunity for me to supplement what I have already said.

As far as the concept of matter in the ordinary sense is concerned, the following comment—my second point—has to be made. A remarkable development has taken place in the natural sciences—no one believes any longer that “atoms” are *a-toma*, indivisible particles. What is more, all kinds of previously unchallenged concepts in physics have been questioned and are seen to be much more closely related to each other. C. A. van Peursen has given an outline of the more recent concept of physical matter in a chapter on matter in his book *Filosofische Oriëntatie*.² His most striking remark is: “The modern concept of matter is a subtilisation of the earlier idea of matter”.³ This can also be applied to matter itself. We have an increasingly less firm foothold on matter, with the result that the volatilisation of matter according to modern views is also under discussion. To some extent, this was already the case when the conviction that it was possible to reach the essence of matter in what was directly perceptible gave way to the belief in invisible particles. A further step was reached when these particles of matter were thought of as even more finely subdivided and it was even less possible to believe in external solidity.

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 9-10; see also Part I, Sections 6-9.

2 1958; B 236, p. 148 ff.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 150; see also B 98, III, p. 158 f: “In this “dynamistic” view of the world, only “effects” ultimately remain”.

The last stage in this development is reached when it becomes even less clear what is meant by matter itself¹—whereas those effects which can be used by man are no less real and are, in fact, made even more formidable.

This development is, of course, of considerable importance in connection with our subject. The earlier matter, which was solid and consisted of little particles, can, with some justice, be contrasted with the extremely heterogeneous category of thought (or the mind or consciousness), as is done in anthropological dualism (the epsilon standpoint). There is, however, far less reason for doing this in the case of what van Peursen has called the "subtilisation" of the concept of matter. In this context, it should not be forgotten that certain activities which are made possible by modern science—for example, the remote control of aircraft and rockets—very strongly resemble the well known situation which has so far defied explanation. This is the movement of the human body and parts of the body caused by decisions made by the will in the human spirit. Even this resemblance, however, raises a number of problems.² There may, for example, be a certain amount of truth in what many of those who support a theory of interaction between the psyche and the physis claim—that, on innervation, a very slight quantity of energy is used and transferred.³ This implies that all kinds of concepts have to be re-examined. The concept of psychical energy, for example,⁴ may, in this light, be seen to be connected very closely with hylic pluralism. I cannot, however, go into all these questions in any detail in this chapter.

I must now say something about matter in a very broad sense (this is my third point)—about matter as the possibility that has still to be filled or actualised. This very broad concept of matter is found in Plato and Aristotle (although each stresses different shades of meaning and in Indian thought as *ākāśa* and *mūlaprakṛti*. It is important to mention this, because matter in this sense clearly goes beyond hylic pluralism. What, for instance, is meant by the matter of a conversation, both after it has a more concrete content and, even more, before? we have to consider once again in this context the fundamental distinction between eidetic and hylic relationships.⁵ The purely abstract content of a conversation or an intention or, to be more precise, of an idea or

1 See B 236, p. 151—matter used in an extremely broad sense.

2 See Part I, p. 19-20.

3 See B 114, § 49; see also below, Section 130.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 207 ff; see also B 114, p. 340.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 36, 39-40; see also Part I, p. 19; B 114, §§ 58-60.

a syllogism is connected with other ideas in a way which is quite different from the connection between one idea which has been thought of in time and a second, similar idea. The first is perfect in itself and always true (or not true), even if it has perhaps never been thought of in the concrete. The second is always imperfect and defective, no more than an approximation, closely bound to the passage of time and perhaps perceptible by a clairvoyant as a process in a body or *ochēma* of fine matter. However this may be, a distinction must, in my opinion, be made between, firstly, the very broad concept of matter as a pure possibility, secondly, matter as the abstract content of an idea or ideas or of a conversation, in other words, eidetic intentions, and, thirdly, matter as the concrete matter if all kinds of processes taking place in time, with which more subtle species of matter or varieties of *pneuma* may be possibly be connected, in other words, the hylic.

What, then, is there in opposition to these three categories of matter, the spirit and the immaterial? As far as the third heading is concerned, that of the hylic, there is considerable controversy. According to the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism, the mind, the consciousness of the human *psyche* can only be in contact with matter, space and the body indirectly, by a scarcely tolerated¹ innervation or influx. According to the delta standpoint on the other hand, the human consciousness and *psyche* are themselves immaterial, but have an aspect which consists of fine matter—they may, for example, have a body or *ochēma* of fine matter at their disposal after death or there may be a nucleus of fine materiality, a *materia spiritualis*, present in them. According to the gamma standpoint, everything that exists in the concrete in time consists either of ordinary matter or of fine matter, with the exception of God himself, with the result that eidetic relationships or relationships according to meaning or intention (for example, the relationship between one geometrical figure and another) are always present within the hylic. The immaterial thus always has a function within plurality, that is, in the form of the eidetic. Indeed, all concrete existence consists of these two factors—on the one hand, the content, the idea or the form and, on the other, matter, the more or less defective realisation in matter (either coarse or fine matter). There is, in other words, a constant correlativity between the eidetic and the hylic.² At the same time, however, the eidetic also participates in matter in itself and quite apart from any hylic realisation, that is, as the matter

1 See above, Vol. II, pp. 122-125.

2 See B 114, § 60—just as a sculptor tries to express an idea in matter; even for that purpose, this matter was a definite matter.

of a conversation or the content of a concept. This is because the eidetic consists of a multiplicity of aspects.

According to the gamma standpoint, all that is truly immaterial is what transcends that multiplicity either of hylic unities functioning in time and spatially perceptible at least in principle or of those of the multiplicity of aspects of the eidetic. This is the one Spirit, the *Deus nisi ipse*, "apart from God himself", the deity as the truly transcendent one. According to the Vedantists, this is at one and the same time the One self behind all the lesser selves—the *Ātman* behind the many *jīvas*. In my terminology, it is the one Suprasubject in which all the infrasubjects participate.¹ It is at this level—the level of the Buddhists, *nirvāṇa*—that the purely immaterial is to be found. In the multiplicity of aspects, on the other hand, everything insists on being expressed and made concrete, on asserting itself and on becoming visible and tangible.

This becoming visible is part of a very long process. As far as inner perception is concerned, this process can be found in the objectivisation described by W. Haas in his *Die psychische Dingwelt*.² In practice, we, who are basically the one Suprasubject, identify ourselves with our concrete person, our ideas, our bodies and the place where we are—in other words, with our infrasubject. This is inherent in our existence in multiplicity. To this extent, the antithesis between our own inner world, the psychical aspect in us that is lasting (although subject to change) and relative,³ and what is made objective by us, what is recognised by us to be things that are independent of us, is constantly present in our lives. The frontier between these two zones is, however, in principle open to change and, for the clairvoyant or the visionary, it is already changed. This greater objectivisation makes it possible for other, more subtle forms of matter to be perceived. On the other hand, insofar as there are beings—such as, for example, human souls after death—which make use of an *ochēma* or vehicle of different, perhaps finer matter, then certain impediments or obstructions in ordinary matter—that it is, for example, impenetrable—are removed.

If matter in this somewhat narrower sense of the "hylic" can therefore be separated into ordinary matter and subtler forms of matter which can be called *pneuma*, we are bound to ask whether these two categories possess characteristics in common. In my opinion, this is certainly

1 In the "fundamentally paradoxical" relationship of "we are both" (see B 114, Vol. II, pp. 8-9).

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 207-208.

3 B 114, § 71; for this objectivisation, see also below, Section 109.

possible. They exist in their being active and effective, in making themselves known externally. The matter of the natural sciences can also be included quite explicitly within this definition. The more "subtilised" or increasingly volatilised the matter of physics may be or become, the more these material phenomena can be manipulated and the more dangerous they become for this reason. However incomprehensible the matter of physics has become for very many people who are not physicists, it cannot easily be dismissed as chimeras, especially when a combination of circumstances can lead to the possible destruction of the whole or almost the whole of life on this planet, precisely by physical matter.

On the other hand, however, as I have shown again and again in this work, activity and effectiveness have always been regarded as typical of this subtler species of matter and, what is more, fine materiality has even been postulated in order to attribute effectiveness to it. As the Stoics maintained, *quidquid facit, corpus est*¹—everything that acts, is effective or works is a body. It is also very likely that a similar conviction prevailed in the persistent tendency to ascribe bodies to the angels, even where this would hardly be expected.² It is remarkable that, for example, G.T. Fechner and several of his followers called the "psychical body" an "action body",³ which, of course, it was so long as it worked.

The two Dutch words for "reality"—*werkelijkheid* and *realiteit*—have become almost interchangeable, but the first, which is derived from *werken*, to work, to be active or effective, to have an effect, is more applicable in this particular instance than the second, which goes back to the idea of *res*, being a "thing". After all, both the *res* or the thing and the body can first be perceived in their effect. If, then, the various themes of fine materiality and of subtle bodies or *ochemata*, which many people find so strange, are seen in this light, they do, I think, become more meaningful.⁴ What is more, they can in this way be included under the single heading of ordinary matter and ordinary bodies, with the result that, instead of a dualism, there is a continuity.

It has, I think, been valuable to discuss several of the more theoretical aspects of matter and *pneuma* in this chapter. Now, however, we must return to our phenomenological survey of hylic pluralistic views.

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 7.

2 See above, p. 31.

3 See above, Vol. II, pp. 171, 204; see also B 36, under "Tatenleib".

4 See below, Section 100 and 109.

When I was engaged in the task of collecting material concerned with hylic pluralism and putting it in order, I inevitably came across a division of opinions about a *pneuma* consisting of fine matter. According to the ethnologists, two headings can be distinguished in the views of primitive peoples—on the one hand, the body-soul or the breath-soul and, on the other, the external soul or the free soul, which can be released from the ordinary body, can wander or fly around like a butterfly and can return to the body and which continues to lead an independent existence after death.¹ (This datum is borne out by those specialising in the field of comparative religion). It is also true to say that both of these souls are regarded by the primitive peoples as consisting of fine matter. Terms like *ātman*, *rūah*, *spiritus* and *pneuma* (from *pne*, to blow),² many of which were later to acquire a more immaterial significance, were initially at least thought of as something material, perhaps as fine matter, whether they were used in the context of the one narrower concept of the soul, the body-soul, or in the context of the other, wandering soul. There is no question at this stage of a sharp distinction having been made between the physical aspect on the one hand and the immaterial psychical aspect on the other.³ We can therefore take as our point of departure the antithesis between the body-soul and the external soul as a contrast which is to be found within the sphere of hylic pluralistic ideas.

The first classification of the *pneuma* which is in accordance with the idea of a body-soul consisting of fine matter is what I have called the physiological *pneuma*, although this term is rather too narrow, because what is generally meant by physiology or the study of the functions of the living body is, in fact, biology, in which physics and chemistry are used to throw light on those functions. Any views about the physiological *pneuma*, on the other hand, are bound to contain more than this—although they are concerned with the functions of living beings—(unlike the psychological *pneuma*, which is concerned with the free *psyche* in life and after death), they cannot be studied with the help of ordinary scientific methods, at least at present.

It would seem that such doctrines about subtler functions very closely connected with the ordinary body have occurred very often and in many different forms in the history of thought, partly in anticipation of later,

1 See above, Part I, p. 72, 73, 84, 99-100, 160-161, Vol. II, p. 9-10; see also G. Van der Leeuw, B 90, § 42.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 23; see also Part I, p. 21, 22, 71, 72.

3 See above, Part I, p. 83, 166.

more precise research (the doctrine of the *spiritus animales et vitales*, for example, anticipates modern physiology of the senses) and partly independent of this. In any case, the theme has occurred with such persistence that one is inclined to say that it deserves to have been treated with more respect. Since my task here is to investigate all the different hylic pluralistic ideas that occur anywhere, however strange they may at first seem to be, I cannot avoid considering these views about the physiological *pneuma*, although I am bound to point out at the outset that they are so widespread and so diverse even in our own time (not only in the past) that a cursory review, which is all that I can provide here, cannot do justice to the theme.

The nineteenth century author, H. Siebeck, wrote a chapter on the doctrine of the life-spirit or *pneuma* ("Die Lehre vom Lebensgeist [Pneuma]") in his book *Geschichte der Psychologie*, which was recently reprinted after almost a century. In this chapter, he said that this *pneuma* was regarded, in the entire scientific world of classical antiquity and until long afterwards, as an "undoubted fact". It was seen as a kind of link between spiritual and material nature, as volatile, but certainly as a finer, sublimated matter.¹ In fact, Siebeck almost defines hylic pluralism as such,² but what he means by this *pneuma* or this *spiritus* is precisely the physiological *pneuma* in the sense in which I use the term, that is, a *pneuma* which is directly connected with the functions of the ordinary body. It will be recalled that Galen (ca.129-199) formulated the doctrine of the *spiritus* so clearly and so adequately that his views were generally accepted for more than a thousand years.³ At the same time, however, it should not be forgotten that he was teaching in the tradition of earlier physicians, for example, of the Sicilian school of medicine⁴ and of others. In other words, from the very beginning, what I now call physiology (in the physiological *pneuma*) has always been very much the same—the doctrine of the *spiritus* which was current for so long signified the ancient physiology, the doctrine of the functions of the body, including, for example, the action of the nerves, the circulation of the blood and the operation of other matters in the bodily organs.

1 B 155, p. 131.

2 Mattiesen has also written about a "metaphysiology" and it might be possible to call the physiological *pneuma* by this name. Mattiesen, however, takes a very broad view and writes, for example, about the "metaphysiology of immortality"; see B 97, p. 795.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 134-135 and in the index of this work under "spiritus".

4 See B 174, p. 175 ff; see also above, Vol. II, p. 135-136.

Galen and his successors distinguished between the three species of *spiritus*—the *spiritus naturales*, the *spiritus vitales* and the *spiritus animales*.¹ The history of these life spirits in the modern age has been rather like that of the “ten little nigger boys”, dying one after the other,² despite their long life together for centuries. The last remaining evidence of this long history—the occasional references to them in the miscellaneous columns of Dutch newspapers at least to the “life spirits” having departed in a notice of death—is fast disappearing. In passing, I am bound to mention the striking analogies to the western doctrine of the “animal spirits” in the East—the “vital airs” or *prānas* and the Chinese *ch'i-ching*.³

We are, however, bound to ask whether the third species of life spirit, the *spiritus animales* or “animal spirits”, in Greek *to pneuma psuchikon*, does not in fact come to the same as our psychological *pneuma*. These spirits were also regarded as being physiological and connected with the ordinary body, certainly as the finest of the three species of *spiritus*, but distilled in the brains from the other two⁴ and causing the nerves to move. It is not the independent soul, the “external soul”. It is, however, possible that there are transitions.

Such possibilities are, for example, a transition in what is presumed to be the thing or subject itself, contaminations of intention, in other words, insufficient differentiation, and finally a confusion on the use of terminology.

In the first case, if there is a *spiritus animalis* which is called the organ of the soul⁵ there is a connection between this and the external soul (what I have called the psychological *pneuma*) so long as this makes use of the ordinary body and only leaves it temporarily.

In the second case, it is true to say that, although a clear distinction was sometimes made, the classical authors did continuously fail to differentiate here, nor did primitive man.⁶ Lavater has written, for example, about “impressions made by the animal and life spirits on the etheric machine of Bonnet”.⁷ The first are simply the *spiritus vitales*, which were in the main generally accepted as real in the century

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 134-135; see also Part I, p. 23.

2 See B 149, p. ff. 99.

3 See above, Part I, p. 198, 217, 277-278.

4 See B 149, p. 42.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 135. This is clearly connected with Aristotle's idea of a *pneuma* as the first instrument of the soul (see above, Vol. II, p. 42) and this idea in turn had an effect on Galen's teaching (see above, Vol. II, p. 41-42).

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 12, 20; see also below, Section 109.

7 *Aussichten in die Ewigkeit* (1773), I, p. 45; see also Part I, p. 26 and Vol. II, pp. 137-138.

during which Bonnet was writing.¹ The second, however, is undoubtedly the "external soul", the "true seat of the soul", a kind of intermediate corporeality, something between death and resurrection and even pre-existent.²

The third possibility is a confusion of terminology. This is undoubtedly true in the case of the etheric body, the animal spirits and so on. On the one hand, it is certain that the etheric body, the *sōma aitherōdes* was a term used by the neo-Platonists in classical antiquity for what was also known as the astral body, the *sōma* or *aitherōdes*, the vehicle of fine matter of the soul,³ in other words, as the meta-organism which I have called the psychological *pneuma*. A similar situation exists with regard to Bonnet's "etheric machine" and the "etheric body" of the romantics.

In modern occultism, however,⁴ quite a different use of the term "etheric body" or "etheric double" is encountered—the term is used by the occultists in antithesis to that of the astral body. A. E. Powell, for example, dealt separately with each in his *The Etheric Double and Allied Phenomena* (1925, B 118) and *The Astral Body and Other Astral Phenomena* (1926, B 116).⁵ What is particularly striking in this context is that what is known in modern occultism as the etheric double is, like what I have called the physiological *pneuma*, something that is connected extremely closely with the ordinary body, although it to some extent transcends it. The name "double" points clearly to a presumed doubling or duplication of the ordinary body.⁶ This is in turn connected with all kinds of ideas about the "halo", "aura", radiant light or circle of light which certain people have claimed to have perceived surrounding ordinary human bodies.⁷

Another aspect of this problem is that a phenomenological examination of the reports of hylic pluralistic ideas reveals a distinction with regard to life after death. This continued existence has been realised very generously, as it were, in the case of the psychological *pneuma*, the free soul. In the case of the physiological *pneuma*, on the other hand, if there is any question of survival after death, this is only for a

1 So much so, in fact, that belief in them, by, for example, thinkers such as Lamettrie or Descartes, cannot be claimed as evidence of a significant embracing of hylic pluralistic ideas on their part; see Part I, p. 24.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 137; see also B 109, p. 713.

3 See Part I, p. 17, 18, 26.

4 See above, Section 83.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 182-183.

6 See Part I, p. 24.

7 See B 118, p. 93 ff. Here too, a distinction should be made between different levels—the halo or aura (see above, Vol. II, p. 11, 235-236) should be at a higher level than the "external aura" of the etheric double.

short time, after which the human person disintegrates.¹ We have the examples of the churchyard ghost² and the shade (Homer made a distinction between the shade of Hercules in Hades and Hercules with the gods³), although the shade or shadow, the *eidolon*, does occasionally have characteristics of the psychological *pneuma*. Modern occultists have also ascribed a very short period of survival after death to this etheric body—this in contrast to the longer continued existence of the astral body.⁴ In addition, it is important to remember that this etheric body or double was also regarded as having the function of vitalising and controlling the ordinary body.

This brings us back again to the *spiritus* and their primitive physiology. During a period when very little was known about ordinary magnetism and ordinary electricity, A. Mesmer (1733-1815) inaugurated a movement which claimed to be able to bring about cures, in other words, to have an effect on the ordinary physical body, by means of what was thought to be a fine force radiating from the hands of the mesmerist.⁵ The assumptions on which this practise is based—a practise which has by no means died out even today and which quite a number of people believe to be effective—are clearly also at the level of the physiological *pneuma*.

Mesmerism is also known as “animal magnetism”.⁶ This is in itself remarkable. It was to some extent obvious to use the term “magnetism” in the eighteenth century, before the effect of the magnet was fully understood, for the presumed radiation from the “magnetiser”. Electricity has, after all, always exercised a strong fascination. As we have already seen, Balzac called anger “an electric current”.⁷ This is, in itself, reminiscent of hylic pluralism. Even more important, however, is the fact that the nineteenth century physiologists, such as J. Müller, Du Bois Reymond and Helmholtz, who made such a real contribution to their science, tried to establish a connection between the nerves in the human body and electricity,⁸ though without much success at the time. Nowadays, however, the part played by electrical processes in the nervous and muscular processes is fully accepted and has been studied in considerable detail. In this context, there is

1 See Part I, p. 24, in connection with, for example, Epicurus.

2 Plato, *Phaedo* 81 B-C: “... tumulum circumvolat ombra”; see B 237, p. 245; see also above Part I, p. 100.

3 *Odyssey*, XI, 59-60; Plotinus also quotes this passage (*Enn.* I, 1, 12).

4 See B 118, p. 70.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 160-161.

6 A detailed, historical survey will be found in *Der animalistische Magnetismus*, written by Schneider, who supports mesmerism (1950; B 152).

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 229.

8 See B 149, p. 53; see also B 52 (1959), II, 1, p. 6.

reference to action potentials¹ and to "chronaxon",² a measure of time for electric currents in the nervous system, by which disturbances the nerves can be ascertained. The whole nervous system has sometimes been called simply an electro-chemical apparatus and it has been said³ that the action of the soul is probably, in the last resort, converted by electrolysis into chemical processes and that an electromagnetic force underlies the motory power of the *psyche*.

It does rather look, therefore, as though the doctrine of the *spiritus*, however naively and even mistakenly it has been elaborated, is in some sense correct. Electricity is a relatively subtle and in itself invisible force—we take it for granted, but it is all the same very strange. It would seem as though the early physiologists were in search of something of this kind in order to explain the functioning of the nervous system and that they had an idea that something of the kind was bound to exist.

We have, then, on the one hand the claims made by a few visionaries among modern occultists that there is such a thing as an "etheric double", through which the forces of the soul at a rather higher level than the electrical stimulus of the nerves is conducted downwards and, on the other hand, the development according to which electricity is believed to play a very important part in the human body. Theosophists have not hesitated to link the two together. An example of this will be found in the symposium, *Where Theosophy and Science Meet* (B 79; 1938-1939, 2nd edn., 1949-1951), to which, among other, two authors have made contributions which are relevant to our subject. The first is Prof. J. Emile Marcault of the universities of Grenoble and Pisa. The other is the well-known French physiologist, Dr. Thérèse Brosse, who carried out investigations with yogis in India on behalf of the French government and was, at the time of writing the article in question, was a member of the S.P.R. In these articles, "Western Scientific Research and the Etheric Double"⁴ and "Physiology"⁵ respectively, we read that there is, within the ordinary body, an "electro-structure"⁶ or "electric body"⁷ and that this structure is very closely related to the "etheric double". Admittedly in rather a round-about way, the ancient idea of a *pneuma*, a fine materiality, in close connection with the ordinary body, is to some extent confirmed in this.

1 See B 179, VIII, p. 46.

2 See B 179, VI, p. 67.

3 See, for example, J. L. C. Wortman, *Psychosomatische Geneeskunde*, p. 57.

4 B 79, III, p. 31 ff; II, p. 27.

5 *ibid.*, III, p. 1 ff; II, p. 1 ff.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 34.

7 *op. cit.*, p. 4.

We may go further and say that the connection between electricity and human life has been very much in men's minds since the Second World War. The article on "The Electro-Dynamic Theory of Life"¹ by H. S. Burr and F. S. C. Northrop, in which the authors speak about "bionics, biological effects of magnetic fields" (*ibid.*, p. 24), has recently been reprinted in *Main Currents in Modern Thought*, XIX, 1 (September, 1962).

Certain distinctions have, however, to be made. For a number of years now, various methods in which use has to be made of the electricity of the human body—two examples of this are the electro-encephalogram and the electro-cardiogram—have been employed as diagnostic aids. The electric currents measured are, of course, very weak, but they are clearly related to the currents which play a part in the nerves and muscles of the human body, in other words, in innervation and perception. The idea, however, is taken much farther when—assuming that telepathy, the transference of ideas between two people, is a fact—an attempt to explain this phenomenon of telepathy is made by means of electro-magnetic currents which are presumed to emanate from the brains. The Milanese psychiatrist F. Gazzamali and the Russian B. Kazhinsky have been particularly active in this sphere.² Even before this, however, H. Berger, who played such an important part in discovering electric waves in the brains ("EEG"), wondered whether these might perhaps also be responsible for the phenomenon of telepathy.³ Cazzamali's experiments, however, did not meet with a very favourable reception and L. L. Vasiliev, who thought that it was distinctly possible that telepathy might exist, was convinced that he had successfully refuted the theory.⁴ This, of course, brings us to the theory of radiation⁵ as an explanation for parapsychological phenomena, which is something that I shall have to discuss at a later stage. What can be said at this stage, however, is that an electrical structure for internal transmission is different from simply receiving impressions from outside and then decoding them.

I cannot, however, conclude without the following comment. Either in connection with animal magnetism or dissociated from it, there was

1 *The Quarterly Review of Biology*, 1935, p. 322 ff.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 197-198.

3 See his *Psyche* (1940) and W. G. Roll's article on him in B 219, June 1960, p. 142 ff.

4 See his *Experiments in Mental Suggestion* (Church Crookham, 1963), p. 14 ff; B 265, September 1962, p. 204.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 197-198.

in the past—and still is—a fairly widespread belief in “fluid”,¹ a conviction that fine radiations existed in close relationship with the ordinary body—and consequently intimately connected with our theme of the physiological *pneuma*—and an attempt to prove the reality of these radiations. A number of figures, works and theories can be cited in this context—C. von Reichenbach’s “Od” theory,² A. de Rochas, H. Durville, W. J. Kilner, who maintained that the etheric double, for example, of the human hand, could be perceived with the help of special screens,³ R. Montandon’s *Les radiations humaines* (1927, B 108), which is subtitled “an attempt to prove experimentally the existence of subtle human bodies”, the works of the Swiss author E. Bertholet, the German J. Wüst and finally a fairly recent book by the English writer Langston Day, *New worlds Beyond the Atom* (1957), in which there are, among other things, accounts of attempts to prove, with the help of various kinds of apparatus, the reality of finer effects and influences.

Clearly, then there is no lack of interest in the subject, although the results seem to be inversely proportionate to the attention devoted to the study. But why do most of these books and articles make such a dilettantish impression? Is it perhaps because the point of departure, that something of this kind *must* exist, is wrong? It is because the rejection *a priori* of all these investigations by “official” scientists has gone too far, with the result that no proper means are made available to test these hobby horses? Certainly it cannot be excluded *a priori* that they may be crowned with success. In the meantime, however, the impression that one has of the whole field of activity is that it is in no sense sufficiently serious, erudite or critical. What is beyond dispute is that it comes within the sphere of the physiological *pneuma*.⁴

There is, however, another kind of magnetism, which is different both from ordinary magnetism and from Mesmer’s “animal magnetism. This is the *magnetism of places*. It is a common experience, for example, in old cathedrals, that something more is present than what is simply aroused within us by our own mental associations, in other words that something is present in itself. The French author Jean de la Varende has expressed this experience thus: “It seems as though suffering and prayer *settle* on the walls of the hospital or chapel which have contained them”.⁵ A similar view was also held by Plutarch,

1 See, for example, B 47; B 218, p. 10 ff; B 256, p. 32 ff.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 162.

3 *The Human Atmosphere* (1911); see B 118, p. 93 ff.

4 The arguments for and against the effectiveness of the divining rod, dowsing or “radiesthesia” are also clearly related to this subject.

5 *Contes ferventes*, II (1958), p. 158.

who thought that a *pneuma* was active in certain holy places. Verbeke has reproduced his view: "The result is that, in those places in which oracles are uttered, every object is permeated with mantic *pneuma* and bathed in this divine breath, even the stone and bronze statues."¹ On the other hand, of course, there are also *loca infesta*, places laden with earlier disaster.² This magnetism of place has a counterpart in, or can be extended to include the idea of personal magnetism which can, for example, confer a blessing. The Tibetan Buddhists have stated explicitly that the present Dalai Lama has this personal magnetism.³ We may also include, in this context, the supposed influence exerted by talismans and relics.⁴ This personal magnetism is apparently a transition in the direction of the magnetising of the magnetisers. We may, however, doubt very much whether magnetism in the sense in which it is used today really forms part of the subject of the physiological *pneuma*.

The same question may also be asked in connection with the last point that I wish to discuss in this chapter. This is the question of the *chakras* and the *nādis*. In India, the concept of wheels or *chakras* was used to denote a number of centres of revolving power in man's subtler bodies. These were not identical with, for example, the centres of the human senses, but were very closely connected with the ordinary body and had a decisive effect on certain places in the body. In the theory of the *chakras*, the explanation for the fact, for example, that violent emotions upset the stomach was that the *chakram* which was connected with the feelings was one of the six or seven which was situated near the diaphragm. Similarly, the *chakram* of thought was thought to be near the top of the skull and so on. In Indian thought and especially in Tantrism, a name was given to each of these nerve-centres or *chakras*.⁵ What is more, in a treatise by a disciple of Boehme's G. Gichtel (1638-1710)—the *Theosophia practica* (1696)—there is a drawing, which I have reproduced here as Plate 7⁶, showing

1 B 174, p. 268.

2 See W.H.C. Tenhaeff, *De Voorschouw* (B 260), p. 271.

3 See the report by L. Eversdijk Smulders in the Dutch newspaper, *Elsevier's Weekblad*, 14. xi. 1959.

4 C. W. Leadbeater has dealt systematically with most of these points in his *The Hidden Side of Things* (1913); see also above, Part I, pp. 97.

5 See Arthur Avalon (Sir John Woodroffe), *The Serpent Power* (1919). This author maintained that, although the *chakras* had a bearing on the ordinary body, they were nonetheless thought of as subtle—"a sukshma or subtle vital force" (p. 34); see above, Part I, p. 228. M. Y. Evans-Wentz also thought that the *nādis* were "psychic nerves or channels" and the *chakras* "psychic nerve-centres"; see above, Part I, p. 267.

6 See C. W. Leadbeater, *Les centres de force dans l'homme* (1917), pp. 24, 27.

seven centres which bear a very close resemblance to the Indian *chakras*.

These *chakras* may also be connected with various forms of clairvoyance and one is involuntarily reminded in this context of the romantics' "seeing with the pit of the stomach"¹ and the views of H. Conrad-Martius which I have briefly discussed above.²

The Japanese scholar Dr. Hiroshi Motoyama thought that the *chakras* had something to do with the "psychosomatic choice of organs"³ and to a very great extent the doctrine of the *chakras* has been taken over by the modern occultists.⁴ Although they are thought of as having an influence on the ordinary body, it is nonetheless clear that they are regarded by modern occultists as existing at a very much higher level in themselves than, for example, the *spiritus*.⁵ They therefore form a very suitable transition from a discussion of the physiological *pneuma* to an outline of the psychological *pneuma*. Before I go on to talk about the latter, however, I have to deal with two other questions—the first being more particular and the second more general.

97 BIRTH PROBLEMS

The conception and development of the human embryo and foetus followed by the birth of the child—these are at first sight ordinary physiological processes and fine materiality would not appear to be involved in them. In antiquity and even later, however, other ideas prevailed—as Siebeck has said, the *pneuma* played a part in ancient embryology.⁶ Let us consider this briefly.

The ancient Egyptians believed that the father's *ba* force was transmitted to the son at the time of procreation.⁷ The Egyptian concepts of the soul, *ba* and *ka*, were moreover, as we have seen, very far from being immaterial.⁸

In Indian thought, the link with hylic pluralism in this case is obvious. All the factors of the soul were in general regarded as consisting of fine matter⁹ and the essence of the soul which continued to exist

1 See B 157, p. 117; see also G. Walther, B 268, p. 242 on the "prayer of the heart" (*Das Herzensgebet*).

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 208.

3 See *Chakra und das autonome Nervensystem. Institut für religiöse Psychologie*, Tokyo, Part I, 3 (1960).

4 See C. W. Leadbeater, *The Chakras* (1927).

5 See B 118, p. 22 ff; B 116, p. 31; B 119, p. 117.

6 B 155, p. 136.

7 See L. J. Cazemier, *Oud-Egyptische voorstellingen aangaande de ziel* (1930), p. 93.

8 See above, Part I, p. 109, 110.

9 See above, Part I, p. 182, 200.

throughout various rebirths was also thought to be of fine matter.¹ This material entity, the Indians taught became combined, on conception or little later, with the embryo. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that S. Dasgupta's standard work on Indian philosophy (B185) contains a chapter entitled "The Foetus and the Subtle Body".² A third factor, an *ātman* with its subtle body, constituted of air, fire, water and earth, and *manas*³ is added at the time of conception to the two factors provided by the child's father and mother. Dasgupta discusses this in some detail, devoting special attention to the ideas of the physician and philosopher Caraka (ca. 100 A.D.). the philosophers of the Vedānta and the Sāṅkya were also, generally speaking, in agreement with Caraka.⁴ The Buddhists also held very similar ideas, which have been analysed, for example, by E. Windisch in a chapter on the Buddhist teaching about conception ("Die buddhistische Lehre von der Empfängnis").⁵ In Buddhist thought too, the idea of a third factor consisting of fine matter is encountered.⁶

According to certain Chinese scholars, the length of a man's life depended on how much fluid (*ching*) he had received at birth.⁷

In early Western philosophy, less thought was given to this third factor, but more to a *pneuma* of fine matter that was thought to be active in fertilisation. H. Leisegang therefore spoke explicitly about the "*pneuma* as an erotic substance" and collected a great deal of material on the subject.⁸ A number of remarkable data can also be found in Onians (B 233), even though, as the reader will remember, he was hardly concerned at all with the reality of hylic pluralism.⁹ Erna Lesky has also written a detailed and learned study on the teaching and the continuing influence of the ancient ideas about procreation and heredity.¹⁰ She provides many medical and biological details, but she, like Onians, is not open to hylic pluralism as such and tends to emphasise ancient doctrines which are in accordance with the results of modern

1 See above, Part I, p. 194-196.

2 II, p. 302 ff; see also above, Part I, p. 186.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 312.

4 *ibid.*

5 B 178, p. 9 ff; see also above, Part I, p. 240-241.

6 Another remarkable fact is that the Dutch psychiatrist M. Lietaert Peerbolte, whose special field of research has been the prenatal stage of life, is clearly open to the possible existence of a third factor; this emerges from his analysis of dreams. See his *Prenatal Dynamics* (Leiden, 1954), Part I, p. 42, 65, 97.

7 See B 188, p. 71; see also above, Part I, p. 278-279.

8 See B 93, p. 71; see also B 226, p. 193 ff.

9 See above, Vol. II, p. 22.

10 *Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehre der Antike und ihr Nachwirken* (Abhandl. Akad. Mainz, 1950).

research. All the same, the role which the ancient thinkers attributed to the subtle *pneuma* on conception emerges very clearly from her account.

I should now like to select certain elements from all this material on the subject in order to show how widespread these ideas were. Before doing this, however, something must be said about the term *traducianism*. In theological thinking, it has been common to distinguish three theories to explain the origin of the human soul. The first is creationism, according to which God creates a soul for each embryo. The second is the theory of pre-existence, which was favoured by a few theologians in the West, but is widely accepted by Indian thinkers. The third is traducianism (from the Latin *traducere*), according to which a part of the parent's soul is transferred, at fertilisation, to the child.¹ Tertullian is traditionally branded as an adherent of this third doctrine, but it would be quite wrong to claim that he was the first to proclaim it. Long before Tertullian, it was believed that the part of the soul of the parents that was transferred was soul-matter or *pneuma* which was—with apologies to modern women—derived from the father. Verbeke therefore also wrote about the traducianism of the Stoics and I have previously mentioned some of the places in his book where he shows that this is the case with several of the Stoics.²

I believe, however, that this term can be applied much more widely, in other words, to every case in which it is assumed that via the father's sperm (which was also thought of, at least partially, as subtle) *pneuma* is transferred from him to the child. The pre-formation theory, the adherents of which believed that the whole of later mankind was present and preformed in the sperm of Adam,³ can also be called traducianism. This idea of pre-formation was, moreover, present even in the thought of Anaxagoras.⁴

Many of the Greek thinkers were of the opinion that an important part was played in conception by inner warmth, to *emphuton thermon*. This was not, however, ordinary heat, but a special kind that was closely related to the fiery *pneuma*. The Pythagoreans thought that animation was very closely linked with the *pneuma*⁵ and the pre-Socratic Diogenes of Apollonia (fifth century B.C.) stated this explicitly. Like Anaximenes, he attached great value to light as a basic principle and

1 See, for example, B 179, XVII, p. 571; see also above, Vol. II, p. 75-76.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 75.

3 See E. Lesky, *op. cit.*, p. 51; see above, Vol. II, p. 145; B 91, VI, p. 601.

4 See E. Lesky, *ibid.*

5 See Diog. Laert. II, VIII, 28.

believed that everything originated from it.¹ Diogenes also thought that the sperm was a kind of *pneuma*, *pneumatodes*.² Aristotle discussed this in some detail in his *De generatione animalium*. In his opinion, the seed in procreation was breath, *pneuma*,³ although warmth also played a part in this process. As Leisegang said, "procreation consists of warmth which is not a fire or similar force, but a *pneuma*."⁴ According to Aristotle the man played the leading part—the *pneuma* was related to that of the stars⁵—and the woman was mainly passive. (In classical antiquity, there was considerable divergence of opinion as to the contribution made by the woman to the embryo; E. Lesky provides a good deal of information about this.) Clearly, this is evidence of Aristotle's hylemorphism—the form, the entelechy has an effect, in the male sperm, which is a *pneuma*, on the matter provided by the woman. At the same time, however, we are aware of the uncertain element in Aristotle's psychology and biology here—following earlier authors, he regarded this *pneuma* as a force of fine matter and thus not as a purely spiritual form or idea. As such, Aristotle's doctrine of the *pneuma* consisting of fine matter was clearly a precursor of the later teaching about the *ochema* and the *pneuma* and even of Galen's doctrine of the *spiritus*.⁶

A similar situation prevailed among the Stoics, who believed that the soul consisted simply of a fine *pneuma*, a fragment of which was transmitted by the father to the child.⁷ Although there were slightly different interpretations of this theory, it was generally accepted in classical antiquity. All the same, ideas of a rather wider import are found in connection with this. The Stoics, for example, also spoke of the *Logos spermatikos*, the "sowing" Logos,⁸ which included within itself the subordinate "sowing" logoi. Plato's ideas and Aristotle's forms also occur in a function which produces concrete entities consisting of fine matter, a sort of cosmobiology of *idées forces*. In Democritus, too, the idea of a panspermism, a state in which the world is thought to be full of seeds,⁹ can be found. This would certainly seem to widen the field, but it would of course be wrong to think that these are basically erotic theories, a form of pansexualism. It is more

1 See B 170, p. 52; see also above, Vol. II, p. 29.

2 See B 176, I, p. 84; B 226, p. 194, B 233, p. 121.

3 See B 233, p. 120, where references to his texts are given, for example, 736b.

4 See B 93, p. 71.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 40-41.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 41-42; see also B 33, p. 316; B 177, p. 236.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 75-76; see also B 174, pp. 30, 47, 96 145.

8 See B 170, p. 422; B 176, III, p. 65.

9 See E. Lesky, p. 70; B 233, p. 253.

a question here, I think, of general vivification or formation. Onians has commented in this context of the significance of the winds, but adds that the psyche (related to *psuchein*, to blow) is not the air in the lungs.¹ One is reminded here of the *pneuma* or Spirit of God "moving over the face of the waters"² and the connection between Yahweh's spirit and the winds.³ There is also the text in Genesis in which we are told that God breathed or blew the breath of life into Adam's nostrils.⁴ *Pneuma*, then, was thought of as generally life-giving and thus as usually consisting of fine matter. Some part of the universal power was doubtless expressed in sexual procreation.

What is more, Porphyry discussed in detail the "way in which the embryo receives the soul" in his text "To Gauros",⁵ describing this as a phase in the descent of the soul through the spheres.⁶ Clement of Alexandria was in agreement with the Stoics concerning the part played by the father in conception.⁷ Hildegard of Bingen also recounted in one of her visions how the soul takes possession of the child's body "like a fiery globe".⁸ Paracelsus also made a distinction between a finer species of seed or sperm and an external species.⁹ J. B. van Helmont was convinced that procreation was not simply a corporeal act.¹⁰ Many theologians apart from Tertullian—for example, Augustine, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Luther¹¹—were favourably disposed towards *intraduciam*.¹²

In conclusion, I should like to discuss very briefly a few relevant points which may contribute towards our understanding of the problem and cannot in any case be neglected if our aim is to deal completely with the subject.

Paul, as we have already seen,¹³ appears to teach a trichotomy and for this reason the translation of the *sōma psuchikon*, the "psychical body" of 1 Cor. 15. 44 as "natural body" is wrong, because because this would clearly refer to the ordinary body. My view, that Paul was writing here under the influence of the Stoics, is, I think, quite tenable. What is

1 B 233, p. 120.

2 Gen. 1. 2; see above, Vol. II, p. 59.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 59, note 5.

4 Gen. 2. 7; see above, Vol. II, p. 60, 76-77, 111.

5 B 44, p. 265 ff (Appendix II).

6 See above, p. 16.

7 B 174, p. 430.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 128.

9 Schriften (ed. Kayser), p. 475.

10 See B 83, p. 202.

11 See B 179, XVII, p. 571.

12 See Paul Schutz, B 271 (1957), 2, p. 111.

13 See above, Vol. II, p. 74 ff.

more, it fits in perfectly well with the theme of this chapter and I do not need to add much more to it, except to point out that, when we read *speiratai sōma psuchikon*—"it is sown a psychical body" (1 Cor. 15. 44), this sowing should not be regarded as a purely physical act—it also has to do with the transmission of *pneuma* consisting of fine matter from the father. It is therefore not surprising that Paul should call this a sowing or begetting in weakness in contrast to the very different kind of resurrection of the "spiritual body".

There is, however, no such contrast in this concept if it is seen in its wider significance of fertilisation. The spring wind and the rain give life to the field and there is a sacred marriage between heaven and earth.¹ In the ancient mysteries, this theme was, with the help of the symbol of an ear of corn, connected with the mystery of the human person. A more sexual significance emerges from the very frequent ancient theme of divine fatherhood, in other words, that of the hero whose real father was a god.² According to Philo Judaeus, Yahweh himself was the father of Sarah's child (Gen. 21. 1),³ of Leah's (Gen. 29. 31) and of Rebekah's (Gen. 25. 21).

The most interesting case in the Bible, however, is the overshadowing of Mary by the Holy Spirit (Matt. 1 18-20). As with so many religious doctrines, this account of the fertilisation of Mary can be regarded as a miracle which is beyond our comprehension and either accepted as such or rejected or else it can be subjected to critical scrutiny in an attempt to discover a rational element in it. On the one hand, the gospel account should be compared with the many other accounts of divine fatherhood of the same period. On the other hand, it should be remembered, firstly, that the *pneuma* consisting of fine matter of every father was generally speaking thought at that time to play a part in procreation and secondly that the Holy Spirit was believed to bring about very concrete effects. The New Testament authors stress this second fact, again and again in their accounts of cures and of Pentecost, when the Spirit was poured out on the apostles.⁴ All this points clearly towards the possibility of eliminating or at least of reducing what so many people today regard as absurd in the gospel account of Mary's conception by recourse to hylic pluralism. If a process involving fine matter, similar to the materialisations of angels at

1 See B 90, p. 81.

2 See B 90, p. 91, 103, 197.

3 See B 93, p. 20 ff.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 69-70.

séances,¹ did in fact take place here, then what is known in logic as a "transference to another kind" (*metabasis eis allo genos*) is less applicable in this case—there is no physical cause by a purely spiritual substance.

The fact that the event which followed the annunciation was thought of in very concrete terms in the Middle Ages is demonstrated by the way in which this event is depicted on the tympanum of the Lady Chapel at Würzburg (see Plate 8).² The angel is shown kneeling on the left. Above is the Holy Spirit, seen as a male figure with something coming from his mouth and going to Mary's ear—clearly something in analogy with the creative Word of John 1. 1 ff. What is of interest to us, however, is the little doll or human figure shown moving downwards from the mouth of the Holy Spirit to the ear of the Virgin, along the visible connection between them. The reader will recall that it was common in the Middle Ages to represent the soul after death as a little person being received by Christ³ and that artists at the time frequently depicted the soul as a miniature human being.⁴ In my opinion, then, the representation of the little figure on the tympanum at Würzburg may safely be called a representation of a pre-existent *eidolon*.

Earlier in this work, in Volume II, I said that divine fatherhood has also been ascribed to Buddha in certain legends. In connection with this idea, there are many accounts of Buddha's descent into the body of his mother Māyā. E. Windisch has pointed to similarities between Buddha's birth and Christ's virgin birth.⁵ What is more, it is beyond dispute that, in Buddhist circles, this descent was regarded as consisting of fine matter. The similarity between these two births, both of which were claimed to be divine, also struck the Church Father, Jerome.⁶

However great the tendency has been to regard the process of human birth as physiological, it cannot be denied that hylic pluralism has been associated with it in the history of thought.

1 See above, p. 24-25. The medieval belief that fertilisation was possible by *incubi* (see above, p. 25) also becomes a little less strange as soon as we remember the widespread conviction that a factor consisting of fine matter played a part in procreation.

2 See L. Réau, *Iconographie de l'art chrétien*, II, p. 190.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 232, 238.

4 See the index in Volume I.

5 See B 178, p. 195, See also above, Part I, pp. 241-242.

6 *Adversus Jovinianum*, I, § 42; see also B 178, p. 220.

The senses, as organs which receive stimuli, form an accepted part of the field of study undertaken by scientists specialising in physiology. For a very long time, five senses have been distinguished—sight, hearing, smell, taste and feeling or touch, in which the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue and the skin are used. Modern physiologists, however, are inclined to extend this number and to include, for example, a sense of temperature, a sense of balance and so on. In any case, stimuli from the senses reach centres in the brain and are there changed, in a way which has not yet been sufficiently explained, into sensations and, when the data of these sensations have been entirely assimilated, into perceptions.

In Indian thought, the senses are called *indriyas*. A distinction is made, however, between the *Jñānendriyas*, by which knowledge is obtained, and the *karmendriyas*, the action senses—language, holding, walking, the digestion and so on—by means of which man expresses himself externally.¹ *Indriya* thus has a very wide meaning, signifying a point through which things pass. In fact the sensory, receptive aspect is contrasted with the motory, active element—the element which is searching for the centre is contrasted with the element that is trying to escape from the centre.

To what extent is the question of the senses related to hylic pluralism, thus going beyond ordinary physiology? We have already considered cases of a conviction of the existence of *several* apparently subtler senses (or modes of perception—sensation and sense are apparently correlative) and I should like to reconsider these briefly here and amplify what I have already said about them here and there.

Gonda has said that the *indriyas* are related both to the coarse and to the finer elements.² Democritus, for example, believed that there were several kinds of perception and tried to find what Professor C.J. de Vogel has called an “explanation of telepathic phenomena”.³ In this way, by means of *eidola*, the gods were thought to be in contact with men.⁴ More recently, Lessing said explicitly “that men might have more than five senses”.⁵ He thought that man could become even more perfect, developing, for example, a special sense which

1 B 58, p. 143.

2 *ibid.*, B. 58, p. 143; in the last case, the *iddhis* or *siddhis* have an effect (see above Part II, p. 196).

3 B 163, I, p. 74; see above, Vol. II, p. 31-32.

4 *ibid.*

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 146; see also B 172, p. 480

would be capable of perceiving electric (perhaps "magnetic"?) phenomena directly.¹ According to the pneumatologists of the romantic period, man possessed both a subtle body and subtle senses.² The poet Jean Paul agreed with the author Lessing that man probably had more than five senses.³ Fechner wrote in his essay on the "comparative anatomy of the angels" about his belief that the angels had senses.⁴ W. Haas wrote in his book, *Die Psychische Dingwelt* of 1921: "We can only speak universally of matter in cases in which sense organs can be proved to perceive that matter", but, because he was convinced of the existence of a "psychical body" and of "psychical things", he looked for "psychical organs of the senses" and believed that these could be found in thought, feeling and sight, with which "content, attitude and value—the three modes of the psychical thing" were conceived.⁵ Jung's disciple, G.R. Heyer, also appears to have accepted the existence of other senses in addition to the ordinary coarse senses.⁶

Perty and Ulrici suspected that certain people were capable of perceiving unusual phenomena by means of a finer capacity. They and several others living and working at the same time were precursors of modern parapsychology.⁷ This, of course, at once raises the question as to the extent to which those who have studied parapsychology—psychical research or *métapsychique*—have been inclined to accept the existence of a perceptive capacity and of senses that are different from the ordinary ones. Surely we may assume that they have done so—or that the occultists mentioned in Section 83 do so? This assumption is to some extent implied in the use of such terms as clairvoyance ("clear seeing") and the Dutch *helderhorendheid* (clear "hearing").

Not all parapsychologists, however, have been prepared to draw such conclusions. Those who have been inclined to accept the radiation theory have done so,⁸ believing that the stimuli caused by these hypothetical radiations were received by unusual organs. Charles Richet was especially inclined to accept this view⁹ and outlined it in his book

1 See B 271, IX, 2, p. 155.

2 See B 157, p. 21; see also above, Vol. II, p. 161.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 228.

4 See his "Vergleichende Anatomie der Engel", *Kleine Schriften* 1913, p. 157 ff see also above, Vol. II, p. 172.

5 See B 61, p. 81; see also above, Vol. II, pp 206-207.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 191.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 175.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 197.

9 This does not mean, however, that he was also in agreement with all the theories about finer radiations mentioned, for example, in Section 96 in this work. Montandon has complained of this in Richet (see B 108, p. 406).

Notre sixième sens of 1927. Several other authors have also put forward this theory,¹ but without receiving very much approval.² Generally speaking, later parapsychologists have been disinclined to accept the theory of radiation and its correlative theory of unusual senses or capacities to perceive.

I shall be returning to the radiation theory later in this work when I come to discuss the "truth" of hylic pluralism. A number of theoretical problems, however, are raised in connection with this question of several senses which are different from the ordinary senses and I should like to discuss these briefly here.

There is, of course, a well known affirmation which is frequently made in relation to the possibility or the impossibility of unusual knowledge—*nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, nothing exists in the intellect, (in the spirit or in the mind) which has not already been in sensory perception.³ This statement, however, says rather more than simply that we can only perceive ordinary things. It is really a pawn in the fight between rationalism and empiricism. The empiricists insist that all knowledge is and must be derived from empirical experience. The rationalists, on the other hand, are open to the existence of intellectual truths, such as, for example, "innate concepts". An extreme form of empiricism is sensualism, according to which all knowledge without exception is derived from the senses.⁴ Not all empiricists, of course, go as far as this. Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, for example, supported statement *nihil est in intellectu...*, but, in their case, it really meant "*in time*, sensory knowledge always precedes conceptual knowledge".⁵ What is interesting in this connection is that John Locke, who was also a supporter of this statement and is generally regarded as an empiricist,⁶ although he was certainly not so fanatical in his support of empiricism, that is, as fanatical as he has often been made out to be. In addition to the ordinary perception, outward perception, he believed that there was also an inner perception, because only this was capable of experiencing certain varieties of feelings species of judgement and so on. In this, Locke was not so very far removed from the rationalist Leibniz, who added to the above statement *nisi intellectus ipse*—apart from the intellect itself, in other words,

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 196, note 7.

2 For H. G. Heine's book, for example, see B 220, IV, 3, p. 94 ff.

3 See, for example, B 36, p. 439.

4 Van Condillac, for example; see B 36, p. 605.

5 See B 36, *op. cit.*

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 141 ff.

intellectual knowledge, the knowledge of the mind of itself, is not derived from sensory experience.¹

The situation with regard to this inner perception is, however, very peculiar. Heymans has written about "freely arising ideas"² which are contrasted with whatever one builds up, step by step, oneself—an argument, for example. But surely, one is bringing about one's own destruction in this way? Who can say that there are no ideas among those that arise freely which originate in the minds of other people or in another world, but which are simply not recognised by us as such?³ In any case, a clear distinction has to be made between the content of this inner perception insofar as it is directly connected with us, in the form, for example, of memories or of the subject of a book or a painting, and what appears to enter our mind from outside and not through the normal channels of the ordinary senses.

It is important to go into this question of the origin of the senses rather more fundamentally. It is clear, for example, that the Stoics were "sensualists"—they believed that all knowledge originated outside. They did not, for example, think, as Plato's followers did, that knowledge came from the world of pure ideas. This, of course, was the Stoic theory of *tabula rasa*—the soul viewed as a clean wax tablet.⁴ On the other hand, however, they supported the doctrine of a *pneuma* consisting of fine matter and believed in divination and what we should now call occult phenomena.⁵ It is fairly obvious, then, that they accepted the existence of unusual experience.

The argument that the possible occurrence of unusual phenomena may be refuted by the statement *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu* is therefore clearly not valid. It is particularly valuable to consult the philosopher C. D. Broad if we are to understand this question. Broad compiled a list of "basic limiting principles", in other words, of principles which have been generally accepted by scientists and ordinary people, but which are in conflict with the results of research into parapsychology. One of these limiting principles is that things can never be perceived directly, but only by means of a whole chain of events such as the influence of the body of the observer, especially one of the senses, by an external process, which then gives

1 See, for example, B 36, p. 439.

2 See, for example, B 68, p. 112, 331; see also B 36, p. 222.

3 For "objectivisation", see below, Section 109. Heymans in fact assume that there could, under certain circumstances, be ideas among those that occur to us and apart from those which came from our peripheral consciousness which were derived from the minds of other people; see B 68, p. 331; B 69, I, p. 208.

4 See B 36, p. 667, 605.

5 See B 77, p. 60 (see above, Vol. II, p. 42 ff), p. 94 ff.

rise to a process in his brains and only then to conscious perception.¹ This reasoning thus has a prohibitive effect both on the paranormal perception of physical events (or clairvoyance) and on the direct reception of the thoughts of others (or telepathy)—the ordinary senses and the brains play no part in this.

If this principle is considered in conjunction with the statement that I have quoted several times here—*nihil est in intellectu* . . .—it is at once obvious that, as B. J. J. Visser has correctly remarked,² the statement has to be amplified to read, not simply *nihil* . . . *quod non in sensu*, but *nihil quod non in quinque sensibus notis*, nothing apart from what has come to us through our five well-known, traditional senses can be known by us. In this case, the statement does in fact exclude the possibility of paranormal knowledge. (This, of course, is something that would be welcomed by the positivists.) If, however, *in sensu* can be understood in a broader sense, that is, as including other possible senses, unusual modes of perception, then it cannot be used as an argument against parapsychology. In this broader sense, the Stoics were clearly “sensualists”.

We can now formulate a counterpart to the statement that I have quoted so many times, once again by consulting Broad. According to another of his “limiting principles”, a person’s mind can only bring about a change in the ordinary material world by means of changes that have previously taken place in that person’s own brains.³ This would be, in Latin, *nihil ab homine moveri potest quod non prius causam in corpore (in cerebro) eius habuerit*. This excludes “psychokinesis”, for example—the movement of objects in an extraordinary way which is different from innervation in the brains of normal bodily movements.

This counterpart should really be added—over and against the sensory aspect, there is the motory aspect, over and against the *jñānendriyas*, there are the *karmenindriyas* (see above, p. 55) and a distinction is made in parapsychology between parapsychical and parapsychical phenomena. If the authenticity of parapsychical phenomena—psychokinesis, sounds and materialisations at séances—were established, this would at once provide a refutation of the second statement, unless *in corpore* were to be understood in a wider sense as *in sensu* in the first statement, that is, if the first statement were to be read as *nihil ab homine moveri potest quod non prius causam in corpore aut ordinario*

1 See B 196, p. 294.

2 See B 267, p. 298.

3 B 196, p. 293.

aut subtili habuerit, in other words, there must be a cause in the body, either in the ordinary body or in a finer body.

This, of course, brings us back once more to the radiation theory. The parapsychologists, however, were not in favour of this theory and thought that a link was unnecessary. According to them, therefore, the second statement would have to read: *homo res movere potest quae prius non causam in aliquo corpore eius habuerit*.

The question as to whether either paranormal perception or paranormal activity is possible without some kind of intermediary link or not has, in my opinion, not yet been definitively answered.¹ I am, however, inclined to think that such concepts as "extrasensory perception",² J. B. Rhine's "ESP", anticipate this definitive decision, by suggesting in advance that there is no involvement of the senses, even finer senses, in this. Of course, it cannot be denied that Rhine did not care very much for the "wave theory" as he called it and had a rather dualistic conception of parapsychology.³ On the other hand, however, he was very cautious and, in suggesting the term ESP, he added "... I agree to mean by this merely 'perception by a means or way that is outside the now recognised sensory modes'".⁴ This clearly left the question open and, if the term "perception" is used, can this be so very far removed from paranormal senses? "Extra-sensory" could therefore be interpreted as "outside the ordinary senses".⁵

Three other points remain to be discussed in this chapter. The first of these points is this—is the antithesis between the five ordinary, traditional senses and other, possibly finer senses really so sharp and so absolute? In the first place, as I have already said (see above, p. 55), modern physiologists have believed that it is possible to discern, even at the normal level of experience, several other senses, perhaps not very striking ones, but nevertheless independent. In this sense, the term "sixth sense" is clearly not the right one to use for possible paranormal perception. What is more, there are also all kinds of transitions from our ordinary sensory stimuli to others to which we are perhaps not sensitive, but which are nevertheless quite real. De Froe has said, for example: "We have no senses that are capable

1 See below, Section 122 ff.

2 See the article by Herman Wolf, "De beteekenis der buitenzintuigelijke waarneming voor de wijsbegeerte", in B 169, XXXI, 4, p. 178 ff.

3 See, for example, B 219, March 1961, pp. 46, 26.

4 See B 247, p. 131.

5 The emphasis is again different in the term "cryptaesthesia" or "hidden perception".

of receiving all the impulses that come to us. We have no senses, for instance, which will receive electrical, physical or chemical stimuli. Indirectly, however, we react strongly to these stimuli."¹ If the theory put forward by certain psychoanalysts is right, moreover, that the unborn child is sensitive to the mother's mood and is influenced by it (this is not a psychosomatic influence on the child), this is certainly very strange, because the child's nerve centres are at this stage either not at all developed or at the most hardly developed.²

In animals, we find a whole scale of senses, the emphasis being sometimes on one mode of perception and sometimes on another. The animals also have many different forms of perception which are very far removed from those found normally in human beings. Examples of these are the dog's sense of smell and the homing sense of bees.³ We can therefore ask whether other modes of perception do not occur here as well. If, for example, it is true that bats find their way not only by extremely sensitive hearing (by the reflection of sounds), but also by a kind of radar, then clearly something divergent is involved here. Another example is the "homing" of carrier pigeons and of other domestic creatures taken away from their home. Determined attempts have been made to provide "normal" explanations for these phenomena, including orientation towards the position of the sun and even of the stars. On the other hand, it is scarcely surprising that several parapsychologists should have wondered whether a paranormal capacity is not involved in such cases.⁴ B.J.J. Visser has dealt with this particular question of the relationship between parapsychology biology in rather a different way in his book *Parapsychologie* (B 267). He has quoted W. Mackenzie and E.N. Marrais, who have claimed that the activities of the "workers" in the nests of a certain species of termite in South Africa are co-ordinated in a way that can only be explained as paranormal.⁵ Clearly, the last word has not yet been said about this. Visser has, however, also discussed the situation with regard to certain unicellular beings which certainly do not possess senses or nerves, but which undoubtedly display reactions

1 See B 234, II, 6, p. 262.

2 We may also ask how the climatological influence described by W. Hellpach in his *Geopsyche* of 1934 (2nd edn.) come to us.

3 J. J. von Uexküll has stressed that the environment of animals is quite different from that of men. I believe, however, that these environments are not totally different, but rather that they are supplementary.

4 See J. B. Rhine and J. G. Pratt in B 219, June 1950, p. 85; Dec. 1951, p. 230; March 1962, p. 1.

5 See B 267, p. 259.

without senses.¹ H. Conrad-Martius has also written about amoeba and their reaction without senses.²

We may be sure that it is difficult to make a clear dividing line here between normal and paranormal phenomena. But, in any case, does this matter so very much? As we have seen in the first part of this work, in connection with the physical *pneuma* in Section 6, there are many different places which elude our ordinary senses. The name that we give to this is not so important. It depends ultimately on our theoretical standpoint whether we try to explain it as something ordinary or whether we are not inclined to accept any gradual transition to a completely different level.

At this different level, we find quite different ideas postulating the existence of divergent or finer senses. I have already given several of the opinions expressed in this context, which is, of course, that of my second point. I should like to go a little further here and to discuss the theme of the *sensorium commune*, or "common sense".³ It should, however, be noted that I am not concerned here with "common sense" in the sense in which it was used in English philosophy and in ordinary English speech. What I am thinking of in this connection is principally the sound, common idea that the data of the separate senses, for example, seeing and touching an object, can be united somewhere into a whole. This point, the union or hypostasis, can now be taken more or less seriously. A. Pfänder has written about a "psychical central organ" in addition to the various "psychical regions".⁴ It is, however, possible to go further and, firstly, regard this central, unitive organ explicitly as something independent, placed above the ordinary senses and more than simply the sum total of their data and, secondly, make a connection here with hylic pluralism, by looking for a place in man's subtle body for this independent *sensorium commune*. This has already been done in different ways and with different shades of emphasis and I should like to discuss one of two aspects of this briefly here. At the same time, however, it is important to remind the reader once again that he should bear in mind the distinction between the synthesis of ordinary data in the senses (this is what Pfänder was referring to) and the assumed function of the *sensorium commune* as an autonomous sense, possibly a more original sense, more original,

¹ *ibid.*, p. 262; see also F.J.J. Buytendijk, *Psychologie der dieren* (1932), I, p. 36 ff.

² See Visser, p. 263; see also H. Conrad-Martius' *Bios und Psyche* (1949; B 197). p. 85.

³ See B 36, p. 605, 240.

⁴ *Die Seele des Menschen* (1933), p. 312.

that is, than the ordinary senses which may perhaps be simply specialisations of the *sensorium commune*.

Aristotle has written about *to pantōn tōn aisthētēriōn koinon aisthētērion*, the common sense where common perceptions become conscious. It was, in his opinion, situated "in the heart".¹ Apparently, Aristotle thought of this sense as being closely connected with the *pneuma* which was, in his view, the first organ or instrument of the soul.² The Stoics too had a great interest in the *koine aisthesis*, the common or communal perception.³ Galen too made a distinction between three inner senses, the first imagining the data (*to Phantastikon*—the imagination or fantasy was also an important theme in the Stoic writings), the second selecting them and the third keeping them in the memory.⁴ The scholastics also spoke of the *sensus communis* and Kant believed that it was impossible to dispense with an "inner sense".⁵

Kissling, in discussing this theme, has pointed to the link between the *ochema-pneuma* and sensory perception and the imagination in, for example, Simplicius, Themistius and Syrianus.⁶ G. R. S. Mead has also pointed to a passage in Origen, in which the ancient author has said that the *whole* of the spiritual body can both hear and see.⁷ The link with hylic pluralism is, moreover, very clear in Indian philosophy. As Gonda has said, *manas* is the internal co-ordinating organ.⁸ *Antahkarana* has also been defined as this. We know, too, that the Indian psychologists regarded all the factors of the soul as consisting of fine matter.⁹ In the Upaniṣads, *prajñā* was thought of as *sensorium commune* in which the "vital forces or *prāṇas*" came together "in the heart". The Buddhists were in agreement with this theory.¹⁰ In the West too, there have been authors who have, for different reasons, been in favour of a body of fine matter and who have written about "common sense"—examples of such writers are von Baader.¹¹ Hamberger¹² and the romantics generally.¹³ Modern occultists are

1 *De anima* III, 2; B 176, II, p. 212; B 128, p. 40.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 41, III 41 note 3.

3 See B 36, p. 240; in the synthesis, the seat of the function performed by *to hegemōnikon* was situated "in the heart"; see B 128, p. 49; B 176, III, p. 89.

4 See B 89, II, p. 421.

5 See B 89, II, p. 422.

6 See B 85, p. 321.

7 See B 99, p. 115.

8 See B 58, p. 157, 187.

9 See above, Part I, pp. 182-183; B 1, p. 63.

10 See Mrs Rhys Davids. *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 59.

11 *Schrieffen* (1921). p. 217.

12 B 62, p. 134.

13 See B 215, II, p. 97.

inclined to regard the *chakras*¹ as astral senses. On the one hand, we read that the development of a form of clairvoyance goes together with the "vivification" of a certain *chakram*.² On the other hand, this may also lead to the growth of perception by means of the subtle body as a whole.³

A clear distinction has always to be made in the work of such an author between his possible use of "organs of the soul" simply as indicating a spiritual function—I have already alluded to this in the work of A. Pfänder⁴—and his possible objectivisation of that function as something consisting of fine matter. We are, of course, bound to admit that both these points of view are very close to each other. W. Haas has written about psychical functions as "psychical organs of the senses".⁵ In this context, too, what the well-known classical scholar, B. Snell, said about Homer is also striking, namely that *psuchê* and *thumos* were organs of the soul which the poet thought of as analogous to the organs of the body, that is, as "half objective".⁶ We should not be too surprised by this if we realise that the "primitive" peoples did not make any clear distinction between the psychical and the physical aspects and had no idea of anthropological dualism.⁷

This brings me to my third and last point. It is important element played in recent psychology by the author's acceptance or rejection of Cartesian anthropological dualism, the epsilon standpoint. There is a noticeable tendency in recent years to reject anthropological dualism as the unquestioned presupposition for all psychological considerations. For example, even in his introduction, Erwin Straus disavowed Cartesianism in his well-known work *Vom Sinn der Sinne*.⁸ M. Merleau-ponty did the same in his widely read *Phénoménologie de la perception*.⁹ Instead of emphasising the antithesis between the

1 See above, p. 47.

2 See above, p. 48.

3 See B 116, p. 34.

4 See above, Vol. II, pp. 191-192. I should like to mention the fact here that various authors have accepted in a rather different sense the existence of inner senses. François Hemsterhuis spoke of a "moral instrument" or sense (see above, Vol. II, p. 213) and C.W. Opzoomer (1821-1892) of a specifically religious sense or feeling (see B 250, p. 322). On the one hand, there is a link here between the use of *sensus communis* for "common sense" and its use for what Heymans called, on the other hand, the logical and ethical laws, which he regarded also as "factual and real laws". Speaking of a "moral instrument or sense" leads us in very much the same direction, that is, towards what I have elsewhere (in B 169, LV, 4, P. 208) called a possible extension consisting of fine matter of physicalism.

5 B 61, p. 81; see above, p. 56.

6 *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, p. 25 ff: see also above, Vol. II, p. 23-24.

7 See the index under "psychical" and "physical".

8 1935 (2nd edn., 1956), p. 1 ff.

9 See for example, R. C. Kwant, B 234, II, 6, p. 278.

mind and the body, he stressed—along with many others—the unity of both in, for example, perception.¹ What is quite remarkable in this context is that Merleau-Ponty here gives renewed prominence to the time-honoured concept of a *sensorium commune* and states explicitly that he agrees with the pre-romantic author Herder in this respect.²

To conclude, then, I have discussed in this chapter a number of questions with many complicated and uncertain ramifications. For this reason, my treatment has been no more than provisional and tentative. From the phenomenological point of view, there are, however, without the slightest doubt clear links between this theme of the senses and hylic pluralism. I shall deal with the problem of the *extension* of the qualities of the senses in the context of hylic pluralism in a series of later sections (§101 ff), but for the time being we must leave the physiological *pneuma* and consider the psychological *pneuma*.

99 PSYCHOLOGICAL PNEUMA

We must now consider the second species of *pneuma* consisting of fine matter. As I have already remarked,³ this psychological *pneuma* brings us to the very heart of the subject of hylic pluralism. The physiological *pneuma* is less central—who can say what finer effects or activities closely connected with our ordinary bodies or what kinds of “unbelievably” fine senses may be discovered in various species of animal. The existence of the *spiritus animales et vitales*, which, according to my definition, can be included under the title of the physiological *pneuma*, was accepted so generally in earlier centuries that philosophers whose views were otherwise very divergent believed in them.⁴ The problem is not to found in the physiological *pneuma*, but in the conviction that human beings—as free souls or psyches independent of the ordinary body, for example, after their death—and other beings—unlike the angels and demons, not permanently in possession of an ordinary body coarse matter—nonetheless always have at their disposal a body, a psychical body; in addition to the ordinary organism, then, they have a meta-organism.

1 See, for example, B 236, p. 64.

2 *Phénoménologie de la perception* (1945), p. 271 ff.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 9-10; see also Part I, pp. 26, 27.

4 Examples are Thomas Aquinas, Descartes and Lamettrie; see above pp. 99, 126, 135.

This presupposition is so characteristic of the theme of hylic pluralism that I am almost inclined to say that there is no real need to discuss the psychological *pneuma* especially in this book—it is under discussion throughout the work as a whole. This is, however, not really possible to do. In the first place, hylic pluralism is a wider concept than the psychological *pneuma*—it includes fine materiality in general (for example, the fine materiality of other worlds and spheres) as well as the other two species of *pneuma*, the physiological and the sublime *pneumata*.¹ In the second place, several points of difference between the psychological and the physiological *pneumata* can undoubtedly be examined more easily and conveniently in a special section devoted to the psychological *pneuma*.

I shall not, however, provide a detailed review of the terms used to indicate this psychological *pneuma* and of the thinkers who have used these terms in this section. One of the most commonly used is “astral body”. This has the great advantage of not suffering from the ambiguity of being used sometimes to indicate something at the level of the psychological *pneuma* and at others something at the physiological level, like the term “etheric body”.² Other terms that are frequently encountered are “psychical body” and “subtle body” and, in certain circles, more specialised words such as *śartra*, *ochēma*, intermediate body, action body and so on. I am not going into this aspect of the psychological *pneuma* in detail here mainly because I have reviewed it and the extant literature concerned with it before in this work.³

What characterises the psychological *pneuma* especially is that there is constant reference to a body, even where this would hardly be expected. I have called this psychohylism.⁴ In the case of the physiological *pneuma*, there is always a connection, though sometimes not a very close one, between a postulated fine materiality and the ordinary body. It is this that has given rise to the term physiological *pneuma*.⁵ In the case of the psychological *pneuma*, this connection is broken and the unexpected element is found, so that the idea of a body—here a finer body—is still retained.

I took as my starting point the antithesis found among the primitive peoples between the body-soul and the free, external soul and the fact that the primitive peoples regard both of these as consisting of fine

1 It should not be forgotten that the sublime *pneuma* can also be regarded as a part of the psychological *pneuma*; see Part I, p. 33, note 1.

2 See Part I, p. 16; see also Part I, p. 278; Vol. II, p. 47.

3 See above, Part I, pp. 62; see also Vol. II, p. 13-14.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 11-12; see Section 91 and the index.

5 See above, p. 39 ff.

matter.¹ Connected with this is the idea, held by these primitive people and also by others that this free soul or *psuchē* can either leave the ordinary body for a time in an excursion or an ecstasy and then return to it later or break the bond with the body permanently and then firstly continue to exist and secondly lead an existence as an entity consisting of fine matter or else at least possess an aspect of fine materiality. Seen in this light, death is a radical excursion from the ordinary body. In addition, of course, the idea that sleep is also a kind of temporary excursion is met with quite frequently. Finally, there is the permanent excursion of the soul from the body in certain cases, when it takes the form of an apotheosis or an ascension.

Various aspects of this theme may therefore be summarised under certain sub-headings. Firstly, there is continued existence after death or immortality. Secondly, there is the journey of the soul. In this case, viewed from without, the body remains in a state of reduced consciousness—asleep, unconscious or in a trance. Viewed from within, the individual feels that he is transferred to a different place. In extreme cases, this may lead either to ecstasy, with the emphasis on a mystical awareness of unity, or to visions. What is very apparent in the whole of this theme, however, is that the various aspects of it occur in a much wider sense and far more comprehensively in the history of thought than simply in connection with hylic pluralism or fine materiality. It would therefore be not only wrong but also impossible to discuss all these different aspects in their wider context in great detail here, however interesting they may be in themselves. Clearly, we have to confine ourselves to hylic pluralism.

As far as continued existence after death is concerned, we may be quite sure that this is not always associated with hylic pluralism. We have only to think here of the existence of human souls as purely spiritual substances according to Thomas Aquinas. On the other hand, however, it is very often associated with hylic pluralism. The Indian thinkers were, as we have seen, inclined to regard all the factors of the soul as consisting of fine matter and they also thought of the entity which passed from one incarnation to the other in the same way.² Again, many Protestant theologians believed in intermediate corporeality between death and resurrection and this has also to be included within hylic pluralism.³ A similar situation prevails in modern

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 9, 18.

2 See above, Part I, p. 194.

3 See above, Section 72.

occultism,¹ that is, in spiritualism, anthroposophy and theosophy—the conviction that, after death, man is in a “higher body”, which may be a perisprit or an astral or mental body. It would, however, occupy too much space to go into all these views in detail. We must limit ourselves to their hylic pluralistic aspects.

There is in existence a large number of books on occultism which are usually completely ignored by non-specialists, who at best simply see the titles in the catalogues of antiquarian booksellers or at auctions. A great deal of hylic pluralism certainly occurs in many of these books and I should like to point to one or two aspects here.

In the first place, even in connection with the physiological *pneuma*, we sometimes find reference to a continued existence, that is, the idea that the etheric body in the narrower sense or the etheric double continues to exist for a *short time* and can, for example, be seen as a graveyard ghost, but soon disintegrates.² On the other hand, the psychological *pneuma* or astral body is thought to be something with a much longer continued existence, although, in this case too, disintegration or “second death”³ is accepted sometimes. There can be no doubt that the length of the continued existence constitutes a phenomenological difference between the physiological and the psychological *pneumata*. I shall be discussing the whole question of the connection between hylic pluralism and the theme of excursion or the journey of the soul in the following chapter. Now, however, I should like to discuss briefly another remarkable aspect of this presumed fine materiality at the level of the psychological *pneuma*.

It has to do with a factor about which there is very great agreement among the different reports made by mystics and visionaries about their experiences. This is the *plasticity* of this other matter or of what presents itself as such. In our environment, matter clearly takes on fairly solid, firm forms. I say “fairly” advisedly, since liquids and gases easily assume the form of what surrounds or contains them.

The same is, we may assume, the case to a far greater degree in these other spheres or in connection with objects consisting of fine matter. Here we express ourselves rather clumsily, for example, by means of languages or drawings. There, on the other hand, thoughts, we may suppose, can be projected in the manner of “thought-forms”.⁴ All the same, this astral sphere may, because of its special characteristic

¹ See above, Section 83.

² See Part I, p. 24; see also above, Part I, p. 162-163; B 118, p. 71.

³ I. p. 27; see also above, Part I, p. 278, Vol. II, 47; B 116, p. 206.
p. 43.

of plasticity, be a typical zone of illusion, a sphere of images, an area which is deceptive.¹

In this context, one is immediately reminded of the part played in those various schools of thought, such as the Stoic school,² which were open to the possibility of hylic pluralism, by the imagination. Another important aspect of this question is that, in Indian thought, *māyā* means not only illusion, but also creative activity,³ so that what we have here is really a giving of form or formation, which could be called *ideoplastics*. This is something that is known to us in our ordinary experience. We have not only the example of the sculptor fashioning his work of art, but also the seed or the embryo from which a new specimen of the same species develops ("entelechy"), with much greater latitude in the case of the lower animals (an example of this being the regeneration of the tail in the case of reptiles).⁴

I am inclined to think that what we have here is a universal principle. This is that form and matter always go together, that they are correlative within plurality. Even the sculptor's clay already has a certain form before he fashions it further.⁵ The plasticity of matter in more rarefied spheres amounts to this—the resistance offered by existing matter to being given form, to being fashioned into different patterns, is very slight. This principle of ideoplastics is expressed in different ways. In my opinion, there are four ways in which it is expressed. These are the normal way, the paranormal way, the way that takes place within the same sphere or at the same level and the way that takes place between two different spheres or levels. Let me briefly outline each of these ways in turn.

In the first case, normal ideoplastics at the ordinary level take place when imprints are made mechanically using a mould, a stencil or a template to produce metal objects, imprints on sheets of paper or even specially shaped children's biscuits. Normal ideoplastics taking place between two different levels occur when, for example, an architect uses a design or a scale model for a building and has it erected on the basis of this first plan. The same applies to every undertaking carried out by an individual on the basis of a previous plan. There are, in such cases, always transitions of one level to the other which do not make an entirely normal impression, even though they may be recognised

1 See B 116, p. 153.

2 See above, p. 63; B 36, p. 486.

3 See J. F. Staal, *Advaita and Neoplasticism* (1961), p. 122.

4 B 254, p. 134 ff; see also R. Cudworth on "Plastic natures" (B 141, p. 236); there is also the saying "every idea tends to be realised".

5 See above, p. 36, note 2.

more and more, with each stage, as real. Psychosomatic illnesses may, for example, also be included under this heading—the influence of certain attitudes of mind, such as worries, on physical organs and functions of the body which had previously never been accepted to such an extent. If this is so, the farsightedness of pregnant women must also come within this category¹. Far less usual, of course, are the parapsychical phenomena found in parapsychology—the formation from a matter known as ectoplasm, which is secreted by the medium at a séance and which can be interrupted at least by infra-red rays,² of limbs which can, for example, leave footprints or fingerprints in wax lift a table by means of “pseudopods” and so on. Very similar is the case of complete materialisation³ either in the context of spiritualism—a famous case was that of Katie King—or in theory. Theoretical materialisation can be found in the case of appearances of angels, a possibility accepted even by authors who have otherwise denied that angels could in themselves have a body consisting of fine matter at their disposal.⁴

We now come to the fourth category, in which we have the case of ideoplastics within the rarefied sphere itself. According to the testimony of clairvoyants, plasticity is so great in that sphere that they have the greatest difficulty in distinguishing between their own thoughts, ideas projected and visualised by themselves⁵ and others which come to them from without and which represent perceptions and sensations at this level. It is with good reason, therefore, that the word “fantasy” has two fairly distinct meanings. The first is usually rendered as “imagination”, a clear and vivid recollection of things in images in the mind, the writer’s or speaker’s presentation to himself, seeing in his “mind’s eye” what he wants to express.⁶ The second meaning of “fantasy” is an apparently unfathomable visionary process, a dreaming, an imagining of all kinds of “fancies”,⁷ which sometimes border on hallucinations, in other words, the conviction that what is not really present is seen or heard. How difficult and complicated the whole problem is can be seen from the fact that parapsychologists are inclined to speak about “truthful hallucinations”, that is,

1 See B 267, p. 140; apparent pregnancy as the result of fear is, however, an established fact.

2 See B 205, p. 89 (tests carried out by E. Osty; see above, Vol. II, p. 199, note 1).

3 See E. Mattiesen, B 98, III, p. 203 ff.

4 See above, p. 25.

5 See above, Part II, p. 208; B 116, p. 230.

6 The “eidetics” (E. R. Jaensch) are those who have a social capacity for imaging things vividly and “plastically”.

7 The Stoics made a distinction between the *phantasia* and the *phantasma*; see B 36, Part I, p. 281.

for example, images which come to mind of a member of the family in need¹ and which are later proved to have been true, in other words, when it is learnt afterwards that the member of the family in question was in those or in similar circumstances. I say "in those or in similar" circumstances, because it often emerges that the impressions which became conscious were in the main correct, but in some way distorted, obscure or symbolic. This would appear to be a case of plasticity, the formation of illusions or an exuberance of forms playing a part.

Almost everyone is familiar with this exuberance of forms from the experience of his own dreams. Some of those who have studied the question, however, have maintained that at least part of the content of dreams points to real experiences during sleep² and a few, such as Frederik van Eeden, have tended to speak of a "dream-body". These experiences in dreams—those in which the dreamer seems to float may, for example, be a recollection of a free movement of the soul while the body is asleep—are, if they are authentic, certainly heavily overlaid by gaudy and strangely overlapping images.

This wealth of forms at a more rarefied level is, of course, especially closely connected with our subject. What is particularly striking in this context is that, if we consider the ways in which belief in the existence of a finer body or a psychological *pneuma* has been expressed in the history of thought, some are purely abstract, such as "subtle body", *upādhi* (= limitation) and so on, but others are figurative. It cannot, for example, be disputed that the neo-Platonists commonly called the more rarefied soul body an *ochēma* a vehicle or vessel of the soul. But they also referred to it as a *chitōn*, a garment. Proclus, for example, used *ochēmata* and *chitōnes* inter-changeably.³ It would seem as though there was a certain hesitation or even fear involved in considering the one concept of the more rarefied (*leptoteron*⁴) body and that there was a certain comfort or familiarity in speaking about a vehicle or a garment. In any case, the use of the terms "vehicle", "chariot", "garment" or "tunic" for the rarefied body has been so common that I have often wondered whether it has not really been the intention to refer to a body consisting of fine matter in many of the cases in which mention has been made of a vehicle or a chariot in connection with the soul, even though no explicit reference has been made in such cases

1 The "telepathy of crisis"; see B 260, p. 267; B 267, p. 71.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 199, 217.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 52.

4 See the index.

to a subtle body.¹ If the plasticity in the more rarefied sphere to which I have referred above is in fact correct, then we are bound to ask ourselves whether it has not given rise to a very varied and many-sided use of different images for the subtle, higher body. This would certainly explain the use of many different images, each of which probably points in its own way to a subtle body, even though a great deal of diversity exists among these images.

The first of these images is the *vehicle* or *chariot*. If we may be certain of the explanation of fine materiality in the case of the neo-Platonists, then surely it is obvious to ask whether Plato did not have a similar intention to that of the neo-Platonists when he mentioned *ochēmata*. Secondly, may we not also draw a parallel between the chariots on which Plato believed the gods rode and the *vimānas* which figure in the Mahābhārata and elsewhere in Indian philosophy?² Are the fiery chariots referred to in connection with Elijah's ascension also perhaps not better thought of as relating to some higher vehicle of the prophet?³ Are ascensions in general frequently not thought of in much too literal, too physical a sense?

There are, however, other images which can help us here, including the idea that man can raise himself, as a soul, without a vehicle, but perhaps with a *horse*—a "heavenly steed". As we have seen, tradition has it that Mohammed made use of a "heavenly steed" on his way to God.⁴ Furthermore, in the Guimet Museum in Paris, there is a wooden representation of *Lun-rta*, the "aerial horse" of Tibet.

Another very popular image is that of the *bird* or of the state of being *winged*. After all, birds raise themselves up by means of their wings into the air, which is relatively rarefied matter. The theme of the "soul-bird"⁵ is therefore a very common one. What is more, the angels are usually represented as winged, as are the horses drawing the chariots of the soul.⁶ Other very well-known images are the dragon,⁷ so often found on or as kites in China, the butterfly—the *angelica farfalla*⁸—or *psuchē*. One cannot help entertaining the suspicion that those who used these images *at the same time* also had something of a subtle character in mind.

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 233; see also Section 26, "The Vehicle Theme".

2 See above, Part I, p. 205, Vol. II, p. 36.

3 See above, Part I, p. 140-141, Vol. II, p. 64, 233.

4 See above, Part I, p. 142, Vol. II, p. 113.

5 See the index.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 233.

7 See above, Part I, p. 281.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 222.

In his *Lux Perpetua* (B 23), F. Cumont listed many of these images that have been used in connection with the soul.¹ He also linked the use of these images with the neo-Platonic concept of *ochēma*.

Cumont also referred to the fact that, to indicate the contact that may exist between different levels, the theme of the ladder has often been used, for example, in the Old Testament (Jacob's dream, Gen. 28. 12) and in the Koran.²

The mutually contradictory or every divergent use of these images does not necessarily indicate a basically different meaning, in other words, that they do not point to the same background of fine materiality.³ Because of the extreme plasticity at the higher level, there was little surprise in men's minds that the various images used would contradict each other or merge into one another. Even such a vague and undefined image as the *cloud* could be used to indicate a higher, finer reality.⁴

We are, however, bound to ask whether certain limits are not set to the use of these different images. What is especially striking is that many sensory qualities—colours, sounds, smells and so on—also play an important part in all these visions, as they do in our ordinary dreams. The pure positivist or sensualist is therefore bound to say that it is clear that human beings are always, as far as their ideas are concerned, dependent on what comes to them through their ordinary senses. On the other hand, however, as we have already seen, many of these sensory qualities have been used in contexts in which much more has been intended than simply the perceptions of the “five” ordinary senses. I am in any case convinced that this is so and shall be discussing this whole question in greater detail later in this work (see Section 101 ff). We may therefore conclude that, among all the plastic ideas concerning this more rarefied level, it is possible for certain elements which contain more than “fancy”—fantasy in the less favourable sense—to occur.

Another striking fact is that there is *one* manner of imagining or representing the more rarefied body that is presumed to exist, a manner which does not rely on images such as the vehicle, the horse, wings and so on. This is the theme of the *figure* as such. This theme has, however, two limitations. The first is that there has always been a

1 See above, Part I, p. 144, note 4, 233, Vol. II, 20, note 4.

2 See above, Part II, p. 113; see B 210, p. 299; see Plate 9, William Blake's *Jacob's Dream* (Blunt, Plate 44) and J. E. Cirlot's *A Dictionary of Symbols*, under “Jacob's dream”.

3 Ancient man was moreover less inclined than we are to use pure imagery; see above, Vol. II, p. 218-219, 231-232.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 220; see also above, pp. 22-23.

distinct preference for the *eidolon*, the small figure, the *mannikin*, the thumbling or the *humunculus*. The second limitation is that the human figure used in such cases always has a tendency to take on the ideal shape of the *sphere*. I shall be returning to this later.¹ At the moment, however, it is more appropriate to discuss the theme of excursion and the connection between this and hylic pluralism.

100 EXCURSION

This is certainly one of the themes which is encountered quite often in connection with hylic pluralism, but which undoubtedly occurs far more frequently in the history of human thought unaccompanied by hylic pluralism than accompanied by it. As a consequence of this, it is hardly necessary for me to discuss every aspect of this theme here,² although I am bound to say something about it in this broader sense.

In general, there has for a very long time been a widespread belief that the soul or the person can leave the ordinary body and make an excursion.³ As a rule, the soul returns afterwards to the body, unless it leaves the body permanently at death. The soul's absence before its return may be long or short and it may be more or less intensive—from a deep unconsciousness to normal sleep from which it is possible to be easily aroused and which, in the context of this theme, is often regarded as an activity of the soul. On his return, that is, when he regains consciousness or wakes up, the person is often able to tell stories about what he thinks that he has experienced in his dream or even give detailed accounts about a sojourn in another world.

According to the ethnologists, the primitive peoples especially hold such views. All the authorities, Kruyt, Hellpach, Hidding and Fischer, for example, say that these ideas occur frequently among the primitive peoples whom they have dealt with.⁴ The free soul is a very common concept among the primitive tribes and this soul is absent in sleep, fainting and unconsciousness and can experience all kinds of adventures when it leaves the body.

These ideas are not, however, confined to people of a "primitive" mentality—they are also encountered among much more highly developed people living in more civilised societies. In that case, of

1 See below, Section 102.

2 See above, p. 67.

3 The use of the term "excursion" in this context seems to go back to F. W. Myers; see B 195, p. 210.

4 See Part I, p. 73 ff; see also above, Vol. II, p. 21.

course, they are almost always branded at once as "myths". As one would expect, they are frequently encountered in Western classical antiquity. A notable example is the story of Aristee's ecstasies and alleged appearances in different places.¹ This, of course, is a case of the theme of the "double" or of "bilocation", so often discussed in parapsychology, in which a person is believed to have been seen in two different places, that is, in another place apart from the one in which his ordinary body is. Hermotimus of Klazomenae is also reputed to have left his body regularly for quite long periods, leaving it behind in a state of unconsciousness, while he went on "ecstatic journeys".² At the end of Plato's *Republic* (614 d), there is the story of Er, the son of Armenius, who, after having been wounded in battle, regained consciousness twelve days later and gave a detailed account of the situation in the beyond, from which he had just escaped.³ A similar story is that of Heraclides Ponticus (who belonged to Plato's Academy⁴) about the "ecstatic vision" of Empedotimus⁵ of Syracuse. As in the *Somnium Scipionis* in Cicero,⁶ the same theme also occurred in Plutarch's well-known story in *De sera numinis vindicta*—"Why the deity delayed to punish for so long"—cap. 22, about Aridaeus, whose real name was Thespesios. In Plutarch's story too, Aridaeus recovered consciousness after a few days and gave an account of what he had learned, among other things, about punishments in the underworld.⁷

The theme is therefore a common one and is not confined to the "primitive" peoples. There is, as I have suggested, a tendency to overlook it as a "myth". G.R.S. Mead was, however, of the opinion that Plutarch, for example, indicated that it was not a *mythos* for him at least, but a *logos*.⁸ Whereas the nineteenth century author Rohde reported these stories, but poured scorn on them,⁹ Bidez had a very different attitude towards them.

The theme of excursion also occurs again and again in the Mahābhārata and elsewhere in Indian thought.¹⁰ The Chinese philosophers

1 See E. Rohde, *Psyche* (B 132), II, p. 92.

2 See B 132, II, p. 94 ff.

3 See J. Bidez, *Eos* (B 12), p. 42ff; B 135, p. 109.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 34.

5 See B 132, II, p. 94, note 1; B 12, p. 53; B 135, p. 110.

6 *De Republica*, VI; see B 170, p. 471; B 33, p. 321.

7 See the translation in J. J. Hartman's *De Avondzon des Heldendoms*, II, p. 317 ff and in B 100, III; see also B 135, p. 113.

8 B 100, III, p. 6.

9 See, for example, B 132, II, p. 320, 95, 96.

10 See above, Part I, p. 199; see also the index.

also debated whether the soul was able to leave the body temporarily and go on journeys during sleep.¹

Most remarkable of all, perhaps, is the prominent place occupied by the theme in modern parapsychology.² Let us first of all consider the question of the "dream-body". As we have already seen, the Dutch doctor and poet, Fredrik van Eeden, declared that he was in the habit of having, not only ordinary dreams, but also special "lucid dreams", in which he was able to move about freely and to make use of a kind of dream-body.³ In his study, "Dreams and Out-of-the-Body Experiences,"⁴ the English philosopher C.D. Broad⁵ discussed this special kind of dream in considerable detail. He mentioned van Eeden's "lucid dreams" (p. 162 ff) and his own remarkable dreams (see, for example, p. 158 and thought that there was a transition from these dreams to "out-of-the-body experiences" in the more general sense of the consciousness being apparently concentrated "in a secondary body" (p. 168). The American sociologist Hornell Hart has also analysed this special kind of dream, concluding that man can be conscious of possessing a body which is visible and which can be freely moved, but which is nevertheless not the ordinary physical body, because it can, for example, elevate itself. This dream-body is a "vehicle of consciousness", an "objective reality" in the case of the person who has the experience referred to.⁶

I have in fact briefly reproduced Hornell Hart's opinions in the wrong order above, giving the conclusion that he reached in his last book first. This conclusion was preceded by long research on his part. His interest in this subject was quite obvious at the international Parapsychological Conference at Utrecht in 1953.⁷ From 1954 onwards, he conducted a small scale survey on the whole question and published his conclusions in *The Enigma of Survival*.⁸ In his opinion,

1 See above, Part I, p. 281 f.

2 In the paragraphs which follow, I shall, of course, have to refer again and again to parapsychological ideas and to studies in parapsychology. The reader will not take it amiss if I do not discuss what I refer to in very great detail in every case. A great deal more has been written in general about these and related problems than has been written about hylic pluralism and in particular about hylic pluralism in the context of excursion. Up till the present, no summary of this subject has been available. On the other hand, as far as the purely parapsychological aspects of this question of excursion are concerned, it is not difficult for the reader to acquire information.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 199-200.

4 In *Lectures on Psychical Research* (1962; B 195), pp. 153-189.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 15-16.

6 See B 214, p. 225.

7 *Conference Report I*, Proceedings, p. 91 ff; B 264, II, 2, p. 81 ff; "Man outside his Body?"; see also above, Part I, p. 105, Vol. II, p. 199-200.

8 1959; B 214. The obvious step is to link the two problems of continued existence after death and excursion, because it is obvious that, if man can leave his ordinary body during life, he can continue to live as a free soul.

we have at least forty-one firmly established cases of excursion at our disposal.¹ I have already mentioned one of the most striking of these, the "Wilmot case".² Mr Wilmot dreamed, during a sea voyage, that his wife had visited him and Mr Tait, who shared his cabin, perceived an apparition of a woman. Mrs Wilmot was very uneasy about her husband's fate because of the violent storm at sea and a recent shipwreck. It had seemed to her that she had gone to him on the night concerned, found him in his cabin and kissed him. What is important, however, in this case is one particular detail—the fact that she had hesitated before foregoing right into the cabin when she saw another man there and that this other man had noticed her apparition and her hesitation.

Others have also commented on this case—Broad, for example, was convinced that it was unreasonable to doubt the correctness of the recollections of the person concerned.³ I have also mentioned, in an earlier part of this work,⁴ a very similar case, in which a doctor, travelling by night in a boat in Florida, had the sensation that he was "walking through air" and that he was in a friend's room a thousand miles away. This friend saw the doctor and said "I thought you were in Florida". Their letters also crossed.⁵ In a third case, a clergyman, L. J. Bertrand was walking in the mountains with a party of people and had to remain behind because he was tired. He experienced a faintness and felt as though he was floating in the air. Remarkably enough, he could still follow the movements of the party ahead and even noticed a small act of dishonesty on the part of the guide, which was confirmed later.⁶

Hornell Hart has called this type of case "travelling ESP" and what appears to others—for example, the hesitant Mrs Wilmot—a "projected body".⁷ I am very much inclined to think here of my definition of fine materiality as that which works and is effective despite unusual circumstances.⁸ This type of apparition may be quite fleeting or changeable—the reader may recall what I said about the plasticity of finer matter in Section 99—but, if something is attained, such as a

1 See B 214, p. 182.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 200.

3 See B 195, p. 177; see also B 244, VII, p. 41 ff; G.N.M. Tyrrell (B 266, p. 116 found it difficult to explain this case with the aid of his own theory, but did not doubt its authenticity.

4 See above, Part I, p. 105.

5 See B 214, pp. 199-200.

6 B 244, VIII, p. 194 ff; B 266, p. 151; B 195, p. 185; B 202, p. 5.

7 Report Conference, I, p. 1; see also above, Vol. II, p. 7-8.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 8; see also above, p. 38.

making oneself known, and the details are later confirmed by the other party, than it is not a purely subjective hallucination, but an objective reality, a vehicle of the human consciousness, that we have here.

It is possible to see a connection here between phenomena involving excursions and hylic pluralism or fine materiality, on the basis of modern parapsychological research. On the other hand, it is possible too to ask whether the theme of excursion, which has, as we have seen, occurred so frequently and indeed still occurs both among primitive peoples and in other, more sophisticated and developed societies, does not have its origin in the fact that something effective has really been suspected or even confirmed in this context. Everything, after all, fits so neatly into place—the primitive people's acceptance of fine materiality in the case of the soul and hylic pluralism as I have defined it. What is more, all the "primitive" tribes investigated seem to have been much more open towards impressions not derived from the ordinary senses than modern man with his high degree of rationality.

The theme of excursion has also been discussed in various other ways in parapsychology. For example, there have been attempts to make human "guinea pigs" under hypnosis ascertain things taking place elsewhere (a situation, for instance, in another room in another place). Somnambulism has been studied systematically in recent years with this in mind and it would seem that the results have not been at all bad.¹ It is, however, not possible to discuss them here.

A great deal has also been written about the phenomenon of excursion itself, but most of this has consisted of descriptions of subjective experiences rather than objective observations of effects. Two books in particular merit special mention in this context, the first being Sylvan J. Muldoon and Hereward Carrington's *The Projection of the Astral Body* (1929; B 229). Muldoon was the man who had the experiences of excursion and Carrington, who should not be confused with W. Whately Carrington, is an American parapsychologist of good reputation. C.D. Broad has given good account of what took place here.² Muldoon had his first out-of-the-body experience at the age of twelve and later began to experiment with these experiences, claiming that he could evoke them consciously. What characterises this experience is that the person concerned has the sensation that he is floating above his ordinary body and is making use of another body, the astral body. This astral body cannot move physical objects,

¹ See above, Vol. II, p. 199-200; B 219, XVII, 1963, p. 161 ff; B 264, VI, p. 4.

² B 195, p. 182 ff; see also B 214, p. 241 ff; B 98, II, p. 317.

but it is, on the other hand, not impeded by them (that is, by walls, for example). If desired, it can also move very quickly. The person concerned sees his own body, his ordinary body, lying in bed and the two bodies remain attached together by a kind of elastic thread.¹ Muldoon has made all this clear in this book and in two others by means of sketches and other, similar accounts are quoted. A more recent publication in the same spirit is Robert Crookall's *The Study and Practice of Astral Projection. Analyses-of Case Histories*—(1961; B. 202). Both books contain a number—quite an impressive number—of cases with great many details analysed by the authors, many of which agree in many ways with each other.

The fundamental question, however, is this—how much confidence can we really have in such subjective testimonies? I am of the opinion that we cannot deny that they have some value. (I shall be returning to this point later²) It is, however, very important to remember that a much deeper impression is made by having someone in one's circle of friends who has experienced an excursion, in this case during a serious operation,³ than by hearing accounts of excursions made by others, perhaps at second, third or fourth hand.

Yet these accounts of experiences within our own intimate environment, of others in the world of our own time or even of others in previous centuries are all strikingly similar in many respects. One has the definite impression, for example, that it is not entirely by chance that this theme should occur among such widely divergent primitive peoples. The phenomenological picture is in general that the person concerned has, in his own opinion, left his ordinary body, which he can often see lying, for example, in bed, and is consciously making use of another, more supple body in which he can move much more freely. This is clearly and undoubtedly a case of *hylic pluralism*. There is explicit reference to a second, more subtle body. The effectiveness of this experience (see my definition of *hylic pluralism* above⁴) has in several cases been established externally (see the Wilmot case and others⁵). Experiments have also been made, for instance with subjects under hypnosis and with "travelling ESP" and purposeful effectiveness, such as moving somewhere else and so on, is apparently

1 See Muldoon, *op. cit.*, p. 29 ff. There are also other references to this "silver cord" (see Eccles. 12.6) elsewhere; see, for example, B 202, p. 4, 194.

2 See below, Section 117.

3 See B 265, XVI, p. 219.

4 See above, p. 38.

5 See above, p. 77.

always contained in this experience. We may therefore conclude that the theme undoubtedly comes within our special subject.

We must now discuss a few other themes which are related to the phenomenon of excursion. The first of these is *ekstasis* ecstasy, literally "standing outside" oneself and in the extended sense, rapture, transport of the mind. In antiquity, the term was used especially for perplexity of the mind or spirit, giving an external impression of an incommensurable experience. It always contained, however, an experience that the attention was transferred elsewhere. Whereas excursion and astral projection are fairly neutral concepts, even though those who claim to have experienced these phenomena have spoken of a powerful sensation of liberation or of dissociation, ecstasy has a far stronger connotation of rapture and enthusiasm, in other words, it contains a powerful element of religious mysticism. It is in this sense that it is used, for instance, in the case of Plotinus' ecstasies or of the ecstasies experienced by the mystics.¹ Seen from the phenomenological point of view, however, ecstasy has, from the very beginning and indeed in principle, always had an objective subject. "Rapture" or "transportation" after all, mean being "carried off" or "snatched away" and "enthusiasm" means being "inspired by a god" and thus indicates the activity or effectiveness of a higher function of the consciousness.

It would be impossible to embark on a detailed discussion here of the whole subject of ecstasy and of man in ecstasy. I can, however, in passing, draw attention to the fact that, during his visions, the ecstatic is apparently *somewhere* and *elsewhere* and that he *sees* something. It is true that the emphasis may fall on a mystical consciousness of unity, but it may equally well and even at the same time be placed on an environment, a different environment. A typical example of this Paul's report in 2 Cor. 12, that he was "caught up to the third heaven" (2 Cor. 12. 2).³ Similar reports have been made about other religious figures, such as, for example, Mohammed.⁴ This idea of a heaven and indeed of more than one heaven is of course hylic pluralism in a cosmological context.

In connection with this whole subject, it is also necessary to mention the attempts that have been made to evoke states of ecstasy artificially by means of drugs such as mescaline. Aldous Huxley (1894-1962) has

1 See B 36, under "Ekstase".

2 See, for example, M. C. Mourik Broekman, B 228, p. 28 ff; G. van der Leeuw, B 90, index.

3 See also E. Benz, *Paulus als Visionar*, B 192, 1952, p. 81 ff.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 113.

even asserted that, in this way, *The Doors of Perception* (1954), that is, other senses, are opened and visions are revealed, described in another book as *Heaven and Hell* (1956). Space prevents me from saying any more about Huxley's experiences and conclusions here.

A related theme which I cannot avoid discussing, however, is that of *travelling*, especially upwards, in other words, the theme of *ascensions to heaven* and also that of *descents into Hades*, the related theme of travelling downwards. These can be regarded as excursion themes—the person concerned leaves his ordinary body and his ordinary existence, either temporarily or for good. This theme is very widespread in the history of religion, so widespread in fact that a complete survey of it here would be out of the question. There can be no doubt that these journeys have, at least partly, a literary, symbolic and mystical meaning.¹ As examples of this, we may quote Aeneas' journey into the underworld in Book VI of the *Aeneid* or Dante's long journey in the *Divine Comedy* to hell, purgatory and heaven. It is, however, probable that various elements in Dante's journey also have an empirical and realistic aspect.²

Alfons Rosenberg (b.1902) also collected a great deal of material concerning this theme of the journey of the soul of man after death in his book *Die Seelenreise* (1952; B 135).³ It is moreover clear that he was himself convinced of its reality. Another author who has provided very many data is W. Bousset (*Die Himmelreise der Seele*, 1960).

Even apart from Christianity, the theme of the ascension of important religious figures has always been very widespread.⁴ It is, however, necessary to make clear distinctions here. On the one hand, it is possible to read about what would nowadays be called a bodily assumption into heaven in, for instance, E. Rohde's well-known work, in which he speaks of "carrying off to eternal togetherness of body and soul".⁵ On the other hand, however, one hears again and again of ascensions in which the body did *not* disappear at the same time as the soul.⁶ It is precisely this kind of ascension to which I want to draw attention now, because what went to heaven in such cases was probably a vehicle of fine matter—this may be assumed because of the belief in classical

1 See B 237, p. 280.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 221.

3 See my article B 261, LIV, p. 125 ff.

4 See, for example, G. van der Leeuw, B 90, index.

5 B 132, II, p. 373, see also p. 431 (examples); the theme of "levitation" is really the same as this "carrying off" on a smaller scale.

6 Ibid., II, p. 373, note 1; T. Hopfner, B 70, I, p. 91.

antiquity in the fine materiality of the soul. It is, however, not possible to say that a need was always felt in antiquity to make a clear distinction in cases of this kind, with the result that the intention was not always completely clear. An oracle concerning the emperor Julian the Apostate described his apotheosis after death, saying that, after having separated himself from the long suffering of his human limbs (1), the hero was taken up to Olympus on a fiery chariot, *purilamtes ochēma*, to his father's court in the ethereal light.¹ Pepin has made this comment²: "It was on one of those 'pneumatic' vehicles, not by an ordinary chariot, that the emperor Julian hoped, to be carried off after his death". In a very similar way, I have assumed that the "chariot of fire" named in connection with Elijah's ascension into heaven (2 Kings 2. 11-12) has to be thought of as the prophet's own vehicle of fine matter.³

The situation with regard to these ascensions is very similar to that with regard to Mary's overshadowing by the Holy Spirit.⁴ I do not want to be drawn into a discussion of Church dogmas here, but am obliged to observe that, if any attempt is to be made to reduce rather than to increase the miracle aspect of the account, the ascension, the leaving of the ordinary body on death in the case of an important figure in a radiant vehicle of fine matter is undoubtedly the rational interpretation in comparison with what Rohde called the "carrying off" of the soul and the body at the same time.

As for the symbolism of apotheosis, for example, in the case of emperors, it is only necessary to say here that the eagle plays an important part as the bird of the soul.⁵ In his study on the "Journey of the soul to heaven", to which I have referred above, Bousset points to the significance of the heavenly garments which are bestowed in such cases: "In the Ascension and in II Enoch, the garment is quite clearly the new body which the believer gains."⁶ Enoch is, of course, one of the figures who is reported to have made an ascension into heaven⁷ and, according to Bousset, there is every reason for this to be interpreted non-literally.

There is also another reason, in quite a different connection, for this non-literal interpretation. In addition to ascensions into heaven,

1 See B 245, p. 17; J. Bidez, *La vie de l'empereur Julien* (1930), p. 329; F. Cumont, *Recherches sur le symbolisme funéraire des Romains*, p. 175;

2 B 190, p. 298, note 2.

3 See index, under Elijah; see above, Part I, p. 140 ff; see my Plate 3.

4 See above, p. 53-54.

5 See F. Cumont, "L'aigle funéraire" in *Études syriennes* (1917), p. 91.

6 *op.cit.*, p. 42, note 2; see also above, Section 93 (Chiton).

7 See above, p. 21; see also Heb. 11.5.

there are, of course, descents into Hades, and it has often been claimed that witches ride to the witches' sabbath on broom sticks! K. Kiesewetter has suggested that these "excursions to the sabbath" ought to be regarded, perhaps, as "visionary journeys without any real background, with clairvoyance, an emission of the astral body",¹ in other words, as excursions—that is to say, insofar as they are real. Several remarkable reports, according to which a number of tests have been made with mutual approval in certain witches trials, are in agreement with this. The "witch" is said to remove herself in order to cover herself with special witches' ointment and, according to her, it is possible to ascertain—according to one of the accounts, by looking through a key hole!—that she really disappears. Later, so it is said, the witch can be encountered in what is now called a trance. (It should be remembered that, for the most part, these accounts refer to past events, if indeed they were true). According to Fr. H. Zwetsloot, S. J. this particular account occurs, among other places, in the *Magiae naturalis libri viginti*, II, chapter 26, of John Baptist Porta (1540-1615). This report may be regarded as an attempt to replace a highly improbable literal event by a more rational version or explanation, in other words, astral excursion. It would not be wrong to say that the theme of excursion has many points in common in most cases with hylic pluralism.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that a number of the products of the visual arts which I discussed in Section 89 and which caused me to ask whether the artists in question did not have something of a fine material nature in mind when they created their works especially in those cases representing what appear to be excursions. The *eidolon* making an excursion has, however, been represented in so many different ways, depending mainly on the environment in which the artist was living. There are many examples of this. One of my illustrations, taken from *Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte* (R. Wilhelm and C. G. Jung), shows the "separation of the spirit body to an independent existence" in the case of a meditating Buddhist. There are also several variations of this.² On the Greek amphora of ca. 500 B.C., which I show on Plate I, something quite different appears—a small warrior emerging from a dead one. Elijah's ascension, in which the prophet is sitting in the "chariot of fire" (see my Plate 3 and Plate 4 in Volume I), is, of course, mentioned in the Old Testament, but the text does not say that he is in the chariot. Medieval artists frequently

1 See B 82, p. 567.

2 See B 229, p. 154.

represented the excursion of the soul at death in the form of a little person or a doll. Examples of this in the Middle Ages and later are the illustrations in the *Ars Moriendi*¹ or on the icon' showing the death of the Virgin Mary (see my Plate 12), on El greco's painting of the Funeral of Count d'Orgaz or the sculptured fresco of the Campo Santo at Pisa (see Plate 10). Finally, there is the recent example of the funeral hearse at Aleppo, still in use in 1963 (see my Plate 5).² A modern artist, John Raedeker (1885-1956) has also dealt with this theme in his "Fleeing of Life" (see Plate 11).³

There are, in addition to this, transitions to other ideas. The illustration from the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* (see my Plate 2 in Volume I), usually entitled "The soul of Ani visits the mummified body",⁴ refers to a situation in which an excursion has been made. The Annunciation in relief on the Lady Chapel at Würzburg (see Plate 8) contains a return of the *eidolon*.⁵ If indeed my interpretation of the figure of the little girl on Rembrandt's Night Watch⁶ as a vision of Saskia as a heavenly bride is correct, then this obviously refers to an excursion which was still to take place and which the artist anticipated with agony.

101 SENSE QUALITIES I

In Section 98 ("The Sense Organs"), I dealt with the question as to whether there might other, unusual senses in man, apart from his ordinary senses in the physiological sense, more or less latent in his being—something that has been assumed or suspected by a number of authors. In this connection, I discussed the problem contained in the concept of extra-sensory perception and came to the conclusion that the transition between the five ordinary senses and other possible sense, perhaps finer ones, would appear to be less sharp or absolute as might be imagined.⁷ The senses are obviously part of the science of physiology and for this reason I dealt with various aspects of the subject under the heading of the physiological *pneuma*. At the same time, however, it was clear that the subject went far beyond the sphere of ordinary physiology—to such an extent that it seemed possible to speak of metaphysiology. At the end of Section, 98, I said that I intended to return to the question of sense *qualities* and this is what I propose

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 239.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 239.

3 From the Kröller-Müller Museum at Otterlo, Netherlands.

4 See above, Part I, p. 115-116.

5 See above, p. 54-55.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 240.

7 See above, p. 60 f.

to do here.¹ It will be seen in this section that this aspect of the problem is even further removed from the sphere of the ordinary physiology of the senses, with the result that there is every reason for us to deal with it under the heading of the psychological *pneuma* rather than under that of the physiological *pneuma*.

Generally speaking, a distinction is made between the *capacities* or abilities to see, hear, smell etc., that is, sight, hearing, smell etc., and together with the organs used in these capacities (the eye, the ear, the nose, etc.) and the *qualities* which constitute the content of the perceptions concerned, that is, colours, sounds, odours etc. It should be noted that I have used "etc". deliberately here—after all, what must be added to these three categories are, first of all, those of taste—the tongue—and feeling—the skin—so as to complete the traditional list of five ordinary senses and, secondly, an entirely different series of sensory capacities. These include, for example, man's perceptions of hot and cold, of round and square etc., etc. Although there is no general agreement among scholars as to how they should be categorised—should we speak, for instance, of a separate sense of temperature or not?—they are quite real and important enough for us to accept their existence.²

I should first of all like to consider the question as to what extent hylic pluralistic presuppositions can be taken as a point of departure in two directions. The first is the problem of the senses as such, that is, of course, the problem of the unusual or extra senses mentioned above in Section 98. The second is the problem as to whether the contents or qualities of the specific perceptions are involved in such a way that the normal boundary is crossed and hylic pluralism is brought to the fore. In other words, *is there not a phenomenological extension of the qualities of sensory perception connected with an extension of the senses themselves?* The group or category to which the quality belongs—colour, sound, odour etc.—is, of course, well known as far as the ordinary sphere of experience is concerned, but its use certainly exceeds the normal sphere to some extent at least in this case. This becomes quite evident as soon as we consider, for example, any theme connected with supraterrrestrial experience—white, celestial light, heavenly sounds, figures or *eidola* thought to consist of fine matter and so on.

This entire field is so wide, both as far as the details it contains and as far as the different opinions held about it are concerned, that,

¹ See above, p. 65.

² See above, pp. 55, 60-61.

however interesting it may be, it has to be treated in a concise way. I propose to subdivide the matter in such a way that I shall be dealing first with the "lower", primarily given sense qualities in this Section. Next, I shall consider the figure or eidolon in Section 102. After that, I shall go on to the qualities of "higher" sensory spheres—this will be in Section 103—and shall finally discuss the question of light or *phos* separately, in Section 104.

To begin with, however, I have to make a general comment about the question of *imagery* or *realism*, which is once again raised in this context. The positivist or sensualist is bound to say that all these sense qualities are derived from the content of ordinary perception and, however much they are manipulated by man's imagination in order to make it easier to point to certain spiritual situations their origin is still to be found in ordinary perception because *nihil est in intellectu*. . . .¹ In other words, according to positivism or sensualism, it is simply and solely a question of imagery or of metaphorical language.

Those who oppose positivism, on the other hand, take quite a different point of view, believing that several categories of qualities of sensory perceptions occur,² each with a very extensive range or scale. It is an established fact that qualities which are quite closely related to our capacity or capacities of perception—infra-red light, for example, or very high-pitched sounds—often do not reach us at all via our normal perceptions. This does not, however, imply that they are any less real because of this. Similarly, it is true to say that many species of animal perceive different aspects of the scale that I have referred to from those perceived by human beings. What prevents us, then, from presupposing the existence of a further extension of these qualities, in which psychical colours, for instance, or sounds which differ from those of our normal experience occur? Modern occultists and clairvoyants tend to accept this view. In addition, there are the earlier figures and the conceptions which are familiar to us from our knowledge of the phenomenology of religion and which have, incidentally, all too readily been dismissed as primitive or mythical. Many of these ideas are in support of this theory.

Several philosophers have also been inclined towards this realism in connection with the extension of the qualities of sensory perception. I shall call attention to some of these thinkers and their ideas when

¹ See above, pp. 57 ff; 73.

² With regard to the connection between these different groups, for example, in synaesthesia, see below, Section 105.

I come to discuss the particular aspect of sense qualities. Here, I should like simply to mention H. Conrad-Martius' opinion about this question. In her book, *Bios und Psyche* (1949), she said that words such as hard and soft, elastic and rigid, tenacious and fluid, could not really be used in connection with the psychical element unless they were at the same time also psychical qualities. "A complete ontology of the psychical aspect", she asserted, "has still to be developed and studied here".¹ In her opinion, it is not simply a question of imagery in this case. In this, of course, she shows herself to be a realist.² In accordance with this, she accepted the existence of an "interior soul-space" and an "etheric apparent body".³

This concept of the "soul-space" confronts us directly with our problem. I shall leave till later the question concerning a hylic pluralistic or unusual space.⁴ But the sensation of space itself has qualities. As I have already indicated, the physiological psychologists accept a number of "lower" senses which are often not very easy to define or to situate, but are no less real because of this. The wellknown psychologist Georg Anschütz (1886-1953) included them under the heading of the "skin sense", in other words, the "sense of touch" in his book *Psychologie*.⁵ Certainly, they all have something to do with feeling or touching in the simplest sense of the word. I shall be returning to some of these lower senses mentioned by Anschütz later in this chapter.

There is no general agreement among scholars as to whether a sense of movement should also be assumed to exist as part of the sense of touch. Heymans has spoken explicitly of sensations of movement as a separate category⁶ and regarded them as so important that he tried to deduce the whole spatial *a priori* from these qualities.⁷ (I am bound to point out that I do not agree with him here.⁸) It is, however, beyond dispute that the qualities *above and below* or *high and low*, *right and left*, *before and behind* and *straight and crooked* form a set of very fundamental qualities of perception or sensation connected with the sense of touch. What strikes us in this context is the very wide use of names of such qualities to express certain things. This does undeniably,

1 *op. cit.*, p. 110; see also above, Vol. II, p. 209.

2 Just as we speak, for example, of "biblical realism".

3 See *op. cit.*, p. 112, 120; see also above, Vol. II, p. 208-209.

4 See below, Section 110.

5 1953 (B 189), p. 215 ff.

6 *Inleiding tot de algemeene psychologie*, ed. Pannenberg (1949), p. 90.

7 See B 114, p. 48, 61, 228; § 67.

8 See *Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens*, § 40 ff; see also B 144 p. 46.

contain a good measure of imagery. The high ideals of one person while another goes downhill more and more, the highest and best as opposed to what is low on the ground, straight forward dealings, upright behaviour and righteousness in contrast with what is flat, flat-footed, twisted and forced—one could quote numerous examples. Perhaps the most obvious is the contrast between “I lift my eyes up to the hills. From whence does my help come?” (Ps. 121) and hell or the underworld, which is always thought of as the most profound depths. One is bound to ask, *is all this nothing but imagery?* H. Conrad-Martius insisted that this “above and below” also had an ontological significance.¹

Both modern occultists and a number of other, often earlier thinkers hold similar views. In my opinion, the best approach to this question is by way of the concept of *heaviness*. It is significant that Anschütz listed the sensation or perception of pressure among the many divisions of the sense of touch or “skin sense” and subdivided this further into the antitheses hard and soft, sharp and blunt, wet and dry.² Pressure is moreover, generally experienced as heaviness. Just as the science of kinematics has been developed from sensations of movement, so too has the sensation of pressure been elaborated in the scientific concepts of mass and so on, including, among other things, the idea of heavy mass or bulk.³ Various aspects of subtlety are, it should be noted, also contained in this. As I have already indicated, despite the fact that certain elements did not fit very easily into his teaching about psychical monism, Heymans ascribed a greater or lesser force to the separate contents of the consciousness in their urge to reach the centre of attention. In this way, he came to use such concepts as the psychical energy of distance and level.⁴ These contents of the consciousness thus exert pressure on the centre of the consciousness, but the pressure that they exert is not physical. We do not, however, need to look very far for this phenomenon in its theoretical elaboration and are once again confronted with our question. If someone is under *psychical pressure*, is this once again nothing but imagery? Or is it rather that certain ideas and complexes of ideas are literally forcing themselves on him!

1 See *Der Raum* (B 199), p. 116. She is one of the very few authors who has made a serious attempt to reconcile the cosmological views of the ancient world with modern scientific theories and to do this furthermore not simply in the spirit of “how interesting to see how these ancient thinkers were tending towards modern ideas”—as Erna Lesky has done in the biological sphere (see above, p. 50).

2 B 189, p. 216.

3 See B 179, XIII, p. 438.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 187-188; see also B 69, II p. 319 ff.

And what about such concepts as heavy-hearted, downcast, low-spirited, depressed? Are these to be understood simply in the metaphorical sense? Even though I cannot quote convincing evidence from books and articles on occultism,¹ I know that the person who is heavy-hearted or depressed does not have "his tail between his legs" merely in the physical sense or look figuratively limp and drooping. On the contrary, I feel sure that his condition is always immediately apparent to the clairvoyant.²

Generally speaking, *falling* is the sign that heaviness is overcoming or has overcome a person. The heavy-hearted, depressed person prefers to lie down. In Dutch, a common idiom for "coming to grief" or "dying" is *komen te vallen*, to "have a fall" and both in English and in Dutch the expression "to fall in battle" occurs. Death is therefore the definitive "falling". In these cases, however, what we have is an overcoming by the force of gravity in the physical sense. Is there perhaps another, more subtle kind of falling in addition to this? The obvious case that springs to mind is the fall of man in Adam and the fall of some of the angels. In both of these, the word "fall" has an ethical significance. The individual can also fall or fall back into crime, sinful ways, bad habits and so, on but he never apparently falls into mercy or religious conversion.

It is a remarkable fact that several authors have established a connectant between this moral fall and the force of physical gravity. D. Saurat has written about "the ideas common to C. Renouvier and Victor Hugo—the moral fall of man was the origin of physical heaviness".³ Renouvier (1815-1903), on the other hand, believed in a subtle matter.⁴ This was also the case with Hugo,⁵ who also said himself quite unambiguously: "The first fault was the first weight".⁶

This is clearly hyllic pluralistic thinking and a good example of the occurrence of a quality of sensory perception in a more subtle context. To establish a connection between a moral fall and physical heaviness or gravity is also by no means as strange as it might appear. Such excursions on the part of the freely wandering soul (see Section 100) are, from the phenomenological point of view, also a breaking away from heaviness and slowness. This is even more radically so in the

1 See, however, B 116, p. 227.

2 According to Swedenborg, for instance, a person cannot conceal the state of his soul from the inner eye of another; see B 193, p. 440-441.

3 *Perspectives* (1938), p. 84.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 155.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 229.

6 See B 146, p. 117.

case of ascensions.¹ The *higher* quality, the "image" that is so deeply rooted, as I said a few pages back, is also always the lighter in weight. Exaltation as the result of an inspired sermon or religious address or rite is also the opposite of a "moral fall" and the clairvoyant would probably perceive, in such a case, not a "drooping", but a collapsed astral apparition, a widening radiant *augoeidēs* form. Fechner's view, that the force of gravity is the sense of the angels, by which they are conscious of their relationship with everything, is in accordance with this.^{2 3}

In certain civilisations, however, a connection which is both more constant and more persistent has been made between material heaviness and ethical and religious "heaviness" than was made, rather hesitatingly, by Renouvier and Victor Hugo. What I have in mind here is the doctrine of the *descent* or the *ascent of the soul through the spheres*, which was very widespread in the Hellenistic period and later.⁴ This was undoubtedly thought of in the cosmological sense; insofar as it was thought of as material, then it was to a great extent thought of in the sense of fine matter. In other words, just as the physical body is the outside garment of many garments or *chitōnes*,⁵ so too is this world the lowest of a number of other worlds or spheres. In accordance with this doctrine, the soul descends from one sphere to the next, which is lower and, in so doing, puts on each time a coarser garment—or vehicle (*chitōn* or *ochēma*). When the soul ascends through the spheres, on the other hand, one of these garments—or vehicles—is taken off; this is the process that Pepin called the "strip-tease of the soul".⁶ There can be no doubt that the lowest of these spheres or worlds is the more coarse and heavy and that the higher spheres or worlds become increasingly lighter and more rarefied in turn.⁷ Insofar as "heavy" (in connection with "pressure") is a quality of sensory perception, we

1 See above, p. 81.

2 "Vergleichende Anatomie der Engel", *Kleinere Schriften*, p. 158.

3 There would seem to be two exceptions to the generally accepted parallelism between light and exalted and heavy and inferior. These are gravity or seriousness (see H. Wagenvoort, *Varia Vita*, p. 11; *Imperium*, p. 103) and pride. The seriousness of the "man of gravity", however, refers to an indispensable soundness of underlying structure. Pride, on the other hand, is a false, unjustified exaltation, a delusion. "Levity" and "lightness" are also used in a pejorative sense, that is, in the sense of "frivolity" and a lack of sound structure.

4 See above, p. 16 and index.

5 See above, p. 17 ff.

6 See B 190, p. 301; see also above, p. 16.

7 In connection with this whole complex of doctrines, it would be possible to quote even more passages in an even greater number of authors than I have done above, on p. 17.

undoubtedly have a case of an assumed extension of one of these qualities here.¹

In modern occultism, for instance in spiritualism, there are frequent reports of spirits of the dead departing to "higher", more "rarefied" worlds some time after death. Contact with the living is also said to be more difficult from these "higher" worlds.² In the same context, reports have also been made of dying several times—this is clearly analogous to the 'strip-tease' of Pēpin.

"Pressure" also reminds one of "pain", whether the physiologists accept a separate sense of pain or not. There is, however, also a psychical pain—suffering or anguish. Is this suffering or anguish of the soul or spirit simply imagery? "A sword went through my soul"—it seems to me that it is more correct to say that physical pain and spiritual or mental suffering form a continuity than to say that the second is simply named after the first in the manner of an image.

Anschütz has also mentioned the antithesis *dry-wet*. Does this perhaps also occur as an extension of man's ordinary sensations or experience? In this connection, it should not be forgotten that Heraclitus called the soul, and especially the soul of the wise man, a dry light.³ Generally speaking, in the ancient world, what was dry represented the higher aspect (fire, for example), whereas what was damp represented the lower. A common subject for discussion was that of bodily exhalations (*anathumiasis*), which can be compared with the later doctrine of the *spiritus animales*,⁴ and Aristotle made a distinction between dry exhalations and damp ones, both of them being warm, the first being fire in the making and the second water in the making. The Stoics continued along these lines, developing this distinction still further.⁵

Damp can be generalised as *water* and this, of course, was one of the ancient elements. Among the pre-Socratic philosophers, Thales (ca. 625-545 B.C.) regarded water as the primordial matter from which everything had come. Other pre-Socratics, such as Anaximenes, believed that everything had originated from air. The doctrine of the *five* elements was, in a sense, a synthesis of these views establishing a certain order of importance in them, water being lower than fire,

1 Two fairly recent books, which I have not had the opportunity to study in detail, must be mentioned here: J. Nowak, *Grundriss einer ethischen Gravitationstheorie*, and H. Thoden van Velzen, *Zwaarte in verband met de toekomst der ziel* (1922).

2 See Marcelle de Jouvenel, *Au diapason du ciel* (preface by G. Marcel; Crookall (B 201), p. 216 ff.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 30-31; see also B 176, I, p. 28.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 41, 114.

5 See B 174, p. 125.

but higher than earth. Of course, in our own, ordinary environment, liquids are more subtle than solids.

I am bound to ask whether, by analogy with the explicit distinction made in oriental thought between the coarse elements in the ancient sense and the finer elements (the *sūkṣma-bhūtas* in Indian philosophy),¹ we should not be prepared to discern, in this damp element, something at a higher level than our ordinary food and drink of everyday life. Heraclitus' dry soul of the wise man was, for him, something more than a pure image. What is more, in various occult writings, the sphere which comes next to our own earth, the astral sphere, is known as the sphere of desire (*kama-manas*) and, in the succession of cosmic elements, this is the sphere of water. The lower daemons were also linked especially with the damp element.² We may therefore conclude that this damp element is in a sense an extension.

Anschütz has also pointed to the antithesis *warm-cold*. Certain contemporary scholars have accepted the existence of a separate sense of temperature for this sensation. Warmth, *to thermon*, which was, of course, closely related to the dry element, also played an important part in ancient thought and apparently a more profound part than in our thinking about climate and fever. Innate heat, *to emphuton thermon* was, according to Hippocrates, the cause of all life and was moreover closely connected with the fine *pneuma*.³ The ancients also believed that this factor played a part in conception.⁴ In a wide context, the Stoics distinguished between ordinary fire and another kind of fire, creative fire.⁵ In their doctrine of the periodic world fire, moreover, we find a culmination of the extension of heat or fire.⁶ Fire also appears to have played a part in certain unpleasant states after death—certain thinkers have argued, for example, that man must have a body after death since he would otherwise not be affected by this fire.⁷ Torture by fire as a punishment after death was also very widespread in Indian thought,⁸ an example of this being the "Laws of Manu".

Plutarch connected the fact that younger men were more passionate and older men less passionate with the fact that young men had a greater

1 See above, Part I, p. 226, Vol. II, p. 26-27.

2 See B 33, p. 318 and, for more on the question of the damp element, *to hugron* for example, B 233, p. 251; B 85, p. 322; B 161, p. 12.

3 See B 177, p. 85; see also above, Vol. II, p. 134.

4 See above, p. 50.

5 See above, Vol. II p. 44.

6 See B 170, p. 422.

7 Both certain Stoics and Tertullian were of this opinion: see B 174, p. 446.

8 See above, Part I, p. 197.

inward fire or warmth and older men less.¹ And do we not also speak in a different context, about a "warm heart" or "coldness" of feelings? It would be possible to digress at length about the "warmth" of the human heart and one is reminded here also of the whole mysticism of the "heart". Is this no more than imagery or does it refer to the state of a meta-organism in man?

It is in any case possible to say that the sense quality of warmth has been subject in certain environments and societies to various extensions.

Anschütz has also written about a "vibration sense",² and, as far as an extension of the qualities of sensory perception is concerned, it is clear that the concept of "finer vibrations" occurs again and again in the literature of modern occultism. If it is possible to write, as Groot has done, of ordinary natural science, "The soul of physics, the world as vibration",³ then this applies even more to the occult conception of the world. This, then, is another example of extension.

Anschütz has also included, in his list under the title of "skin sense", the "vital sensations", such as hunger and thirst, the feeling of satiation, the feeling of fatigue and so on.⁴ I should prefer to speak here of an inner sense of touch, but I would not deny that there is a group of sensations which are directly connected with the inner aspect of the body. (It would also be possible to include the sensation of pain within this group). I should like to say a little more about one subdivision within this group of inner sensations, namely the feeling of being *nourished* or of having been fed, resulting in the cessation of hunger or thirst, because it seems to me that hylic pluralistic elements emerge here and there in this feeling.

It is obvious, of course, that a very great deal of pure imagery is used in this context. Again and again, one hears of "spiritual food" and of not being able to live "from bread alone". The palmist's words, "As a hart longs for flowing streams, so longs my soul for thee, O God. My soul longs for God, for the living God",⁵ also have to be regarded as imagery, although his longing for God is represented as a kind of vital need.

I have already remarked that there is no real reason for assuming that these possible finer bodies or *ochêmas* have to be fully developed from the very beginning in every case. On the contrary, Arjuna obtained

1 See B 174, p. 265.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 216.

3 H. Groot, Amsterdam, 1942.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 217.

5 Ps. 42. 1-2.

his heavenly chariot "by ascetic merit"¹ and, if the image of the garment is used instead of the chariot, it is at once clear that these white garments of salvation very often have to be acquired or merited.² In our ordinary environment, only children and dwarves have bodies which small—the great majority of people have bodies of a standard size. This may, however, be quite different in these different circumstances and Mattiesen may well be right to ask whether we should not regard "the whole mystical way as a process of metaphysiological growth."³ But what about the question as to how and by what food subtle bodies are nourished, as the bodies of children are enabled to grow here in our ordinary environment by being given food?

The obvious places to look for an answer to this question are those in which reference is made to unusual food. In the Old Testament, for example, we read of *man* or *manna* in Exod.16.15. If this and other passages are read carefully, it becomes clear that they refer to food to appease the hunger of ordinary man—it is the origin of this food that is miraculous. These stories have, of course, been used again and again as analogies or examples. In the case of the miraculous feeding of the four thousand in Matt.15. 36-38, we read that physical hunger was appeased by the multiplication of loaves and fish and it is this, not be food itself, which is unusual. The whole can, of course, be regarded as a parable of the inexhaustible grace of the Lord. Even if we think of it quite literally as a miracle, the whole event still takes place at the ordinary, physical level.

The apocryphal book of the wisdom of Solomon refers to "angels' food", sent from heaven "bread prepared without the labour" of men (16.20-21), but this, as a whole, clearly takes place at a different level. The poet John Milton expressed himself in a very similar way, saying that food was also assimilated in Paradise⁴ and that the angels were also able simply to feel hungry in their own way.⁵

There are quite frequent references in literature to food at an unusual level. One of the many meanings of the word *amrita* in Sanskrit is "food of the gods."⁶ Similar concepts in the west are, of course, nectar and ambrosia. Onians has analysed the occurrence of these concepts among the ancient writers, especially Homer.⁷

1 See above, Part I, p. 205; II, p. 219.

2 See above, p. 19.

3 See B 97, p. 796.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 224.

5 See K. H. E. de Jong, B 76, p. 33.

6 See, for example, B 225, p. 144.

7 B 233, p. 292 ff.

What is of particular interest, however, is the connection between the different levels. In this, one is struck by the expectation resulting from animal sacrifices. The smoke or fumes (*knisē*) and the exhalations from the blood of these sacrifices made it possible for men to come into contact with other spheres—in the *Odyssey*, for example, Teiresias (XI, 92) and Odysseus' mother (XI, 153) are evoked. The belief that it was possible to come into contact by means of animal sacrifices with the (lower) daemons was quite prevalent even in later classical antiquity.¹ Jamblichus discussed the pro and the contra of these practices² and the Fathers of the Church rejected and forbade them, but did not deny that they might have been efficacious.³ All this is remotely reminiscent of modern occultism, according to which the spirits of the departed come into contact with the living (sometimes against their will) and for this purpose rely, in one way or another on the medium's "ectoplasm" or "teleplasm".⁴

Unusual food is also referred to in another way in one of the meanings of the Sanskrit word *prāna*. In this sense, *prāna* means the subtle life force which, according to modern occultists, also flows through the etheric body or double. This is also absorbed from the light of the sun, by means of ordinary food and above all by breathing, but in all these forms only as an epiphenomenon of the physical component.⁵ The weak nervous system in the narrower sense, the tendency to become tired very quickly because of impressions, is no doubt based on a disturbance on the part of this capacity to absorb and retain the *prana*. There are in fact people who claim that their tiredness more quickly by eating than the food can be digested. All this, of course, takes place at the level of the physiological *pneuma*, which goes a little beyond ordinary physiology.

Again and again, one comes across statements made in this spirit or in a closely related spirit. The ancient Egyptians thought that *ba*, the force of the soul, was obtained by the consumption of food.⁶ Democritus asserted that the soul was renewed by breathing.⁷ Although this undoubtedly seems to be a very physical view, it should not be forgotten that a profound and not exclusively physical significance was attributed to breath, for example, in India. In his last work, Siris

1 Porphyry, *De abstin.* II, 37; see also B 70, p. 236, note 94.

2 *Über die Geheimlehren* (transl. Hopfner), V, 1.

3 See, for example, B 22, II, p. 456.

4 See Dietz, B 205, p. 141 ff; B 97, 570.

5 See B 118, p. 10 ff; see also above, Part I p. 163 for Chand. Up. 6, 5.

6 See above, Part I, p. 114.

7 See B 128, p. 24.

(1744), George Berkeley wrote, following Hippocrates: "the soul of man is not nourished by meats and drinks, but through luminous non-natural nourishment" (§ 240).

J. F. Staal has also made several interesting comments on the Indian concept of *annam*. This means in the first place "food" (and is thus connected with the "life-giving breath, *prāna*"), but it also has a much wider significance—even "the ultimate concept, Brahman, is identified with food". Śankara, Staal says, has written: "The highest self... can be said to eat everything".¹ This means that *annam* is really the principle of transformation in general. Staal makes an important comment here: "the term *annam* clearly shows the continuity which exists between the material and the psychical and the spiritual". He adds that this is very difficult for modern man to understand, but the unity of the factors mentioned that is expressed in this concept is close to the modern mind, because we tend more and more today to reject Cartesian dualism.² What Staal says is very much in accordance with my own argument—the Indian philosophers were able to use the concept of food in this wider sense—what I should call hylic pluralistically (the Indian thinkers had, as we have seen, a very positive attitude towards fine matter)—because they were not inhibited from doing so by anthropological dualism or the epsilon standpoint. This "spiritual food" that I have already mentioned, this sense of inner satiation—I have myself heard a preacher say, immediately after a sermon, "I am so full"—does not necessarily have to be contrasted to strongly with ordinary food or its assimilation, although there are naturally many occasions when it is used purely as imagery.

We may now go a step further. I have already pointed out that the New Testament again and again refers to the Holy Spirit, at least also, in a very concrete and plastic manner.³ This is very markedly so in the case of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the day which we now commemorate as Whitsun or Pentecost.⁴ It is, in my opinion, possible to say quite safely that the Holy Spirit fed or nourished the souls of the apostles on that occasion. "Outpourings of the Holy Spirit" have frequently been regarded in this light in the history of Christianity—inspired religious figures have, in the past, believed that they have experienced this, especially in pietism and in the Quaker movement and no doubt in an unbalanced manner, as a strengthening from

1 B 253, p. 43.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 41.

3 See above, Vol. II p. 69.

4 Acts 2. 2.

outside, as a supply of power from above, Something similar can also occur in prayer and meditation as practised both by the mystic or the monk and by the ordinary believer. Through this genuine prayer of the heart, the believer's higher, subtle body is made to grow.

Some of what I have said can be applied to the Christian's partaking of Holy Communion. Many Christians have in the past felt greatly strengthened by communion and this is still the case today. (I shall be returning to this question in Sections 108 and 125). Inner growth also occurs, of course, in Low Church practices, with a less sacramental character. The word "edify" is used with good reason in the religious sense. Something is inwardly built up in the spiritual body.

In this context, we may certainly also ask whether the giving of a *blessing* is purely symbolic or whether a certain quantity of force or power, in the form of psychical energy, is not, at least in a number of cases, transferred from one person to the other.¹

In any case, there is good reason for us to speak of an extension in the case of our vital sensation of being fed or nourished for the purpose of growing.

One of the so-called lower or more immediate senses has so far not been dealt with here. This has to do with the qualities of the sense of touch in the narrower sense—form or shape. It is, of course, true that we are in the habit of receiving this with the organ of sight, the eye, as well, but a blind person can also conceive an idea or image of form by feeling with his fingers—whether an object is round or square, flat or spherical and so on. This is strongly contrasted to colour—the colours of an object are lost to the blind person, just as someone who is deaf cannot form any image of sounds (unless he does so very deviously). This quality of the sense of touch—forms—is, however, so important in connection with our special subject that it is necessary to devote a separate section, the following, to it.

102 FORM OR SHAPE

We may therefore safely assume that our perceptions of forms or shapes (roundness, the form of a cube and so on) are, on the one hand, very closely connected with our sense of touch and as such with one of what I have called the lower senses. On the other hand, however, they also play an important part in the sense of sight. Colours, light and dark and so on may be highly characteristic of the sense of sight, but, through this sense, our perception of forms and shapes is much

¹ See above, Part II, p. 62, 69.

quicker than that of the blind man, who has to rely solely on his sense of touch. In fact, we are aware of the form of a thing "in the twinkling of an eye" by means of our sight. I cannot discuss at the moment whether this amounts to what may be called an abbreviation of touching and feeling or whether forms and shapes are perceived independently by two senses. In any case, our sensation of shape is extremely important.

It is therefore not at all surprising that a *Gestalt* psychology has come about, a psychology of form or shape which is especially concerned with this subject and inclined to place this at the very centre of psychology. Among others, G. Anschütz has reviewed this movement in psychology¹ and has provided a "short systematisation of forms (*Gestalten*)" or a fundamental arrangement" of these forms or shapes.² What, however, is most striking in his classification is that he takes a very much wider view of form or shape than even I would—my point of departure being form in the narrower sense (square, sphere and so on), which is what Anschütz calls the optical sector. According to him, there are even "many problems of form" in music—problems of rhythm, of melody and even of the style of an individual composer.³ What is more, there are, Anschütz believes, both more elementary and more complex forms (a single note as opposed to a melody and so on) as well as forms or shapes related to objects and forms which are much more focussed towards the inner essence of things (counting, number and so on), including abstract forms like the structure of thoughts or ideas (in a philosophical system, for example) or of feelings.⁴

Although the concept of form or shape is very wide indeed in this case, this does not mean that various aspects of it are incorrect or useless. Something quite fundamental is clearly expressed in these *forms*, as the object of that very obvious sense of touch, and I should like to discuss this briefly here and leave aside the question as to whether or not hylic pluralism is involved in forms or shapes (the *eidolon* etc.), at least for the time being. "Form" or "shape" is therefore a wider concept than the forms of the sense of touch—it is clear that a melody, for example, also has a certain form or shape. We may therefore ask whether this cannot be applied to all the qualities of sensory perception. Colours and smells are therefore forms. Several *Gestalt*

1 See B 189, p. 127 ff.

2 See B 189, p. 131 ff.

3 B 189, p. 133.

4 One is reminded here of Bhagavan Das' classification of emotions in *The Science of the Emotions* (1900).

psychologists, such as W. Metzger, go so far as to claim that the "*Gestalt* idea" is at the centre of all psychology and even speak, for example, of a "colour outline".¹ I believe that it is also possible in the same way to speak quite simply of qualities (*poioiteis*), that is, of qualities of sensory perception. Whatever name is given to them, the whole area is full of these sensory qualities, which I shall later consider in the context of a possible extension in the hylic pluralistic sense.

But something else is also contained in the concept of "form" or "shape". After all, the *Gestalt* psychologists also talk about structures, and not only concrete structures, such as those of a building, but also the structures of abstract reasoning, in other words, the structures of *ideas*. The word idea, however, comes from *idea*, which means aspect, vision, occurrence, outward form or image as well as concept or idea. This, of course, brings us face to face with philosophical problems and we cannot ignore this point of view. I should like therefore to review very briefly the ways in which and the levels at which the concept of "form" or "shape" occurs and is used.

In the first place, we have the entirely abstract meaning of idea or thought. Geometrical figures are connected with each other in a special way which is independent both of the number and of the degree of perfection of the copies of those figures (the real cubes, for example) and of a successful imagination of them in a pure form in the mind functioning in time. Certain very complicated constructions cannot be imagined in practice, but they do exist in a certain fixed relationship with each other even though they may never be illustrated in models or seen as such. A similar situation prevails in the case of tonal laws or relationships and, if the term "form" or "shape" is conceived in the very wide sense in which such thinkers as Anschütz conceives it (see p. 98 f), the same applies to logical or logistic reasoning. It is, in a word, clear that what we have here is the "eidetic" principle.² The summit of this is clearly form or shape as such, but in this very general sense form or shape is evidently what gives form, but is in itself without form or shape. This at once calls Aristotle's hylemorphism to mind—that correlation of form and matter in which only God is form without matter, amounting therefore to perfect formlessness in comparison with the ordinary meaning of form. Diametrically opposed to this is the most abstract or empty concept of matter, amounting to

1 See B 189, p. 138. One is reminded here of the octahedron as a figure in which the colours can be included together with the transitions between them; see, for example, H. Ebelinghaus, *Abriss der Psychologie*, p. 58.

2 See above, Part I, p. 39, note; Vol. II, p. 39; see also B 114, § 59-60.

pure possibility.¹ A little further or lower down there is already a design in this correlativism of form and matter—the “matter of a conversation” is very general or abstract and the form or content of that conversation is not immediately clear, but directly afterwards it is apparent that every conversation has to do with something that has a content, even if we never encounter “horseness”, but only a specific jade.

It is clear, then, that the further development or enumeration of the species or modes of existence of forms or shapes is parallel to the species of matter which I wrote about in Section 95, “Matter and *pneuma*”. The emphasis, however, is different—here it falls not on matter, but rather on the aspect of *form* of hylemorphic correlativism. The concept of *images* or *shapes* has an important part to play here. The so-called “matter” of a conversation can scarcely be called matter—the content of the conversation is all the more important, its content in general—expressed in modern terms, its most profound intentions (independent of the person who has those intentions) and, expressed in ancient terms, its ideas (*ideai eidē*) or essences (*ousiai*). Above all, however, I do not want to confuse the pure content of these ideas, concepts or essences with their being really thought of. To do this would be to commit what I have called Plato’s mistake²—this philosopher certainly confused at times what I have called eidetic relationships, what was purely abstract, with what was factual, hylic and temporal, whenever, for example, he tried to infer ideas from a memory in a previous existence.³

This does not mean that, in the rich variety of the world of form and matter, abstract content and more or less perfect, often faulty realisation are not in constant interaction with each other.⁴ The creative artist or the philosopher has an idea or a form in mind which is later expressed, however imperfect that expression may be in many cases. Furthermore, clay was also clay and not, for example, sand, before it was modelled.

In this pluriformity, there is a confusion, even a chaos of images and forms—beautiful forms exist alongside ugly ones, clear and true forms exist beside untrue, illogical and unclear ones, dynamic forms are found alongside static ones and lowly ones alongside exalted ones. But even these ugly, untrue (erroneous!), incomplete and base forms or shapes belong to the “eidetic”—they are a possibility of it and are as such eidetic forms. Insofar as they are realised, they belong to

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 38; see also above, pp. 35-36.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 36, and the index.

3 See, for example, the *Meno* and the doctrine of *anamnesis*.

4 See B 114, 60—the correlativism of the eidetic and the hylic elements.

history in a very broad sense—the history of errors, even atrocities and failures. There is therefore a whole system or structure of insufficient forms, a superabundance of sometimes comic and sometimes almost mad images or forms, utterly devoid of all logic. We are all acquainted with this sort of thing in our dreams. Part of it is undoubtedly the whole sphere of dreams, illusions and hallucinations.

This rich variety of images, however, also has its positive aspect, in addition to the aspect of illusion or false projection. There are two aspects to man's imagination—that of uninhibited images and that of more worthy images. *Māyā* is not only illusion—it is also creative activity.¹ All kinds of forms come about in this phenomenon that I have called "ideoplastic", some of them very worthy, such as poetry and paintings, and others very extensive, such as organic beings in concrete forms.²

A real problem is raised by this question of "concrete forms". Even though it is often said, where does he get it all from? how do all those unexpectedly properly functioning organic beings come about? despite this, the problem in question is not to be found so much at the ordinary level of life, but rather, in my opinion, at the level of fine materiality. It does seem as though another, more subtle materiality occurs, other than ordinary matter, and if this is the case, where, then, is the dividing line between absolutely bottomless fantasy, an orgy of images on the one hand, and a different *reality* consisting of fine matter on the other?

Let me give one or two examples. Our dreams consist of a riotous confusion of themes entirely lacking, for the most part—despite everything that is said by worthy psychoanalysts—in rhyme or reason. Sometimes, however, they contain elements or themes which are later seen to be strikingly prophetic.³ There have also been numerous cases of people giving accounts of "lucid dreams" in which they have believed that they made use of a different "dream-body" and have performed certain conscious actions.⁴ It is obvious, of course, that only one part of the content of dreams is used in both these examples but both cases are very striking and we may well ask where the dividing line can be found between this aspect of dreams and the general phantasmagoria of our dream life.

¹ See B 253, p. 122.

² See above, p. 68 ff, where the plastic aspect of this phenomenon of ideoplastics is discussed in detail.

³ See B 274, p. 104 ff; B 260, p. 12 ff.

⁴ See above, p. 76.

In addition to this, there is also the phenomenon of *apparitions*. Research has shown that an unexpectedly large number of people have reported that they have perceived what they believed to be unusual images. These, of course, include the hallucinations of insane people, but very many cases have also been recorded of people—a mother or a husband or wife, for example—who are sure that they have seen unusual images at a time when the person they loved was in danger or need. This is, of course, the phenomenon known as crisis telepathy.¹ The content of their reports has frequently been very remarkably in accordance with an event that has been known to take place at that very moment. These cases have been called “true hallucinations” or *hallucinations vëridiques*, because, insofar as they do in fact contain elements of truth, they can hardly be regarded simply and solely as hallucinations or images without any sense or meaning. It certainly seems as though what we have in such cases is a latent sense, an unusual capacity for perception which enables forms or shapes to be transmitted, but not by means of the ordinary senses.

It would take us too far away from our special subject if we were to investigate here all the various kinds of apparitions that interest the parapsychologists, so we must confine our selves simply to those apparitions which are meaningful and bring something about. I have already mentioned the Wilmot case, in which Mrs. Wilmot, who was seriously disturbed, appeared to her husband during a dangerous sea voyage, her appearance and her hesitation being noticed.² This is clearly more than a mere chimera. Hornell Hart has spoken of “traveling clairvoyance” and “a projected body” in this and other cases.³ There are also “arrival cases”, in which a person announces his unexpected arrival by an apparition.⁴

These and similar cases are valuable in connection with our special subject insofar as we tend to define the fine materiality with which we are concerned as everything that works and is effective, even in unusual circumstances. In that case, we encounter, even in the sensory quality of form or shape, certain extensions, which can be perceived outside the normal sphere in which the sense of touch is used in conjunction with the ordinary sense of sight. Some *Gestalt* psychologists take an extremely broad view of form or shape (*Gestalt*) and, if we

1 See, for example, B 267, p. 71; B 266, p. 9 (“the type of case which has been most carefully studied”).

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 200; see also above, p. 77.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 200, see also above, p. 77.

4 See B 273, p. 260.

do this, then we are bound to include the whole of ESP—clairvoyance and so on—within this extension of man's perception of form or shape.

I should like now to elaborate certain aspects of this whole question of the extension of our perception of form, limiting myself to "form" or "shape" in the narrower sense and not including, for example, the form of a melody and so on.

In the first place, a number of remarkable general statements can be found in this context. The natural philosopher, L. Oken (1779-1828) said, for example, "As appearance, everything is material",¹ which should be taken in conjunction with another of his affirmations. "all being is of a material nature". Oken's standpoint was therefore hylic pluralistic (probably the gamma standpoint). We should not, however, think that all apparitions and all hallucinations are objective—if we were to do this, the distinction between the meaningful apparition (that of Mrs Wilmot, for example) and the illusory image would cease to exist.

Quite different, on the other hand, is the question as to whether illusory images and ideas can be perceived as well by the clairvoyant as objective forms of thought (more or less confused, more or less elaborated, more or less structured "thought-forms").² This is also reminiscent of a remarkable statement by Fechner: "Basically, every image...of an absent person is a spectre of that person".³ It may therefore be that a living representation or idea of a beloved person plays a vital part on possible telepathic contact with that person. A clear distinction must, however, be made between an inner concern with another person and clear cases of crisis telepathy of the kind referred to above.

Whenever it is believed that apparitions have been perceived, the problem of the *status* of those apparitions inevitably arises. A great deal has been written about this problem, by earlier authors such as F. W. H. Myers⁴ and by more recent scholars such as H. H. Price,⁵ G. N. M. Tyrrell,⁶ C. D. Broad⁷ and Hornell Hart⁸.

Even earlier writers have also been concerned with this problem, including writers in the romantic period, but it would be impossible to discuss all their views in detail here. Oken's far-reaching assertion

1 See B 38, p. 515; see also above, Vol. II, p. 7, note 4.

2 See above, p. 69; see also B 116, p. 43 ff.

3 B 42, II, p. 277.

4 See *Phantasms of the Living* (B 213).

5 See B 244, XLV, p. 160 ff.

6 See his *Apparitions* (B266).

7 See, for example, B 195.

8 See, for example, B 214.

can, however, be compared with a characteristic remark by Schopenhauer. As we have already seen,¹ the latter was very interested in so-called occult phenomena, but he was of the opinion a spirit would make itself known to us in a way which was very different from that in which a "corporeal appearance" made itself known to us, presenting itself to us as such, it is true, but with as little material reality as a dream.²

Now this is a very remarkable statement, which is well worth considering carefully. Generally speaking, we are acquainted with all kinds of images and ideas—those caused by our ordinary perceptions, those proceeding from our imagination, those produced in our dreams and those originating in illusions and hallucinations, which are related to images of our fantasy, with the difference that we do not create them freely, but that they more or less force themselves on us.

All these images, however, are closely related in at least one respect—the sensory qualities—colours, sounds, forms and so on—occur in all of them (either with or without extensions, but this is something that we must disregard for the time being). This has struck many scholars who have investigated this phenomenon. Does this mean, then, that they should all be treated alike? Schopenhauer did not do this—he believed that spiritual apparitions were in no sense real, that they had as little material reality as the images produced in our dreams. In fact, together with many other nineteenth century philosophers, he went much further than this and maintained that the ordinary images perceived by our senses did not merely point to a material reality. He claimed that this was so because the qualities which we believed we perceived could not be ascribed to any reality that really existed or that lay behind those qualities, with the result that it simply *appeared* to us that those qualities might be ascribed to that reality. This, of course, is the point of view taken by the subjective idealists or phenomenologists. According to another and even more extreme point of view, that of George Berkeley and the psychical monist Heymans, no material reality is accepted at all, even *behind* the images perceived. These views, held by Schopenhauer and other, later subjective idealists and others, are without any doubt closely accordance with Kant's doctrine of things in themselves which are unknowable.³

Diametrically opposed to this doctrine is another theory, according to which the qualities we perceive can, at least in broad outline and

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 153-154.

2 See Werke V, p. 318; see above, Vol. II, p. 153.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 153, 205-206.

for the most part,¹ be attributed to things, with the result that we can know a material reality which confronts us as individual subjects and which has an effect on us. This, of course, is the ordinary philosophical doctrine of realism.

We must now consider the question of hylic pluralism in this context. Is ordinary matter not very volatilised already² and is not a fact that we also undergo certain unusual effects which might be called "fine material" effects, insofar as materiality is defined simply as effectiveness, something that works. Ordinary and fine materiality would therefore seem to be closely related.

I am inclined to agree with this, but I do not think that the problem can be stated as Schopenhauer states it. He says that apparitions of the spirit have as little material reality as the images produced in our dreams. I have shown, however, that a certain reality can certainly be ascribed to a part at least of our dream images—this is clear from, for example, van Eeden's "lucid dreams", to which Broad attached a certain value. Schopenhauer might therefore have said—as many scholars have indeed said and are still saying—that spiritual apparitions show as little evidence of material reality as hallucinations. If we disregard for the moment the possibility of materialisations of, for example, a hand at seances, then Schopenhauer would be right in saying that all these images are not of an ordinary materiality. But are they of a fine materiality? If fine materiality is defined, as I have frequently defined it, as effectiveness, then Mrs. Wilmot's appearance, observed by her husband's companion in the cabin of the ship, was certainly material. If something is transmitted by a hallucination in the case of crisis telepathy, with the result that it is possible to speak of a "true hallucination", then there is also, in that case, an effect brought about by fine matter. What is more, if there are many transitional states—as Broad believed there were—between "lucid dreams" and cases of excursion,³ in which the one making the excursion tries to ascertain something or to make him or herself known,⁴ then we cannot simply say that all this has as little reality as the substance of our dreams. We may therefore conclude that Schopenhauer's answer to the question concerning the status of spiritual appearances was not entirely fortunate.

Other authors have been more positive in their reactions to this question. What is remarkable is that one of them, G. N. M. Tyrrell,

1 See B 114, 37 ff; for the concept of illusion, see B 114, p. 254 ff.

2 See above, p. 34-35.

3 See above, p. 76.

4 See B 195, p. 174; see also above, p. 78; see B 267, p. 55.

shows clear evidence, in his otherwise excellent book, *Apparitions*, of being here and there under the influence of Kant. He is obviously sensitive to the arguments of the subjective idealists, cannot easily accept "being in space", which he thinks is not really possible for a consciousness¹ and regards direct knowledge of physical objects in the normal way as impossible in such cases.² In other words, The realistic approach of the theory of knowledge cannot apply and clairvoyance, which would certainly result in direct knowledge, is, in Tyrrell's opinion, all the more enigmatical.

Other authors are less deterred by considerations of this kind involving the theory of knowledge. It would, of course, be impossible to go into all their ideas about the nature of apparitions and I shall have to confine myself to discussing a few of the conclusions that they have reached. It should, in the first place, be borne in mind that almost all of them agree that very many gratuitous, meaningless and even deceptive images occur in this sphere. This is what may be called the darker side of the existence of really creative ideoplastics and the consequence of the important part played by form or shape in the multiplicity which consists of the correlativism of form and matter. What we are primarily interested in here, however, is the extent to which images are encountered *among* the rich variety of images that exists, images which point to a *reality* or activity of fine matter.

At the very beginning of the existence of the English S. P. R., there was a difference of opinion between F. W. H. Myers, who believed that there were indications of a background which he called the "metetherial" and E. Gurney, who disagreed with Myers' theory. (I have already alluded to this controversy.³)

A later parapsychologist, H. H. Price, went even further than Myers in the same direction. In his opinion, the images that one has in the case of these apparitions are not entirely private, but seem to come from something that he calls the "psychic ether". This "psychic atmosphere" of someone must, in his opinion, be "a kind of secondary body".⁴ Price has discussed all this in an article in the *Journal of Parapsychology*.⁵

¹ B 266, p.121; see also Leo Polak's similar reasoning in his *Kennisleer contra materie-realisme*, p. 334 and B 115, p. 51.

² B 266, p. 124.

³ See above, Vol. II, p. 195; see also Tyrrell, B 266, p. 45 ff.

⁴ See above, Vol. II, p. 15, 86 ff.

⁵ June 1960, "Apparitions: Two Theories", p. 125. There is also a report by Hornell Hart in 1956; "Six Theories about Apparitions." (B 244, 1956, p. 153 ff).

In his most recent book, *Lectures on Psychical Research*,¹ C. D. Broad went into the whole question very exhaustively and from the philosophical point of view. The title of Section B of this work is "Veridical and Prima Facie Paranormal Cases of Hallucinatory Quasi-Perceptions". He attaches very great importance to "reciprocal hallucinations", of the type found in the Wilmot case.² He was also conscious of the special significance of the transition from ordinary dreams to particular dreams in connection with "out-of-the-body experiences" in which they gradually merge.³ His point of view is therefore quite different from that of Schopenhauer, who regarded apparitions and so on as equally absurd as dreams.

In other words, these modern authors, whose views I have already discussed in a different context (Section 85, under the title of "Parapsychologists"), are thus conscious of a gradual transition between what may be called the wild fantasies of our dreams or of mentally sick people and other *hallucinations véridiques*, "true hallucinations", to which a certain value must be accorded. It is, however, precisely in this borderline territory that effects due to fine matter occur.

Hornell Hart has made a special study of the nature or status of these paranormal phenomena, developing his theory of the *persona*, in which he pursued suggestions made by Tyrrell and Soal.⁴ According to Hornell Hart, then, the medium and those present at a séance build up a kind of "personality structure". This resembles the personality of the dead person who is claiming to appear and is constructed by unconscious and dramatising forces on the part of those present. (see p. 201). This *persona* is both the dead person and yet it is not. It may be connected with him and serve as a "vehicle" (one is inevitably reminded of *ochêma* here⁵), but on the other hand all kinds of "distortions and deficiencies" are, in certain respects also expressed (see p. 203).

I cannot go into this interesting theory more deeply here, but would draw attention to one aspect which all these authors have in common and which is directly related to our special subject. This is an acceptance of a characteristic mixture intermingling or confusion of images or illusory projections on the one hand and of factors which are to some extent real, in other words, which come from outside, as contrasting with those which are purely subjective.

1 B 195 (1962), p. 94 ff.

2 See B 195, p. 210.

3 See B 195, p. 153 ff; see also above, p. 76.

4 See B 214, p. 191 ff.

5 Hornell Hart also spoke about a "projected body" in connection with "travelling E.S.P." (see above, p. 201).

In this context I should like at the same time to discuss the question of religious apparitions very briefly. The Roman Catholic Church is rightly very reluctant to accept such apparitions as authentic. Certain apparitions have, however, been recognised as authentic and Ernst Benz, for instance, is inclined to regard these religious visions and apparitions as extremely significant in the history of religion.¹ What is particularly striking in this connection is that these apparitions display a certain uniformity as far as the general environment of the believers to whom they occur is concerned. There are many accounts of apparitions of Mary, the angels or even of Christ himself in the history of Christianity. Similar accounts exist in Hinduism concerning visions of Krishna, for example, with his flute and surrounded by *devas*. It is also true to say that there are various reports in classical antiquity of some of the gods appearing to certain men.

Is this nothing but hallucination or religious exaltation? I do not think that this is the case, but am rather inclined to look at the whole situation in the context of what I have already said about the pluriformity of images and forms at a certain level of our being. It is certain that, in this religious context too, purely subjective projections have occurred and still occur—and how easily religiously inclined eidetics in the sense defined by Jaensch fall into this trap!—but in addition to these, there are, in my opinion, undoubted cases of manifestations of the *numinous*, of a Presence at a certain time and in a certain environment. The way in which this is seen, conceived and interpreted is, of course, to a great extent dependent on the religious ideas and expectations of the person concerned. The impression made by the experience itself is, however, of far greater importance to that person than the various ways in which it may be interpreted. Insofar as there is any question of a real influence, of an effusion of power which is superior to human power, then this is inevitably a fine material force.² What is more, the contents do not have necessarily to be all equally authentic—some may well be more genuine or true than others. (This can be compared with what I have said above concerning the ideas of a chariot of fire and the heavenly steed as *images* of man's subtle body, as opposed to man's body *itself*.³)

This brings us back to a theme which undoubtedly belongs to this chapter—the theme of the form or shape that man is thought to possess

1 See his *Paulus als Visionar* (1952, B 192) and his "Vision und Führung in der christlichen Mystik", *Eranos Jahrbucher* (B 211), 1962, p. 117 ff.

2 See above, p. 96-97, with regard to the feast of Pentecost.

3 See above, p. 71-72.

after death, that of the *eidolon*.¹ In this question, we are therefore bound to disregard (a) "forms" in the wider sense, that is, "forms" of a melody and so on and to limit ourselves to "forms" in the narrower sense and (b) those means, such as a vehicle or chariot, a horse, bird or butterfly, of denoting the soul. But, since images—even purely eidetic ones²—occur so frequently as thought structures, this limitation is still not sufficient. Both persons (in portraits in the first place) and all kinds of situations, including virtues, for example, are illustrated in the graphic arts in an "allegorical" manner as persons or forms. It is true to say, then, that they are represented abstractly and eidetically. I have, however, often wondered whether early man or the early artist did not, in many of these cases, see more in these forms. Early man—I am not speaking here of primitive man, because this type of primitive attitude also occurred in much higher civilisations³—was inclined to regard so much as consisting of fine matter. (We have already seen how often the beta and the gamma standpoints occur.⁴) For this reason it is probable that he saw much more in these likenesses of the dead person, that little doll that escaped on death, than simply a memorial tablet. He may well have regarded them as an illustration of a reality consisting of fine matter. I have already demonstrated this before several times in Section 26 of this work⁵ and in the section on the visual arts (89).⁶ In both cases, I was anticipating my discussion of form or shape here, in Section 102.

As I have already said a great deal about these *eidola* which were presumably regarded as consisting of fine matter—see, for example, Section 99⁷ and Section 100⁸—I have no need to discuss this question again here. An exception must, however, be made in the following instance.

In several respects, unlike representations of vehicles, animals and so on, this purely human form of fine matter differed from the normal form. In the first place, the subtlety was indicated by the small size of the form. Both the little dolls, in the form of which the soul is shown

¹ The word *eidos* also occurs in Greek, in addition to *idea*, for "form" or "shape". *Eidolon* is derived from the first of these, *eidos*, but the ending—*-lon* is not a diminutive, despite the fact that *eidola* is often used to denote something small (one is reminded, for example, of Democritus' *eidola*). In contrast with *eidos*, *eidolon* is, however, frequently used in a more concrete sense (B.A. van Groningen).

² In the sense in which it is used above, p. 100.

³ See above, Part I, p. 210-211.

⁴ See above, Vol. II, p. 25, 43, 55, 79-80 etc.

⁵ See above, Part I, p. 134 ff.

⁶ See above, Vol. II, p. 230 ff.

⁷ See above, p. 71 ff.

⁸ See above, p. 83-84.

to escape from the body at death in products of medieval art, and the soul of Sāvitrī's husband, "of the measure of the thumb", which Sāvitrī tried to gain by trickery from the god of death,¹ have this miniature form of a homunculus or a "thumbling".² It is also possible to say that the halo or radiant garland³ belongs so closely to the figure concerned that the figure is in fact changed by it. Finally, a painter such as El Greco, who, according to a note which he wrote, wanted to paint "heavenly bodies", tried to indicate this by giving his figures a long drawn out appearance.⁴

This is not all, however, because the human form also tends to become merged into the form of an egg or a sphere. This is a remarkable theme—it was one of the late K.H.E. de Jong's hobbies—and I shall be should like to discuss it briefly now.

According to Democritus, the soul, which consisted of fine, smooth atoms, was in itself spherical.⁵ Empedocles thought of the gods as spheres or globes, without knees, feet and so on.⁶ According to Chrysippus the Stoic, the soul took on the shape of a sphere on death, after it had become separated from the ordinary body.⁷ Proclus taught that the innate and unchangeable *ochēma* of the soul, unlike the other, which was either assumed or else rejected, had the form of a sphere,⁸ like the human skull,⁹ but especially like the heavenly bodies and the universe itself.

This is quite probably the point of departure for a presumed metamorphosis. The sphere was regarded as a perfect body and the soul itself—or the soul on its way towards perfection—automatically returned to this form. This is certainly in accordance with the teaching of the neo-Platonic philosopher Olympiodorus (sixth century A.D.), who insisted that the human soul had the shape of an egg and that the pure form of the sphere had become distorted by the soul's connection with the ordinary body.¹⁰ On the other hand, Origen believed that men

1 See above, Part I, p. 164-165; see also Plate I.

2 See index; for the "mannikin" of the primitive peoples, see, for example, Part I, p. 81.

3 See above, p. 21-22.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 239.

5 See B 156, I, p. 290; B 76, pp. 20-21.

6 See W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Presocratic Philosophers* (1947), p. 141; B 176, I, p. 56. For the spherical form of the ancient gods in general, see J. Pepin, *Theologie cosmique* ... (1964), p. 113 ff.

7 See B 76, p. 21; B 132, II, p. 320.

8 See B 33, p. 308, in *Tim.* II, 72, 13.

9 See Plato, *Tim.* 44 D.

10 See B 33, p. 308, note 3.

would rise again with round bodies—this was one of his teachings for which he was accused of heresy.¹

According to this view, the limbs and the torso are really no more than additions, which could better be dispensed with. What is interesting in this context is that Onians has pointed to the central importance of the head or skull in very ancient thought. The spirit or genius resides in the head² and even the human seed or spermatozoa come from the head via the marrow of the spine.³ The halo, known in antiquity as the *corona radiata*, points, Onians says, to the importance of the head.⁴

Similar ideas are also found in the writings of later authors as well, especially the mystical authors.⁵ Hildegard of Bingen claimed to have seen a vision in which the human soul, coming from heaven, took possession of the body of the child in the mother's womb in the form of a fiery sphere.⁶ According to this mystic, then, the structure of the soul was not that of the human body—it had the shape of a fiery globe.⁷ C.G.Jung has also mentioned Hildegard's statement.⁸ A nineteenth century mystic, Lucie Christine, also had a vision of her own soul as a "mysterious sphere".⁹

Similar ideas are often found in modern spiritualism, where the human halo is often depicted as ovalin shape.¹⁰ Mathiesen has also spoken about "soap bubbles", the "blue ball" as which the soul, according to the spiritualists, should appear.¹¹

Fechner was also in agreement with the view mentioned above concerning the superfluous character of the limbs, writing, in his "Vergleichende Anatomie der Engel", that "all the parts of the body which have come about and are meaningful only insofar as they are related to this earth cease to exist".¹²

1 See *De oratione*, cap. 31, § 29; B 33, p. 308; B 76, p. 25.

2 See B 233, index under "head".

3 See B 233, p. 149; see also E. Lesky, *op. cit.*, p. 5 ff.

4 B 233, pp. 165-166.

5 What K.H.E. de Jong (B 76, p. 22) said in this context about 1 Cor. 11.24, following J. de Zwaan, should also be considered here.

6 *Magna Ungrund*, *op. cit.*, p. 37; see above, Vol. II, p. 128-129.

7 *ibid.*, p. 43.

8 *Ein moderner Mythos* (1958), p. 97; see above, Vol. II, pp. 184-189.

9 See C. Albrecht, *Das Mystische Erkennen*, p. 89 (cf. p. 120).

10 See, for example, B 116, p. 13.

11 See B 97, p. 665 ff.

12 *Kleine Schriften*, p. 143. Psellos also mentions the view that good daemons have a spherical form (see B 159, p. 20). There is also a good bibliography on the subject of the spherical shape of the soul in W. Schrödter, "Kugelgestalt der Geisteswesen", B 269, Jan. 1956, p. 13 ff.

We may therefore conclude this section on form or shape in connection with hylic pluralism by making the following statement. Despite the multiplicity and pluriformity of subjective images in dreams, fantasies and hallucinations, a part of those images or forms undoubtedly seem to have been regarded as relating to a trans-subjective reality. What is more, this also goes a good deal further than it does when the same thing takes place in man's ordinary perception. Obvious cases of this are a dream body, the "projected body" in excursions and the background of fine matter which is thought to exist in many different kinds of representations or illustrations of the soul. In all such cases, it is possible to speak of an extension beyond the ordinary occurrence of a form or forms with regard to the sensory quality of a form or shape.

In the special case of illustrations or pictorial, graphic or plastic representations of the soul, we may add, in conclusion, that there is a constant tendency to move away from subordinate images, such as chariots, garments, horses or birds, and to depict the human form as such, though perhaps on a reduced scale, and to represent this in an oval shape and finally in a spherical shape. Insofar as the spherical shape regarded as the perfect form, the term of the heavenly body and of the deity, then we may conclude that man, according to this conception, is thought to develop in the direction of God's image or else to rediscover his original form.¹

103 SENSE QUALITIES II

In the previous section, we were mainly concerned with "form" or "shape" in the narrower sense of qualities of the sense of *touch*. But, apart from the sense qualities of form and the other, rather primitive or primary qualities dealt with in Section 101 ("Sense Qualities I"), there are several other categories of sense qualities about which nothing has as yet been said, at least in the context of a possible extension in the hylic pluralistic sense. These are the qualities which are directly connected with the senses of taste, smell, hearing and sight. Is it possible to speak of an extension in the direction of fine materiality in the context of these senses as well?

Not very much can be said in this respect about the sense of *taste* and its qualities. Or can we say, with H. Conrad-Martius, that expressions such as "bitter" and "sweet", "sour" and "disgusting" and so on are so often and so intensively used in the wider sense that they must

1 See Proclus on the innate *ochēma*, above, p. 110.

also refer to psychical qualities? (H. Conrad-Martius, of course, used the concepts soft and hard, elastic and rigid and so on, maintaining that they denoted not only physical qualities, but also psychical ones,¹ but the same can perhaps also be said of the concepts bitter, sweet etc.) Certainly "sweet" is often used in a psychical or religious context. "Disgusting" would seem to be a very general term and the "bitterness" of fate and the resulting "bitterness" of the person who suffers such a fate may well be much more real than the "bitterness" of, for example, fruit, just as suffering is in noway inferior to physical pain.²

A good deal more can be said in connection with our special subject about the qualities linked to the sense of *smell*. Odours and smells can be called "qualitative air" and it is well known that the air, breath, blowing and so on all play a very important part in hylic pluralism.³ The gaseous state of aggregation is, as we know, a relatively subtle one in our ordinary environment. Odours and smells would therefore seem to be suitable means of indicating something for fine matter—far more suitable than the solid objects of the sense of touch (such as the statue of a god). But does the matter rest there and go no further?

Let me give one or two examples. Whether it was meant purely in the literal sense or not would be difficult to ascertain, but the ancient Egyptians spoke of "the bad smell of a sinner".⁴ At least two cases of an unusual function performed by smells can be found in ancient India. According to the Jains, *karma* consisted of fine matters⁵ which they thought were not only coloured and more or less dry, but also possessed of a good or a bad smell.⁶ In the Sāṅkhya philosophy, the term used for *samskāra* or unconscious psychical tendencies was, among others, *vasānā* or odour and these thinkers believed that *buddhi* was "permeated with the odour" of these tendencies.⁷ The belief that the approach of immortal spirits was made known to mortals by perfumes was prevalent in ancient China.⁸ Heraclitus said that the souls in Hades smelt and, since the soul "is breath, it perceives by smelling".⁹ According to the gnostics, and especially the Sethites, the *pneuma* was characterised by a "pleasant odour" a "celestial perfume". Going even further and using the familiar epithet for "fine matter", *leptos*,

¹ See above, Vol. II, p. 209, Vol. III, 86-87.

² See above, p. 91.

³ See for example, above, Vol. II, p. 8-9.

⁴ J. Zandee, *Death as an Enemy according to Ancient Egyptian Conceptions* (1960), p. 341.

⁵ See, above, Vol. I, p. 231.

⁶ See B 52, p. 101.

⁷ See B 1, p. 57.

⁸ See B 63, p. 16; see also B 90, p. 218.

⁹ Diels, *Fragment* 98; see also B 76, pp. 1-2.

they called this smell a "subtle odour" or *osmĕ leptĕ*.¹ According to Basilides, too, *to pneuma hagion*, the Holy Spirit, was more than an "aerial current or "draught"—it was a "sweet odour".² (The word "sweet" should be noted in this context.)

One is inevitably reminded here of the medieval theme of the "odour of sanctity". Van der Leeuw has given several examples of this, saying that "this odour is in no sense purely symbolic".³ In his book, *The Physical Phenomena of Mysticism*, H. Thurston S. J. discussed in considerable detail this question of the odour of sanctity,⁴ affirming that, according to reports, those present at and after the death of many figures prominent in the religious sphere had been conscious of a pervasive odour which, in striking contrast to what might be expected, was sweet and pleasant. Thurston maintained that this was certainly the case with Teresa of Avila (p. 217) and that it also occurred in the case of many other saints, often during their lives, however, much they tried to hide it. It was, Thurston insists, "no earthly scent" (p. 229). The author has tried, throughout the whole of his book, to find parallels with parapsychological phenomena and has drawn attention to the fact that odours have often been perceived at seances.. An example of this given by Thurston is the case of seances at which the well-known medium Stainton Moses took part (p. 224). What is really remarkable in this connection is that this odour of sanctity, Thurston shows, is sometimes not perceived by all those present (p. 231). I shall be returning to this point in a later section.⁵

Odours also play a part in Swedenborg's mysticism. A man's "sphere", for example, can be smelt. S. Toksvig entitled one of the chapters in her book about Swedenborg "Speech, Odors, Auras".

The German philosopher Schelling said in his *Clara*—he was not writing about the physical nature, but about the essence of things here—"the finest extract of it, as it were the flavour and the odour of it".⁶ It is, moreover, precisely in his *Clara* that Schelling discussed hylic pluralism.⁷

The ideological socialist F. M. C. Fourier (1772-1835) believed in a body of fine matter which he called, together with his follower H. Renaud, the "etheric, aromatic body".⁸ Victor Hugo also talked about

1 See B 174, pp. 293-294.

2 See B 174, p. 296.

3 See B 90, pp. 262, 268.

4 B 263 (1952), here p. 222 ff.

5 See below, Section 109.

6 p. 99.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 164 ff.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 172.

the "aromatic being" and C. Renouvier wondered, in his book about Hugo, whether he might have taken this term from Fourier.¹ (Both authors, it may be noted, used the unusual word *aromal*, not the customary word *aromatique* in this context.)

Gustav Jäger (1832-1917) is also a remarkable figure in this context. As the inventor of jaeger knitwear, he clearly had a strong practical streak, but he was also a theorist—a fact which borne out by his "theory of the aromatic matters of the soul", elaborated in his book *Die Entdeckung der Seele* (1879, 1885).² He was a follower of E. Haeckel.

Ania Teillard, a contemporary figure and a disciple of C. G. Jung, has given an account in a book of her "experiences of the beyond in dreams and visions" (*Ervaringen van het generzijds in dromen en vizioenen*, 1958; the German version of this being *Die unbekannte Dimension*). What she says is: "For me, there is an unmistakable sign that this world and the beyond are quite distinct. This sign is the odour of the beyond. As soon as other worlds are revealed, they are accompanied by odours" (p. 79).³

According to this, one ought to speak not only about what often occurs—clairvoyance or clear "seeing"—and about what sometimes happens—clear "hearing"—but also about clear "smelling"! In any case, we may say with safety that there are many cases in which "smells" and "odours", in the sense of an extension of man's ordinary perception of smells and odours, are mentioned.

One further comment which must be made in this connection is that certain matters which occur in man's ordinary environment have since time immemorial been thought to form a bridge between the two worlds—"In ancient Egypt, incense was regarded as a "stairway to heaven"⁴ and "the dead were believed to inhale the incense of offerings".⁵ ⁶

As opposed to the odour of sanctity, one also hears of very unpleasant odours which have, as G. van Rijnberk, for example, has observed, been connected with apparitions of demons and devils.⁷ V. S. Soloviev claims, for example, to have had such an apparition, which was accompanied by smoke.⁸

1 C. Renouvier, *V. Hugo, le philosophe* (1900), p. 51.

2 See B 38, p. 290; B 128, p. 249; see also above, Vol. II p. 139.

3 This is, of course, reminiscent of what C.G. Jung has said about his experience which led him to understand what was meant by the "odour" of the Holy Spirit; see quotation above, Vol. II p. 190-191.

4 B 90, p. 426.

5 B 233, p. 286, 282; see also above, p. 66.

6 See also W. Schrödter, *Die Magie der Däster*, B 269, 1955.

7 *Les métasciences biologiques* (1952), p. 45.

8 See B 95, p. 92.

C.G.Jung reported an experience of his own of a ghost in his foreword to F. Moser's book, *Spuk* (1950). This experience was accompanied by sensations of an unpleasant odour.¹ Generally speaking, Jung does not think that it is impossible that the function of the organ of smell, which has to a great extent been lost in man, has been taken over by intuition.² This probably accounts for the saying: "he has a keen nose for ..."!

Parapsychologists have often wondered whether animals, for example, have clairvoyant capacities and perhaps notice apparitions more quickly than human beings.³ If this is true, it may perhaps also be true that dogs, which undoubtedly have a very keen sense of smell, are not only capable of perceiving ordinary odours, but are also "clear smelling"?

Having discussed the qualities of smell, we must now turn to the qualities of *hearing*, which may be called collectively the *sounds*, although a distinction is usually made between noise, sound in the narrower sense and tone. Do any of these sensory qualities lie outside the usual range of sounds?

One is reminded here of Heymans' theory of the *acoustic world-view*, which he hoped would be elaborated later by one of his pupils. As he explained in his introduction to metaphysics (*Einführung in die Metaphysik*), our mechanical view of the world has a special affinity with our sense of movement. This may be obvious and even fruitful, but the various sensory qualities are in principle, Heymans believed, all situated at the same level. It is clear, then, that he was opposed to the familiar distinction that is made between primary and secondary qualities.⁴ Going further, he taught that the entire world of nature could in principle be seen as sounds. In this world-view, light and warmth would, for example, be represented by unimaginably high notes. The value of this world-view and of the mechanical view of the world as knowledge would, in principle, be exactly the same.⁵ Clearly, what we have here is a concept of sounds which extend far beyond the range of our ordinary perceptions and which are nonetheless still meaningful.

1 See B 267, p. 199.

2 See *ibid.*, p. 201.

3 See B 249, p. 59.

4 In passing, I feel bound to mention one further aspect of Heymans' theory. This is that he regarded them *all* as secondary in the context of his theory of psychical monism, according to which all reality is essentially psychical, with the result that all qualities, even so-called primary qualities, only appear. I am inclined however, to regard them *all* as primary, since they are attributed to things. See B 114, p.258 ff.

5 See B 68, pp. 176-178.

A similar doctrine was taught by the ancient Pythagoreans, who were interested in the musical concept of *harmony*, which also existed, they believed in the *spheres*. This was, in their opinion, a number of different notes combining to form one sound, which humans could not perceive and which was produced by the planets moving around a central fire. A similar theory was also current during the Middle Ages.¹

The idea of the central function of sound is also encountered in the conceptions, common both in the East and in the West, according to which the *Word*² or *Logos* was thought to have a creative function. It would, of course, be impossible to discuss this wide-ranging theme in detail here. It is, however, important to point to one aspect of it—that of the *name*, either the inexpressible name of God³ or that of man. In Indian thought, individuality was formed by *nāma-rūpa*, that is, the name (the inner name) and the form or shape.⁴

I should like now to deal in greater detail with the theme of the *music of the angels*. In Indian thought, we find, for example, the *gandharvas*, the musical angels.⁵ This whole subject has been studied, as far as the West is concerned, by R. Hammerstein, in *Die Musik der Engel* (1962), a very competent and scholarly work. In a review, the contents of Hammerstein's book were summarised as follows: according to the ancients, the Church Fathers and medieval writers, music had *overtones*.⁶ Man of that time thought of the world as being continuous with the next world and the angels as continuously praising God, especially during the Sanctus of the Mass,⁷ when men joined with the angels in praise. Hammerstein makes a connection here with ancient and even with ancient oriental views concerning a "resounding universe".⁸

These ideas should not be thought of as merely vague and devout. Various aspects of them have been conceived in a very concrete and plastic way by the mystics, who have, in certain cases, experienced not only a *visio spiritualis*, but also an *auditio spiritualis*. Hildegard of Bingen, for example, wrote in her *Scivias* that she had heard the

1 See B 176, I, p. 21.

2 See B 90, p. 379.

3 See B 90, p. 129 ff.

4 See B 53, p. 33; see above, Vol. I, p. 238; see also B 253, p. 208 ff;

5 See above, Vol. I, p. 240-241.

6 *Vox Theol.*, September 1963, p. 33.

7 *op. cit.*, p. 36.

8 *op. cit.*, p. 116 ff; see also L. Hoyack, *Klinkend heelal* (1937).

angels choirs and the *resonantiae sonorum spiritualium*.¹ Suso also had similar experiences. When saint Elizabeth died, those who were with her claimed to have heard sweet singing.² (There is clearly an analogy here with the odour of sanctity.) Jacob of Liège, a musical theorist of the medieval period (ca. 1300) believed that gradual transitions existed between natural music and *musica coelestis*.³

Hammerstein also discusses in some detail the subject of "sound and music in Dante's beyond" (p. 145 ff), in which he clearly has the personal and mystical aspect—in other words, the empirical and realistic aspect of Dante's work in mind rather than one of the other aspects which are so closely interwoven into it.⁴ Hammerstein says, for example: "A very specific reality, which is neither of course matter nor spiritually volatile, predominates in this beyond, which is at the same time both physical and metaphysical." This statement obviously implies a recognition of what I call fine materiality or hylic pluralism. "The figures in Dante's *Divine Comedy* are not simply pure spirits. They are visible and audible shadow-bodies retaining vital and sensitive powers."⁵ In my opinion, Dante did not himself invent all this—the emphasis is generally elsewhere in the *Divine Comedy*—but was using ideas that were generally accepted at the time when he was writing. This was, of course, a period when Cartesian dualism was not known! During the Middle ages, the angels were thought by some to consist of fine matter (see above, § 94) and by others to be purely spiritual.⁶ Despite this, however, angelic singing was universally accepted as real.

What is more, this angelic music was also thought to have a healing and comforting effect. In the "Golden Legend" (*Legenda aurea*) it is referred to as a spiritual food. Saint Dunstan, when he was ill, heard choir of celestial virgins singing in a dream.⁷

Hammerstein also discusses the representation of angels singing and making music in the visual arts. He is of the opinion that the use of musical instruments by angels in art—a fairly late development—was improper.⁸ He also comments on the fairly frequent view that the demons made infernal music.⁹

1 PL 197, pp. 477-481; see also Hammerstein, p. 55.

2 Hammerstein, p. 86.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 131 ff.

4 See above, Vol. II. p. 221, Vol. III, 80-81.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 131 ff.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 188.

7 *op. cit.*, p. 231.

8 *op. cit.*, p. 218 ff; see also his illustration of the vision of St Dunstan, early 14th Century, from the Queen Mary Psalter, London.

9 *op. cit.*, p. 100 ff.

We may therefore conclude that, as far as the sense of hearing is concerned, there has been, on quite a wide scale, an extension in the form of overtones.

In addition, it is also important to mention the frequent references in spiritualism or in parapsychology, to unusual sounds—the “rappings” of Poltergeister¹ or the question of the “direct voice” at séances.² The hearing of inner voices, however, is a very delicate question indeed—many psychiatrists and many other people as well are of the opinion that those who claim to hear such voices are insane. The results of a small enquiry that I held in conjunction with the *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie* many years ago show, however, that this kind of hearing occurs much more commonly than is generally accepted.³ Furthermore, we have the illustrious example of Socrates, who said that an inner voice, to which he attached great importance, sometimes spoke to him.⁴ A great deal was written about Socrates’ *daimonion* in later classical antiquity.

The colours perceived by man’s capacity to see and the quality of colour in the extended sense are, of course, analogous to the odours of the sense of smell and the sounds perceived by man’s sense of hearing.

As we have already seen, according to the Mahabhārata XII, 10058 ff, the soul has six colours as a way of measuring the value of the state in which the soul finds itself.⁵ In Buddhism, the six *lokas* are thought to be connected with definite colours—this is especially prominent in the *Bardo-Thodol* or *Tibetan Book of the Dead*.⁶ The Chinese alchemists had a similar doctrine.⁷

R. Eisler studied the theme of the celestial cloak in his well-known work and found that it was multicoloured, a *poikilma*.⁸ The gods were thought to have brightly coloured garments.⁹ Joseph’s coat of many colours (Gen. 37.3), which the Septuagint renders as *chitōna poikilon*, was the subject of a good deal of discussion among the Church Fathers and in the rabbinical tradition.¹⁰ According to Psellos, the ancients thought that the demons were able to change colour.¹¹

1 See B 207, p. 66; B 272, p. 44.

2 See B 207, p. 23; B 272, p. 54.

3 “Geheimzinnige Woorden”, B 265, 1939, p. 18 ff; 1940, p. 59 ff.

4 See B 176, I, p. 149.

5 See above, Vol. I, p. 199-200.

6 See above, Vol. I, p. 266; see also M. Eliade, B 211, XXVI, p. 201, 215.

7 See above, Vol. I, p. 280-281.

8 See B 210, p. 248.

9 *ibid.*, p. 245, note 7.

10 B 210, p. 262; G.R.S. Mead, *The Vestures of the Soul*, Lucifer XI, p. 463.

11 B 159, p. 20.

In this context, what Plutarch wrote in *De sera numinis vindicta*, cap. 22, is of interest. Here, Thespesius, otherwise known as Aridaeus,¹ describes the souls he has seen in Hades. Look, he says, at their different colours. Some are dirty brown because of greed and desire, others are blood-red because of cruelty or anger and still others are yellowish green with envy. Here, in the state after death, however, he goes on, the task confronting these souls is to overcome their passions and thus to reveal one bright, radiant colour.²

John of the Cross spoke of the "three-coloured garment of the soul"³ and John Milton referred explicitly to the colour which, for example, the angels assumed.⁴

There is also the well-known painting of the resurrection of Christ by Matthias Grünewald on the Isenheim altar at Colmar,⁵ showing the figure of Christ surrounded by a circle of brilliant colours. Walter Nigg has spoken about Grünewald's "mystical colour language"⁶ of the "hidden figure" in this context. Méautis has said that this and other representations were intended as auras.⁷

Modern occultists have frequently spoken about the colours of the astral body—one has only to consult C. W. Leadbeater's *Man Visible and Invisible* (1902) and A. E. Powell's summaries.⁸ The underlying idea here is that certain states of mind are expressed, for the clairvoyant, by certain colours, which mean that a person cannot hide the state of his soul from the clairvoyant.⁹ This clearly goes a good deal further than a "symbolism of colours"¹⁰ of the kind developed by Anschütz and according to which red, for example, evokes feelings of activity and aggressiveness, blue repentance or conversion and so on. One question which is interesting in this context is whether different clairvoyants have always seen the same feelings or emotions in the same colours or not.

As I have already indicated, G. Méautis, professor of Greek at Neuchâtel, has drawn attention to the great similarity between Plutarch's arguments and those of C. W. Leadbeater.¹¹ This similarity is certainly

1 See above, p. 75.

2 J. J. Hartman, *De Avondzon des Heidendoms*, II, p. 346; B 262, XLVI, Vol. II, p. 54-55 B 100, III p. 12.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 131.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 224.

5 See Plate 15.

6 B 232, p. 42.

7 B 262, XLVI, p. 598, note.

8 B 116, Chapter III.

9 See above, p. 89, note 2.

10 See G. Anschütz, B 189, p. 169 ff.

11 "Verification of Theosophical Teachings", B 262, XLVI, p. 591.

very striking, despite the fact that Leadbeater's theory is more fully elaborated and is not limited to the lower emotions. I do not think¹ however, that it can be regarded as proved that we have two independent sources here.¹

However this may be, it cannot be disputed that there have been many protagonists of an extension of the perception of colour.

But what about *light*? Colours and light are closely related to each other, especially if white and black (or dark) are thought of as colours. What is more, a combination of all the colours of the spectrum produces white light. There can be no doubt that there has been a great deal of discussion about unusual light. On the other hand, however, there is no agreement as to whether it exists or not. Certainly the subject itself is large enough for a separate chapter, the following one, to be devoted to it. The opening section of this chapter on light is taken from an unpublished review which I wrote of a publication of F.N. Klein's which appeared in 1962, in a comparison with other writings.

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One has only to think of an extension of ordinary to fine matter, of an extension of man's ordinary senses and of the forms that such extensions have taken for the theme of *light* to spring especially to mind as one of the forms that has occurred most frequently and most strikingly of all.

This theme is encountered again and again in literature and it frequently contains far more than "light" as it occurs firstly in a religious context and secondly in the sense of the metaphysics of light in philosophy. I shall be returning to this aspect later, but in the meantime must attempt to answer the fundamental question—is what occurs here so regularly intended in the hylic pluralistic sense? Is the use of this term light in this extended sense perhaps not purely metaphorical? Ordinary light is, after all, something so important and so exalted that it is very well suited for use as an image.

The question that we have to consider, then is whether this light in the wider sense was thought of, whenever it has occurred in literature as more than an image or a comparison, or whether it was regarded as something real. Those passages in the Bible which describe Moses' descent from Mount Sinai² and the transfiguration of Jesus on Mount Tabor³—there are also other passages from the apocryphal and other

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 47.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 62.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 70.

books which can be added to these¹—strongly suggest a real rather than a purely metaphorical meaning. There are, however, numerous other places where light is mentioned in this wider sense and where we are bound to ask how the authors concerned thought about it and how others interpreted their views later.

First of all, I have to point out that I am by no means the first to believe that these authors saw this extended light as something real. My opinion is shared by quite a number of others. In the introduction to his Munich dissertation, *Lux intelligibilis. Untersuchung zur Lichtmetaphysik der Griechen* (1957), W. Beierwaltes said: "The spiritual and the divine are symbolised by light. This referential aspect of light should not, however, be thought of purely as a comparison. Light as perceived by the senses points to the light quality of being itself, which is intelligible. This comparison with light is therefore a statement about what is *essential*". At the beginning of this century, a Swedish scholar, G. P. Wetter, dealt with the question of light in two books. The first, published in 1914, was a study of the formula "I am the light of the world" in John's gospel. The second, published in the following year, was entitled *Phos* and dealt with religious convictions in Hellenism related to the theme of light and with Manichaeism. M. P. Nillson summarised Wetter's of light view as expressed in these two books (*Ich bin das Licht der Welt. Eine Studie zur Formelsprache des Johannesevangeliums; Phos. Eine Untersuchung über hellenistische Frömmigkeit, zugleich ein Beitrag zum Verständnis des Manichäismus*) as "matter that is finer and less visible than terrestrial matter, yet thought of as completely natural."²

Not all scholars who have investigated this question are, however, ready to accept the reality of this extended light. I should like to examine here the view of one the main opponents of realism in this case, as expressed in a recent book on the role of light Philo of Alexandria and the hermetic literature. In this learned treatise, *Die Lichtterminologie bei Philon von Alexandrien und in den hermetischen Schriften* (1962), Franz-Norbert Klein says: "I shall to a great extent have achieved my aim in conducting this investigation if I succeed in proving that Wetter's arguments are untenable, at least as far as philo and the hermetic books are concerned" (p. 7). Klein also believes that an extension of his investigation to other related fields, for example, the writings of the Church Fathers, would also lead to very much the

1 There is, for example, an account of a wonderful light that passes into the boy Jesus in the Protevangelium of James, 19 (see Klein, p. 194).

2 See F. N. Klein, p. 7.

same result (pp.192-193). He mentions H. H. Malmede as having already done this in the case of the New Testament in his book *Die Lichtsymbolik im Neuen Testament*, published in 1960 (p.212). Klein is firmly of the opinion that "light" was used everywhere as a comparison, as an image or as a metaphor and his conclusion at the end of his book is simply that light is not used in the real sense ("Die Uneigentlichkeit der Lichtterminologie", p.211 ff).

I do not think, however, that Klein has a very good case here. He believes that Philo used light merely as a metaphor, but it is clear that he has not read F.Rüsch's *Seelenpneuma*—which he does not even mention—because Rüsch points out that Philo, following Posidonius, refined the early Stoic view of *pneuma* as primordial fire and thought of it as an etheric light *pneuma*. Rüsch points out how philo struggled to come to an understanding of a purely intelligible spiritual substance but how this light *pneuma* remained, in his view, a fluid, which shows how much he tended towards early Stoicism.¹ As far as Augustine is concerned, Klein also believes that light—the *inluminatio* of the *Civitas Dei* (X,2)—was simply used as a metaphor and an analogy (p.196). Yet, K.Warnach wrote, in *Augustinus Magister* (1954; B 190), that Augustine certainly did not think of intelligible light, *lux incorporea*, as purely metaphorical, but as a genuine light in which the soul beholds (p.436). In another contribution to the same book, R. Allers said: "So-called spiritual sight requires a spiritual light which must be of the same subtle matter" (such as that of the memory, p. 479). What is more, Klein deviates, although, in his own opinion, "not objectively", from the doctrine of his master G.Mensing, Professor at Bonn University, to whom his book is dedicated and who had previously written, in connection with a Mandaean quotation, "these words prove unambiguously that what is present in the case of this light nature of numinous being is not a natural, but an unearthly light. The gnostics regarded this light as they did all such phenomena—as material."²

But it is precisely this—that this extended light may perhaps in some way or another be material—that Klein is so stubbornly opposed to. He disapproves entirely of other authors writing about this ancient conception of an extended light as though it were "physical

¹ B 137, pp. 29-33; Klein automatically accepts that *Pneuma* is immaterial (p.70.) even in the Bible (p. 72, note 2). This strikes me as very much open to doubt.

² G. Mensing, *Die Lichtsymbolik in der Religionsgeschichte. Studium Generale*, 1957, 7, p. 428; see also Klein, p. 209, note 1.

or almost physical" (p. 212) or as something "cryptically materialistic".¹ He himself prefers to speak of "substance" and "substantial" as "a factor which is analogous to, but not identical to matter and which is *not of fine matter*" (my italics), but is, for example, divisible (p. 209).

There is good reason for asking why Klein is so fundamentally opposed to what I have called, in this case, with light in mind, hylic pluralism. He has various reasons for this opposition. It is clear that he has to concede a certain amount, with his "substantiality", to what the ancient authors understood by extended light, but it is equally clear that he is also afraid of regarding this intelligible light and ordinary light as continuous. "Modern scholarship has, generally speaking, been responsible," he writes, "for the sharp and *conscious* division between the symbol on the one hand and what is symbolised on the other. This does not mean, however, that this division did not already exist at the time" (p. 212). This is really what Klein wants to do—he would like to approach this and similar problems with the modern concepts of the pure spirit.

But it is precisely a question of this! In the first volume of this work, I quoted W.B. Kristensen as saying, in an article on "Symbol and Reality" ("Symbol und Wirklichkeit"), that the ancient view of the relationship between symbol and reality was different from our own—that the ancients were less conscious of symbol and more aware of reality.² If this is true, then they do no doubt saw this extended light as reality and even as a hylic pluralistic reality. What Klein is doing is clearly to interpolate the modern epsilon standpoint—anthropological dualism—into these ancient views.

This, then, is Klein's first reason for opposing hylic pluralism in the case of extended light. Another is that religion—by which he means the Christian religion, because Philo and the hermetic writers were, in his view, very close to Christianity—unlike pantheism, in which the forces of nature, such as light, are regarded as the highest element, has as its object the "totally different one". Here Klein adds a comment ("see R. Otto"). This is so, Klein continues, to such a degree that it is impossible for the "highest natural element"—which was, for many ancient writers, sunlight—to be identified in religion (that is, Christianity) with the highest reality. (See pp. 204-205.) This, according to Klein, is precisely why, as soon as God is spoken of as light in a religious context, such a sharp division has to be made

¹ See Klein, p. 193, note 1; see also Vol. I, p. 122. According to Klein, H. Somers wrongly called the Manichean teaching about light a "materialistic doctrine" (ibid.).

² See above, Vol. I, p. 138—*De Gids* July 1931; see also above, Vol. II, p. 21.

between ordinary natural light and this other light. The simplest thing to do, then, is to call the use of intelligible light in ancient thought purely metaphorical, as this is completely in accordance with the contemporary division made between symbol and reality.

I am bound to disagree with Klein, who, I am convinced, is misrepresenting the views of the ancient authors here, and to agree with the modern authors whose opinion he challenges. What is more, I am not prepared to make such a sharp distinction between two religious views, both of which make use of the concept of extended light. I believe that the only possible conclusion is that an intelligible matter of *fine* materiality is intended in both of these cases, that is, both in more pagan and in more Christian environments.

Either Klein refuses to see the possibility of hylic pluralism here, that is, of matter, in this case, light, which is finer than, but also continuous with ordinary matter or he will not accept this possibility. In this context, another comment is certainly to the point—Klein clearly wants to exempt Philo from the conclusion that “God is identified with light in the natural sense” in his teaching (p. 24; see also p. 39). This is not difficult to do, because Philo uses the concept of light so much in connection with God. Klein is in fact ready to admit that the divine light “can be understood in the concrete sense”¹ in Philo’s teaching, but “never in the natural sense” (p. 78). Klein insists that a very clear distinction must always be made between the divine and the natural and this difference is qualitatively greatest when the first is used by Philo simply “in the metaphorical and technical sense” (ibid.). In my opinion, however, Klein is once again overlooking an important factor here—the gamma standpoint as a species of hylic pluralism. According to this standpoint, God himself is purely immaterial and transcendent, but a great deal of fine materiality occurs in the multiplicity of creation. There is also the delta standpoint, according to which both God and the soul are immaterial, but fine materiality exists everywhere in addition to these. It is not important to establish whether Philo’s teaching is closer to the delta or to the gamma standpoint. There can also be little doubt that he used higher light as a metaphor as well (as did the hermetic writers). But it is a hopeless task to try in this way to explain away the whole idea of intelligible light as a factor which was regarded as real. It is also not feasible to go against the opinions of the other modern authors mentioned above and Klein is therefore obliged to accept a “substantial”

1 In the hermetic writings, however, light can occasionally even be understood “in the materially concrete sense”; see Klein, p. 138.

extended light as the ancient view. It is also superfluous, since the transcendence of God—to which full justice is done both in the delta and in the gamma standpoints—provides a complete safeguard for that “totally different” character. It is, however, important not to draw a *wrong dividing line*¹ and include the whole of this intelligible light, in Philo and in many other authors, within this “totally different” aspect. If this is done, the continuity between ordinary and extended light ceases to exist. Obviously, Klein ought to have paid more attention to what Theophilus of Antioch, whom he quotes on p. 200, said. This is, “When I call him (that is, God) light, I am speaking about his work (his creation).” In other words, God himself is not necessarily light (—the transcendence of God, an aspect both of the gamma standpoint and of the delta standpoint), but many typically higher situations are accompanied by phenomena of a “supraterrestrial” light. These are, however, to be seen as real and as hylic pluralistic, as consisting of fine matter. To be more precise, they have to be seen as “sublime *pneuma*”.

Having outlined the whole question of extended light in some detail, on the basis of F.-N. Klein’s objections to the hylic pluralistic aspect of this light, I should like to discuss more fully the theme of unusual light in general as an extension of the quality of sensory perception.

In the first place, it is important to point out that the whole subject is enormously extensive—a separate book could easily be devoted to it. Both R. Eisler² and F. Rüsche, in his *Seelenpneuma*,³ mention books, articles and passages which deal with the theme of light, but one article which is quite outstanding—and which Klein does not even mention!—has been written by Mircea Eliade—“Significations de la ‘lumière intérieure’”.⁴ Eliade also confirms the widespread occurrence of this theme and not only mentions a number of writings on the subject of light in the Old Testament and in Judaism,⁵ but also gives a number of sources himself.

What is of interest to us in particular is that Eliade is on the one hand so convinced of the significance of this inner light as something *sui generis*, as something that is, in other words, quite different from ordinary light and is not simply imagery and yet, on the other hand, cannot accept a complete discontinuity between the two species of

1 See below, Section 136.

2 B 210, p. 18, 87, 556 note, 656-657.

3 B 137, p. 35 ff.

4 *Eranos Jahrbuch* (B 211), XXVI, pp. 189-242.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 221.

light. Klein, of course, felt compelled to accept a discontinuity and, as we shall see, others have also been inclined to see a very great gap between ordinary light and in the extended sense.¹

I propose now to give a brief survey, basing my data partly on Eliade and partly not on him, of the contexts in which this unusual light has occurred and then to close this chapter with a number of fundamental statements. In what follows, it is important to bear in mind that this unusual light is often designated in different ways as transcendental, uncreated, intelligible or supraterrrestrial light and that these other terms also frequently contain an element of interpretation.

Eliade has, for example, pointed to the Eskimos' sudden experience of light, known as *qaumanek*, as something that the *shaman* detects in himself (p.193). Something very similar is also experienced by Australian medicine men (p.195). The connection made in the *R̥gveda* (I, 115, 1) and later in various *Upaniṣads* between *ātman* and light is also comparable with this (p. 197). The *yogi* too can have contact with what Eliade calls "mystical lights" (p. 199).

According to the Indian philosophers, the *puruṣa* is *tejas*, that is, a magical divine essence which can sometimes be perceived as a glimmer of light or fire.² According to the Sankhya system, too, the *puruṣa* is light.³ The dwellers of heaven glitter—they are said to be "resplendent".⁴ In the ninth part of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, Arjuna is recorded as having a vision of the Lord, who is characterised by "the splendour of a thousand suns" (IX, 12; see Eliade, p. 202 ff).

Similar ideas are encountered in Buddhism. The gods or *devas* attain to a state of *samādhi*, which is fire-like (p.204). Buddha himself is radiant, his radiance emerging from the excrescence on his forehead (p.204). A. Coomaraswamy has connected the term *lila* (cosmic interplay) with the term *lelay* or "glitter" (p.205)—the cosmos being an interplay of flames according to the Indian philosophers. According to the Tibetan *Book of the Dead*, there is a special function ascribed to inner light in the *Bardo* state (pp.206-209). The Chinese also believed that, when the factors of the soul separated after death, the *k'i* (*ch'i*) "raises itself up on high and becomes a radiant light".⁵ The Chinese "golden flower" is also a discovery of light (p.216 ff).⁶

1 See below, Section 106.

2 See Gonda, B 58, p. 46.

3 See B I, p. 77; see also above, Vol. I, p. 215.

4 See above, Part I, p. 206.

5 See above, Part I, p. 279-280.

6 See above, Part I, p. 247.

In ancient Iran, there was *xvarnah*, the light of glory (p.220) and the archangels or Amerta Spentas possessed a body of light.¹ In Mazdeism, light also played a fundamental part, something which continued to be felt later, for example, in Manicheanism.

Heraclitus called the soul of the wise man a dry light and Rusche saw the origin of the later doctrine of the light *-pneuma* in Heraclitus' teaching² and it is possible to ask whether a continuous line does not run between this and the later idea of the radiant vehicle, the *augoeldes ochēma*. Heraclides Ponticus thought that the soul was an etheric body of the nature of light.³ In his well-known myth of the cave in the *Republic* (VII, 517), Plato compared man with someone who turns away from the light.⁴ In Rüsche's view, Plotinus' *pneuma to peri tēn psuchēn* amounts to a light-body of the soul.⁵ Verbeke has drawn attention to the fact that Porphyry believed that the world soul had light as its vehicle.⁶

In the old Testament, we read of light rather than of the sun (Gen. 1. 3). Although it is distinct from Yahweh (see Eliade, p. 222), he does express himself by light. *Kābhôdh* is the radiant light with which he is surrounded —when Moses came down from Mount Sinai, his face was gleaming from the reflection of this light.⁷

The New Testament makes frequent reference to light. Eliade says that light is, in the New Testament and elsewhere, the "syndrome of transcendence" (p.204). Christ, for example, calls himself the "light of the world" in the fourth gospel (John 8. 12). In many passages, light is spoken of in an even more concrete way. The baptism of Jesus must also be considered in this context. Many early Christian writers regarded the "bodily form" of Luke 3. 22, in which the Holy Spirit descended on Jesus, as a light and therefore spoke of Jesus' baptism as a *phôtismos*.⁸ According to this view, the baptism of Jesus was more a baptism with fire than a baptism with water, the *phôtismos* or *illuminatio* being transferred from the initiation into the mystery to baptism.⁹ This was the view of Justin, Gregory of Nazianzen and other Church Fathers (see Eliade, p. 223). The Holy Spirit, who, according to Luke 3.22, descended on Jesus, was also frequently represented as a fire.

1 See above, Part I, pp. 122-123.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 30-31. see B 137, p. 36.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 34.

4 See B 137, p. 29; See Beierwaltes, *op. cit.*, p. 61: "the idea is light".

5 See B 137, p. 53; see also above, Vol. II, p. 51.

6 See B 174, pp. 363-364.

7 Ex. 34. 29 ff; see also above, Vol. II p. 62, Vol. III, p. 121 see Eliade, p. 224.

8 See Malmede, *op. cit.*, pp. 38, 44, 63.

9 *op. cit.*, p. 78.

Even more important than this, however, is Jesus' transfiguration on Mount Tabor. What happened to Jesus there—and, of course, elsewhere—has become a model for Christian believers. Thus, the transfiguration—which is known in the Eastern Church as the *metamorphosis*—has become the basis of all Christian mysticism and Christian theology insofar as this deals with the divine light (see Eliade, pp. 223-224). "And he was transfigured before them, and his face shone like the sun, and his garments became white as light".¹ This can be interpreted, in the hylic pluralistic sense, as an opening of the "eyes" of the disciples and their beholding Jesus in a higher, subtle body. When Moses came down from Mount Sinai with the tablets containing the ten commandments, "the skin of his face shone because he had been talking with God" (Exod. 34. 29-30). It is not necessary for us to decide here whether a physical change was observed in this case or in similar cases, or whether those who saw this phenomenon had become partly "clairvoyant".

There have, of course, been other cases of reports of a shining -face, one of the most notable being the apparition of the Cynic Peregrinus.² Eliade has drawn attention to the reports about the "blazing monks" in Christian Egypt—Abba Sisoës, for example (p. 226). The theme of garments becoming white occurs regularly in the New Testament—I have discussed it in some detail in Section 93, in which I concluded that the intention was to show that a higher, radiant body was acquired or developed.³ Another important place in the New Testament is the passage in which Saul (Paul) is said to have had a vision on the road to Damascus. This was also a vision of light, a light which was so dazzling that Paul's eyes were blinded for some time afterwards.⁴ Ernst Benz has correctly attached great importance to Paul's experience and to the way in which he experienced the vision.⁵

The theme of light was a very important one in the Hellenistic period, quite apart from the New Testament. Whether one agrees with Klein's interpretation or not, his book shows clearly that light played a large part in Philo's thought. At the same time as the neo-Platonists were teaching the doctrine of a radiant body, to *augoeides ochêma*, the gnostics were writing, for example in the *Pistis Sophia*, about a garment

1 Matt. 17.2; see also above, Vol. II, p. 69. ff and Plate 2. In the Eastern Church, it is believed that the divine light radiates through icons; see above, Vol. II, p. 102.

2 See Malmède, *op. cit.*, p. 92: Exkurs I: "Das leuchtende Antlitz".

3 See above, p. 19.

4 See Acts, 9. 8.

5 See B 192: *Paulus als Visionär* (1952).

of light or robe of glory.¹ The gnostics thought of spirit and light as being very closely connected.²

In his use of the notion *illuminatio*, Augustine was thinking literally, as we have seen, of a spiritual light, a *lux incorporea* which was supra-empirical and non-metaphorical.³ The Cathari had a doctrine of a light-body which man had lost and had to win back.⁴ In Islam, the Nasafi, for example, taught a monism of light.⁵ According to Surah XXIV, 35 of the Koran, Allah was the light of heaven and earth. The whole of this Surah deals in some detail with this theme.

In both Western and Eastern Christianity, doctrines concerned with the inner light are encountered, but they have developed in different directions. In the West, the so-called *metaphysics of light* play an important part in the writings of many Christian thinkers, occurring for the first time as a prominent theme in *De luce* by Robert Grosseteste (1170-1253).⁶ Etienne Gilson said of Grosseteste that he "went so far as to attribute a leading rôle to light in the creation and the constitution of the Universe".⁷ Albert the Great also showed considerable interest in the metaphysics of light⁸ and Bonaventure regarded light as the basis of all material things.⁹ With the growing influence of Thomism, these Augustinian and neo-Platonic ideas receded into the background, but the theme of light began to emerge again during the Renaissance especially in the work of F. Patrizzi (1529-1597).¹⁰

Insofar as it has occurred at all, then, the theme of light has tended to be largely theoretical in Western Christianity. In the East, however, practical experience of this supraterrrestrial light has, throughout the centuries, been given greater emphasis than the theory of this light, although Platonism has continued to play an important part. In this context, the Hesychasts—those seeking inner "quiet"—whose members include the monks of the community of Mount Athos have been prominent. Eliade has pointed out that these contemplative monks have claimed that they were able to see the light original seen on Mount

1 See B 226, p. 370 ff; B 99, p. 133; B 100, X.

2 See B 226, p. 27; see also above, Vol. II, p. 83-84.

3 Warnach in *Augustinus Magister*, B 190, p. 436; see also above, Vol. II, p. 89.

4 See F. Wiersma-Verschaaffelt in B 227, 953, p. 11; see also *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis* XLVI, p. 11.

5 See B 211, 1947, p. 189.

6 See B 140, p. 194.

7 See B 212, p. 470.

8 See B 140, p. 218.

9 See B 140, p. 240; B 171, p. 388.

10 See B 141, p. 54.

Tabor (see p. 227).¹ Their leader Palamas (d. 1360) defended this point of view at the Council of Constantinople in 1341.

Another protagonist of the metaphysics of light in the West was Jacob Boehme,² who was followed in this by his disciples. George Fox (1624-1691), the founder of Quakerism, mentioned the inner light in his diary and preached frequently on the theme of its living in all men.³ As I have already said earlier in this work, Walter Nigg claimed that Rembrandt believed in the metaphysics of light.⁴ The Dutch poet Vondel also spoke of an unusual light:

Who is it who is placed so high,
So deep in the fathomless light...?⁵

Another Dutch poet, Jan Luyken (1649-1712) wrote:

It is too fine for the animal eye to see,
But if the skin is taken away
It will no longer be invisible,
Since the visible universe has come from it.⁶

In his *Geestenwaereld* (verse 525), Bilderdijk wrote:

What did I see? Myriads

Of beings bathing in the light as their own element.

Finally, a fourth Dutch poet, A. Roland Holst, (b. 1888), spoke of the experience of a transcendental or "empty" light.⁷

It is reported that the woman who served Swedenborg recoiled from him in fear after one of his visions, because "his eyes resembled the brightest fire".⁸ Görres (B 56) has also reported other similar cases.

The "light-body" was a common concept at the time of the romantic movement—I have already quoted Lavater's enthusiastic lines about this⁹ and mentioned what the late romantic philosopher, Fechner, said about a "light-body".¹⁰ another philosopher, L. Lavelle (1883-1951), was also very interested in the theme of light. Delfgaauw has said that "the problem of material and spiritual light preoccupied Lavelle from *La perception visuelle de la profondeur* (1921) to his last work".¹¹ Gerda Walther (b. 1897) has also mentioned a remarkable

1 See B 160, p. 261; see also above, Vol. II, pp. 70, 130.

2 See for example, B 172, p. 149.

3 See B 232, p. 255.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 235-236. See also B 232, p. 254.

5 *Lucifer* I, 282,

6 *Bijlief* 171.

7 See A. F. Ruitenbergh-de Wit, "Het lied van Elysium", B 227, 1958, p. 112.

8 See B 193, p. 307.

9 See above, Vol. II, p. 108.

10 See above, Vol. II, p. 170.

11 B. M. I. Delfgaauw, *Het spiritueel existencialisme van Louis Lavelle*, 1947 p. 26.

experience of her own concerned with light in her *Phänomenologie der Mystik* (1923, 1955). This reference is on p. 145 of her book.)

There is also the question of apparitions of light at spiritualist séances¹ and Thurston has devoted a whole chapter (V) of his book to "The Luminous Phenomena of Mysticism".² It is, however, a rather short chapter and Thurston appears to have no knowledge of Eliade's "blazing monks".³ It is, however, fairly obvious that the theme of the nimbus or halo⁴ goes back either to unusual apparitions of light in an ordinary environment or to the clairvoyant perception of a higher, radiant body. Aniela Jaffe has also mentioned a number of experiences of light which can hardly be dismissed simply as psychological or as archetypal phenomena—this at least is clear from her examples.⁵

Eliade has drawn attention in his essay to a particularly interesting factor, namely that, both in the East and in the West, this unusual light has been perceived especially in a religious context. I shall therefore be returning to this in chapter 106, which deals with the "sublime *pneuma*". Despite this tendency to occur above all in a religious framework, however, such experiences also take place, Eliade claims, in an "a-religious climate" (p. 234). He discusses this question in a section entitled "Spontaneous Experiences of Light" (p. 231 ff), with personal experiences of special interest to the person concerned more in mind than spiritualist or parapsychological phenomena. He was thinking here especially of the experience of the Canadian Psychiatrist R. M. Bucke (1837-1902) which led to the writing of the book entitled *Cosmic Consciousness* (1901). The well-known philosopher and psychologist William James (1842-1910) regarded Bucke's experience, which had a great influence on his life, as very important.⁶ Bucke's experience was basically a sudden illumination in the literal sense of mystical nature, during which Bucke saw the whole cosmos in front of him as a living whole (Eliade, p. 232). Bucke collected other cases of similar experiences and Eliade adds several others, including that W. L. Wilmshurst, the author of *Contemplations* and that of Warner Allen in *The Timeless Moment* (pp. 235-236). As I have said, this category of experience of light is a-religious, modern and what Eliade describes as "humanitarian" (p. 235). There is no personal God or religious figure involved

1 See, for example, B 98, II, p. 87; B 272, p. 53.

2 B 263, p. 162 ff.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 225; see also above, p. 129.

4 See above, Vol. II, pp. 11, 235.

5 See B 217, p. 82 ff.

6 *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), p. 398 ff.

in these experiences, only light. They are exalting and leave a deep impression.

In his concluding remarks (p. 240 ff), Eliade says that he is inclined to emphasise the aspect of personal mystical experience most of all.¹ This, in his opinion, is more important than "conceptualisation" of which there are "a thousand kinds" (p.242). This follows closely what I have already said above about religious apparitions. Ernst Benz has also drawn attention, in his book on Paul as a visionary (B 192) and elsewhere,² to the great importance of individual mystical experience.

Viewed in this way, this whole subject of unusual light contains an element of hylic pluralism. As abstract systems, all these varieties of light metaphysics are difficult to substantiate, but there are, if the evidence is accepted as valid, sufficient cases of personal experience of unusual light for us to say that there are good examples of an extension of a sensory quality here.

This does not mean that we can be entirely indifferent to the whole question of the "conceptualisation" of unusual light. One theory may well be better than the other and one cannot help being struck by the number of different adjectives used to describe this light—uncreated, supraterrrestrial, supernatural, intelligible and so on. Let me say simply that I would not make any absolute antithesis ("wrong dividing lines") here, but would rather speak of relative differences, that is, differences of terms situated at the same scale. In other words, this unusual light is part of a creation or multiplicity, but of a relatively different creation. It is certainly supraterrrestrial, that is to say, it transcends our ordinary environment, but at the same time it also forms a part of a different nature, continuous with our own. There is, in other words, no absolute antithesis between our *mundus sensibilis* and a *mundus intelligibilis*. Our world is to some extent intelligible (eidetic relationships are expressed in it) and this other world is also *sensibilis*, that is, to other, "extended" senses.

Finally, I shall have something to say in the following chapter about the relationship between the deity and this unusual light.

105 SENSE QUALITIES III

Before concluding our discussion of sense qualities in the extended sense of the word, three questions of a more general nature have to be mentioned.

1 Eliade makes a distinction between "subjective experience" of light and the possible perception by others of objective epiphenomena of light (p.240).

2 *Vision und Führung in der christlichen Mystik*, B 211, 1962, p. 117 ff.

The first point is this. I have chosen, as examples to illustrate the way in which extended sense qualities have been conceived, as far as possible those that have been situated in the subtle zone, such as forms of the soul after death. There are, however, many transitions from this zone to our own ordinary environment. Spiritualists, for instance, insist that materialisations take place at seances and parapsychologists who specialise in "physical apparitions" have investigated the possibility of these phenomena. Obviously, the materialisation of a hand or an arm or even of a complete apparition (like that of Katie King, about which so much has been written, even quite recently¹) is a question of form or shape and in particular of a special form of ideoplastics.²

This leads us at once to two difficulties in connection with hylic pluralism. Firstly, it is clear that a really complete materialisation is not a question of *fine* matter, but of ordinary "coarse" matter. Secondly, where is the dividing line between fine and coarse matter here? If it is true that a materialisation is preceded by the formation of a kind of "ectoplasm", which is able to intercept a beam of infra-red light,³ then we may assume that this is a typical case of transition between the two levels. If it is also true that a factor of fine matter plays a part in the ideoplastics of conception and birth (see above, 97), then too is a similar borderline case. Furthermore, if there is a transference of energy, however slight, in ordinary innervation—the movement of a limb, for example, after a conscious decision—then what we have here is a third, quite normal case.⁴

It is obvious, then, that these cases of transition from the level of ordinary matter to that of fine matter make it very difficult to prove whether a factor consisting of fine matter is really present or not. In other words, it is certainly possible to prove the presence of a physical effect, even if this is nothing more than boxing someone's ears impulsively with a materialised hand, because, if there is an element of truth, in this materialisation, the hand ought to be able to leave behind an impression in clay. (This has, in fact, been tried.⁵) To try to prove the presence of *fine* materiality, however, is less easy.

That a very fine distinction has to be made here will be clear from the following. Thomas Aquinas denied the possibility of fine materiality, insisting that both the human soul and the angels were pure spirits.

1 See Trevor Hall, *The Spiritualists*, 1962, and the various reactions to this book from, for example, R.H. Thouless, B 219, 1963, p. 123 ff.

2 See above, p. 69 ff.

3 See P.A. Dietz, B 205, pp. 89, 149; see above, Vol. II, p. 198, Vol. III, p. 70.

4 See B 114, § 49; see also below, Section 130.

5 See for example, B 205, p. 122.

All the same, presumably basing his view on the Bible, he believed that the angels (messengers) were capable, if necessary, of assuming an ordinary material body, at least for a time.¹ Nor did he deny completely ordinary innervation. It is, of course, easier to see a transition from fine to ordinary materiality. Nonetheless, this is² at least an assertion that heterogeneous transitions can and do take place.

These transitions do not yield very much of interest from the hylic pluralistic point of view, but they have, of course, to be mentioned. They occur above all in what I would call the direction from within to without, in other words, in the motory aspect. Both innervation and the physical phenomena of parapsychology come under this heading and, in the last case, also psychokinesis or telekinesis³ (although innervation may *also* be called psychokinesis, at least normal innervation.) This means that there is a great antithesis between motory and sensory. Both are connected with the senses. The Indian philosophers called the senses *indriyas*, but divided them into *jnānendriyas*, the sensory senses, by means of which knowledge was acquired, and *karmendriyas*, the action or motory senses.⁴ This is really correct—there are many different areas of motory senses. As opposed to the hearing of noises or sounds, there is also the expression of those sounds, by means of language and singing. As opposed to the smelling of odours, we have the spreading of them (by tomtoms, for example, and other animals) and, in contrast to the perception of forms, there is the creation of forms. In the narrower sense, touching can be contrasted with being touched.

We must now consider the difficulty of ascertaining precisely where the dividing line between fine and ordinary materiality is to be found in a number of mostly rather unusual cases of this kind of transition.

With regard to the odour of sanctity, we have seen that some people have been able to perceive this, but others have not.⁵ To what extent was this odour physically present, then, in such cases, and to what extent were the people concerned "clear smelling" at that time? The same question can also be asked with regard to hearing in the case of the singing heard at the death of Saint Elizabeth.⁶ What are we to think too of the "direct voice" at séances or the rappings of Poltergeist?⁷

1 See above, p. 24, 25.

2 See B 207, p. 63; B 272, Index under psychokinesis and the telekinesis.

3 See above, p. 55.

4 See above, p. 113 ff.

5 See above, p. 117.

6 See above, p. 119.

Mrs Louise Rhine, the wife of J. B. Rhine, has recently raised the question of "Auditory Psi Experience: Hallucinatory or Physical?" in an article in the *Journal of Parapsychology*.¹ She is of the opinion that one has to choose between two alternatives. These unusual noises may, on the one hand, be "hallucinatory"—what C. D. Broad would have called "hallucinatory quasi-perceptions"² and in which it should be remembered that "true hallucinations" occur.³ In this case, Mrs Rhine writes, ESP is certainly involved. On the other hand, these unusual noises may be an example of PK (psychokinesis)—things are moved in a way that is different from the usual way⁴ and this causes the physical noises that are heard.

In the case of hauntings, a choice has also to be made between the possibility that the person who claims to have seen the ghost is suffering from a hallucination (in the case of several people, there may be a collective hallucination) and the other possibility that something is objectively present, especially in the ordinary physical sense. A distinction has to be made⁵ between personal apparitions which are connected with the presence of a medium and apparitions which are associated with certain places and are observed at various times by various people. This is very important in the question of the status of apparitions and a good deal of detailed thought has already been given to it.⁶ Let us take one of the best documented examples, that of the "Cheltenham ghost" which haunted the Morton family.⁷ The figure of an elderly lady was seen and heard over a number of years by several people. The daughter of the house, Miss Morton, a student, made experiments with the apparition by stretching wires across the stairs, but the apparition passed through them. Broad observed that, because of this and other reasons, the apparition "proved its non-physical character in many ways" (p. 55). On the other hand, however, the apparition did intercept light. The father of the family did not see the ghost, despite the fact that the place where it was standing in the room was pointed out to him. (The others said that, when he went to that place, the figure slipped round him). I believe that the typically transitory character of active apparitions can be said to exist in cases like this.

1 B 219, XXVII, 1963, p. 182 ff.

2 B 195, p. 99 ff.

3 See above, p. 102.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 201. B 207, p. 63.

5 See for example, Zorab, B 272, p. 275 ff.

6 See above, p. 103 ff.

7 See Proceedings, S.P.R., B 244, III, p. 311 ff; Tyrrell, B 266, p. 55; Broad, B 195, p. 203; Zorab, B 273, p. 277 ff.

That the apparition could pass through wire suggests that it was subtle;¹ the fact that the footsteps of the apparition could, on the other hand, be heard points to a physical effect.

In Section 101, we asked whether the concept of *heaviness* might perhaps have an analogy which was materially fine and in this context found it valuable to draw attention to the ascent or descent of the soul through the spheres as something had that has often been accepted as existing.² There is, however, also a different problem of heaviness or lightness the problem of *levitation*. It might be possible to call the ascent through the spheres a "levitation", but generally speaking something else is meant by this word—the raising of a body in an unusual way, but taking place in our ordinary environment. A large number of reports were made, especially during the early years of psychical research, when there was far more interest in physical phenomena than now, of levitations of tables or of human bodies at séances. A good example of this is the levitation of the medium Home in the nineteenth century, who raised himself several times several inches into the air in front of W. Crookes.³ Similar reports were made of Eusapia Palladino.⁴ There are also very many cases of people with a strongly religious attitude—some "saints", some not—having levitations. Thurston, who was very sceptical with regard to stigmatisations,⁵ has recorded a number of apparently authentic cases of levitation, in which people at prayer raised themselves from the floor.⁶ (In this, they were clearly taking the *sursum corda*, "lift up your hearts" in the literal sense!) There have been so many of these cases and they have been observed by so many people, often by several people at the same time, that they cannot be simply imagined. Even very sceptical parapsychologists feel obliged to admit this. One of the most famous of all cases is that of Joseph of Copertino in the seventeenth century. Even the highly critical Pope Benedict XIV regarded his levitations as genuine.⁷ These levitations may be cases of PK or unusual psychokinesis, but there is no question of fine materiality, unless it is present simply as a force in the background.

1 See the *notes*, above, Vol. II, p. 70-71.

2 See above, p. 90.

3 See above, Vol. II, pp. 139, 194. for Crookes; for Home, see Zorab, B 273, p. 195.

4 *ibid.*, p. 207; Tenhaeff, B 255, p. 126.

5 Stigmatisations did not occur before Francis of Assisi, whose example created what Thurston has called the "crucifixion complex"; see B 263, p. 122.

6 B 263, Chap. I; B 272, p. 53; see Plate 14; Murillo's *Vision of James*; for Eastern Christianity, see A. M. Ammann, *Die Gotteschau im palamitischen Hesychasmus*, 1938, p. 186.

7 See B 263, pp. 15-18.

In the same chapter, 101, I also discussed the apparent need for food that the subtle body has in its own special way.¹ Parapsychologists also speak of cases of "asition", that is, being able to live for some time without taking normal quantities of food and drink.² In addition to this there have been frequent reports of "The Mystic as Hunger-Striker" and "Living without Eating", to use Thurston's chapter titles.³ These too might well be unusual transitions between two zones, something that is from the unusual zone keeping something in the ordinary zone, alive, the dividing line between coarse and fine materiality being in this case very uncertain.

Finally, we are bound to ask whether any motory phenomena of light to be reported. These will certainly not be so obvious as a police car rushing to our aid and it is true that, at our ordinary level, we tend to hear more of phenomena of sound than of light. It could also be said that the "shining face" which I have mentioned above⁴ may be an interpretation of a strange, suggestive or "magnetic" expression on the face of the person concerned. Yet one hears of light phenomena at séances⁵ and in the case of religious figures.⁶ What is more, it is obvious that, if there is an element of truth in the idea of a radiant inner body, this must have given rise to the very widespread idea of the halo or nimbus⁷ surrounding the head of the important religious person. But it is at least equally obvious that the observer might have been clairvoyant at that moment—this is just as possible as the occurrence of physical phenomena of light, as in the case of the "blazing monks" of Eliade.⁸

Finally, it is possible to point to something else that might perhaps indicate a motory function of the capacity of man to see. It is said that certain people can compel others to look up or round by looking or staring at them. The reverse of this phenomenon is that certain people are sensitive to this being stared at and look round when they are fixed with the eyes of the other person. I have myself investigated this question and have tried it out in practice, but my tests have been too few in number and I hope that others will try it out on a larger scale. I have also made a collection of various publications concerned

1 See above, p. 93 ff.

2 See for example, B 207, p. 11.

3 Thurston, B 263, Chapters XV and XVI.

4 See above, p. 129.

5 See above, p. 132; see also B 272, p. 53.

6 Thurston, Chapter V; see also above, p. 129.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 235, and Index under "halo".

8 See Eliade, *op. cit.*; p. 225; see also above, p. 129.

with this question. I am myself positively sensitive to this phenomenon and cannot therefore doubt that it is an authentic experience—it has very often happened to me that I have had to look up, for example, at a window in the street along which I have been walking, only to discover that I was being stared at by another person. The temporal contiguity—the sudden glance upwards and the withdrawal of the other person—and the spatial contiguity—the act of looking up precisely in that particular direction—give an unmistakable impression of causality. The phenomenon presents itself characteristically as a transition between ordinary perception—the turning of the gaze on the one hand and the looking up in a particular direction on the other—as though something might have beckoned and an “extra-sensory” perception—in so many cases, although one’s attention had been drawn in that direction, one could not have perceived anything.¹

In conclusion, it is possible to say that it is better to keep to the sensory aspect if one wants to show that fine materiality is probable. The motory aspect may be interesting and it is certainly worth mentioning here, but physical effects rather than fine materiality are all that can really be established by it.

The second question that I should like to discuss here is that of *synaesthesia*. Psychologists have, as the result of detailed study, observed that quite a large number of people think at once of a colour at the same time as they hear a note. One is inclined to say that they associate the colour with the note, but it is more than this. It is a reaction to a stimulus within a double sensation or perception, within two sensory fields. In his *Psychologie*, Anschütz reviews the whole phenomenon, the research that has been done into it and the books and articles that have been written about it.² He has also devoted special studies to it.³ In the Netherlands, Tenhaeff has written about this subject.⁴

However strange this phenomenon might seem to be (those who experience it are generally reluctant to speak about it) it is really quite reasonable. A reality which is strictly divided into different sensory zones is really a fragmented reality. An object is certainly perceived

1 See B 265, XI, p. 97 ff; B 115, p. 129 ff; B 277, p. 108 ff; “The Feeling of Being Stared At”, Journal S.P.R. (B 221), 40, 699 March 1959, p. 9 ff, for the transition, p. 9. Many earlier theories about seeing postulate a power emitted from the eye (see Plato, *Timaeus*, 45, B—46). As far as physical seeing is concerned, these theories are, of course, not tenable. They may, however, be related to a previous event which was of fine matter.

2 See B 189, p. 234.

3 *Kurze Einführung in die Farbe-Ton Forschung*, 1927.

4 “Over z.g. gekleurd hooren en daaraan verwante verschijnselen”, B 265, 1940.

as a unity—a motor car, for example, can be seen, heard, touched and even smelt. This, however, is a more or less external synthesis. It is clear that, throughout the history of thought, a *sensorium commune* has been accepted again and again, resulting in a communal perception I have already given examples of this doctrine.¹ This organ communal perception is, however, seen from the point of view of the senses (of which there are possibly others, apart from the ordinary senses; see § 98). The synaesthesias clearly form a counterpart to this “common sense” or *sensorium commune*, but only if seen from the point of view of the sensory *qualities*. Both have been discussed as a unity by Merleau-Ponty, for example.²

Various questions are raised by this subject. Is this phenomenon perhaps not arbitrary, since one person always sees one colour when he hears a certain note and another sees a completely different colour? Personal associations certainly play a part in this, of course, but there is a certain “steadfastness and agreement”.³ There is also a certain connection with the symbolism of colours,⁴ but the synaesthesias are more concrete and more compelling.

There is also a connection with the occult. These synaesthesias occur especially in the case of people who are inclined to have other, unusual perceptions. Anschütz, for example, has included in his book *Psychologie* a section on “Die Synästhesien in ihrer Beziehung zum ‘Okkulten’”⁵ Tenhaeff too has drawn attention to this connection. Anschütz gives a number of what he calls “striking parallels”, although he admits that there are also differences. He declares, however, that “the comparison given here is simply a juxtaposition of certain data based on observation. It does not in any way imply a conclusion.”⁶ Anschütz was it should be noted, not an occultist, but a professor of Psychology at Hamburg University.

If there is an element of truth in the idea of extended sensory qualities, with the result that colours and notes which are different from our ordinary colours and notes may exist, then these are bound to be gathered together somewhere in the other zone, in view of the dynamism and the Plasticity⁷ of matter in that zone. Origen’s comment in this context is of interest—the *whole* of the spiritual body could,

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 196, note 5: Vol. III, 62 ff.

2 *Phénoménologie de la perception*, p. 260 ff, 529; see above, p. 64.

3 Tenhaeff, *op. cit.* p. 159 ff.

4 See above, p. 120.

5 B 189, p. 244 ff.

6 B 189, p. 246.

7 See above, p. 68 ff.

in his opinion, hear and see¹ Modern occultists have expressed very similar views.²

We must now consider the third question related to these extended sense qualities that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. If what I have mentioned here and elsewhere in connection with celestial sounds and supraterrrestrial light and so on contains an element of truth, does it also contain a divine or numinous aspect? It cannot be denied that there is a tendency in that direction. The phenomena that are accompanied by light make a very deep impression and the statement, God is light, is commonly heard. On the other hand, however, there is also a tendency to resist this identification of the element of light, for example, and the divine aspect. F. N. Klein, for example,³ disputes the reality of the supraterrrestrial light. He and others try to disprove all the statements that point in this direction by saying that it has always been a question of symbolism and that all these statements should be interpreted as metaphorical. In this chapter and elsewhere, however, I have provided abundant evidence to the contrary, by discussing the opinions of writers who believe in the reality of these other sounds, colours and odours and of this other light. All this points clearly enough to a widespread conviction that fine materiality exists. Does it, however, contain the divine element?

This third question can be answered satisfactorily so long as a distinction is made between dualistic materialism—my beta standpoint—and the other forms of hylic pluralism, especially the gamma standpoint. In the first place, everything that exists is, according to the beta standpoint, material and this matter may be fine or coarse. Those who accept this standpoint believe that nothing at all transcends this. Attention has, however, been drawn to the fact that it is possible to be religious.⁴ Fine matter can in itself be exalted, in which case one has the “religious materialism” of the Stoics⁵ or of a Tertullian⁶ or a Hobbes.⁷ We can, for the present, leave aside the question as to whether this was the standpoint of Philo of Alexandria⁸ There is, however, the possibility of the gamma standpoint, according to which something else exists above creation or multiplicity, in other words,

1 See B 99, p. 115; see also above, p. 63.

2 See C. W. Leadbeater, B 262, XXXII, p. 539; XLVI, p. 674 ff; G. Hodson, B 262, LVI, p. 79.

3 He tries, for example, to defend Philo against this charge; *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 39, 72.

4 See B 76.

5 See above, Vol. II, pp. 43, 78.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 79.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 119.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 65.

a transcendental deity.¹ The supporters can, to some extent correctly, be called pantheists (a term which all too often has emotional and disapproving associations), but this is not possible in the case of the gamma standpoint. Those who accept this point of view are certainly theists (although it is quite a different matter whether this always implies faith in a personal God) and believe in a transcendental reality.

It should be clear by now that this contains an answer to the question as to whether these extended sensory qualities at the same time form the *highest* reality. No, wherever the deity expresses itself, this may be accompanied by a blinding and exalted light, such as Yahweh's *kābhōdh* or gleam of light,² but the deity itself is more than this. This is already apparent in the Old Testament.³ It cannot be disputed that what is fundamentally expressed in the Old and New Testaments and in Christianity (also, incidentally in Islam) is monotheism. Yet, in this monotheism, full justice is done to the transcendence of the deity. On the other hand, however, it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that, in addition to this conviction of the transcendence of the deity, there is also belief in hylic pluralism, that is, in the effectiveness of fine materiality. Insofar as both views are present—transcendence and hylic pluralism—then what we have here is the gamma standpoint (or possibly the delta standpoint).⁴

We may also ask whether the divine aspect is also absorbed into those many overtones, the harmony of the spheres and so on. Yet, whenever we examine the references in the Old and New Testaments to God's voice, for example, it is clear that the deity is more than his voice. The great importance of silence in mysticism should also not be forgotten. In this great silence—"be quiet and know that I am God"—this great source of mystical experience, all sounds are transcended.

It is not only, however, in the deity's being more than light and more than sound that the transcendence of God and consequently the gamma standpoint are expressed. These are also quite apparent in the question of image, form or shape. At the end of Section 102, I discussed

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 7 etc. Buddhism has been described as positivism, materialism and relativism among other things, but, as I have already pointed out (see above, Vol. I, p. 250 ff), it does teach that something—*nirvāna*—transcends everything, so to that characterise Buddhist teaching as materialistic and so on is inadequate.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 62. This light was later described by the words *doxe* and *gloria* (see, for example, A. J. Vermeulen, *The Semantic Development of Gloria in Early Christian Latin*, 1956). The improper use and the abstract use of or meaning of these words have led to the hylic pluralistic content being overlooked.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 60.

4 See above, p. 68.

the spherical form as the perfect form of the evolving soul and of the deity.¹ Is this all that has to be said? The Greeks were, remarkably enough, not inclined to go further than this. (We have seen how widespread the beta standpoint was in Greek thought.²) It is in the monotheistic religions, moreover, that a tendency can be observed—a strong or less strong tendency according to the group within these religions—to make no image or images of the deity. There is also a tendency within these religions not to express the name of the deity (the name being, it will be remembered, a kind of form in the wider sense³). What all this amounts to is a movement away from the beta standpoint towards the gamma standpoint.

One is inclined to regard Indian thought as predominantly pantheistic, but on closer inspection this is not the case. In his *Advaita and Neoplatonism*, in which he mentioned many similarities between these two schools of thought, Staal was bound to admit that Plotinus, as a Greek thinker, regarded form as a higher than the formless.⁴ Another tendency also occurs in Plotinus, thought, namely the idea that the One, *to en*, is situated on the other side, *epekeing*, of being.⁵ This tendency also occurs in an even more fundamental way in the *advaita* philosophy of Śāṅkara, who taught that *Brahman* went much farther than all *māyā*, being the One without a second, *ā-dvaita*.⁶ It is therefore not possible to say that the concept of absolute transcendence is not to be found in Eastern thought or that this philosophy is entirely pantheistic. The concept of *arūpa*, formless which occurs in Buddhism, also points in the same direction insofar as *arūpa* is not used in the purely negative sense (*arūpa* worlds).⁷

We may therefore conclude that hylic pluralism, at least in the form of extensions of the sensory qualities, does not generally speaking necessarily imply an absorption into these qualities and therefore a form of pantheism, that is, hylic pluralism as dualistic materialism or the beta standpoint. On the other hand, many different modes of thought are encountered—in the Bible and in early Christianity, in neo-Platonism and in the Indian philosophy of *advaita*—in which fine materiality—the Holy Spirit as a concrete outpouring, the radiant body or *augoeides*

1 See above, p. 110 ff.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 55.

3 See above, p. 117.

4 B 253, Vol. I, p. 25; see B 169, LVI, p. 143.

5 B 253, p. 185, 193.

6 See above, Vol. I, p. 216.

7 See above, Vol. I, pp. 238, Vol. I, p. 246.

ochēma, *upādhis* and *linga-śartras*—as well as a more or less, but sometimes very clear state of being transcended of the whole world, including the world of fine matter, of creation or multiplicity is taught. This being transcended takes place in the form either of the gamma standpoint or of the delta standpoint, which also includes transcendence. This, then, is the answer to the question that was raised in the third point of this chapter.

106 SUBLIME PNEUMA

In our discussion of the different views concerning fine materiality which have occurred in the history of thought, I have made a distinction between three species¹ of *pneuma*—the physiological,² the psychological³ and the sublime. Each of these is increasingly further removed from the ordinary body—which can also, in its own way, possess *pneuma*, in the form of air, which I have called the physical *pneuma*⁴—so that materiality becomes increasingly more subtle and rarefied. I have already discussed the first two species of *pneuma* in some detail from the phenomenological point of view and must now consider the third, the sublime *pneuma*. This *pneuma* is characterised by its exalted state and whenever it makes itself known it is impressive in a favourable and profound sense.

Before going any further, I am bound to point out that this division into species of *pneuma* is to some extent arbitrary. The dividing lines between the respective species are not always rigid and this is something that is encouraged by an ambiguous use of the term “etheric body”.⁵ Yet, from the point of view of their content, they clearly form different groups. Although it is never purely physiological in the ordinary sense of the word, the physiological *pneuma* is always closely related to the ordinary body. The psychological *pneuma* is emancipated from the body as the free soul when it makes an excursion, although it is neutral and by no means always exalted. It might therefore be possible to call the sublime *pneuma* the better part of the psychological *pneuma*⁶ and classify it as such under the heading of psychological *pneuma*. Nonetheless, the sublime *pneuma* is clearly a species on its own.

1 See above, Vol. I, p. 19 ff; see also above, Vol. II, pp. 9 ff, 33 ff.

2 See above, Section 96 ff.

3 See above, Section 99 ff.

4 See above, Vol. I, p. 19; see also above, Vol. II, pp. 9 ff, 33 ff.

5 See above, Vol. I, p. 16 ff.

6 See above, Vol. I, p. 33, note 1.

We should, however, not be bound irrevocably to this division into three species—it is in no sense a compulsory division. Various subdivisions are also possible. Many authors whose point of view has been hylic pluralistic, even though they were not acquainted with the term, have done precisely that, many of them dividing the *pneuma* into five or seven categories, for example. Five *ātmans* were distinguished in the Taittiriya-Upaniṣad, for example. These were later called *koṣas* or coverings and the highest of these, the *ānandamaya koṣa* or covering of blessedness, clearly corresponds to what I call the sublime *pneuma*.¹ Proclus spoke of seven *chitōnes* or garments of the soul and believed that the soul possessed an even higher body, the innate or *sumphues ochēma*.² Modern occultists too have a clear preference for a division into seven bodies.³ As the field is already so extensive, however, it would be impossible to discuss all these subdivisions in detail here.

As far as the sublime *pneuma* is concerned, we may say at once that this is subtler than the ordinary psychological *pneuma*—the fact that it is exalted or sublime is clearly connected with this—but it does not always remain at its own level. It has a tendency to descend, while preserving its sublimity. This is something that is encountered particularly in a religious context. The outpouring of the Holy Spirit at what was later called the feast of Pentecost, when this divine power was received by the apostles, was clearly of this nature; it is a phenomenon which was and still is regarded as a concrete event taking place in time.¹ The activity of the angels—as opposed to that of the demons—can also be included under the heading of “sublime *pneuma*” and many have been of the opinion that this goes so far that, even though the angels normally dwell in “higher regions”, they do sometimes assume a body of coarse matter when they become perceptible here below as messengers. What is more, there have been reports of a descent, limited in time and space, of a very exalted power or presence during the Mass. This too clearly falls under the heading of or can be regarded as “sublime *pneuma*”.

Quite apart from this tendency to descend, the sublime *pneuma* also exists at its own level, where it is an interesting enough phenomenon in itself. What is more, the sublime *pneuma* can exist at three time levels—at the level of the past, at the level of the present, when it is either partly realised or only germinal, and at the level of an ultimate

1 See above, Vol. I, pp. 177-181.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 53.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 69.

event, that is, at the eschatological level of a desirable state at the end of time. In the case of the last, we have the typical idea of the resurrection, to which I shall be devoting a separate chapter (§ 107). The first state, that of the past, is often associated with the idea of a fall and the intermediary state of the present with the idea of redemption.

The sublime *pneuma* is also very often associated with the theme of light—a light-body and phenomena of light such as a different, supraterrrestrial light, either postulated or perceived either in a vision of an apparition or surrounding a living person. It will be clear, then that what I have said previously about the light or white garments of the soul which must be acquired (§ 93) and about a different species of light (§ 94) anticipate the present theme of the sublime *pneuma*.

I propose now to discuss a number of views of a very varied kind concerning the rarefied body of sublime quality. In some of these views, the idea of the past, of the initial state, is predominant. In others, the emphasis is on the latent germ or nucleus at a high level and in others the idea of beings which remain constantly at that level is stressed. These predominant ideas are, it should be noted, not always easy to distinguish.

As I have indicated above, H. von Glasenapp commented that the Buddhists believed that: "At the beginning of such a newly arisen world men . . . are endowed with a radiant body, they hover over the earth's surface, and they need no physical nourishment".¹ Although I cannot quote any passages, similar ideas are to be found in Hinduism, which taught that there were different modes of procreation before the present mode that is, by sexual intercourse. Windisch has written that, according to the Mahābhārata, the gods in heaven possess fiery bodies, but that this does not prevent them from being subject, from time to time, to a fall.² Arjuna saw the *gandharvas*—a kind of *deva*—with "bodies blazing like the sun" during his ascent into heaven.³ I have already mentioned the highest of the five *kosas* the *ānandamaya-kośa* or body of blessedness.⁴ According to the trikāya doctrine, Buddha had three bodies or *kāyas*, one of these, the *sambhoga-kāya*, being the body of blessedness, in which Buddha dwells for ever at the head of a heavenly hierarchy.⁵

The Chinese also believed that, when the factors of the soul disintegrated after death, one of these factors raised itself up to heaven and

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 27.

2 See B 178, pp. 186-187, note.

3 See above, Vol. I, p. 223.

4 See above, p. 145.

5 See above, Vol. I, p. 244-245.

became a radiant light.¹ In Chinese Buddhism, there is also the idea of the "diamond body" as the secret mystery of the "Golden Flower". C. H. Jung has established a point of contact between this and the search for an imperishable *corpus subtile*, a resurrection body in the wider sense, by the alchemists in the West.² Mircea Eliade quotes a Tibetan text which claims that man originally consisted of light.³ This too is situated before the emergence of ordinary procreation by sexual intercourse.

H. H. von Veltheim-Ostrau reports in his book on India (*Der Atem Indiens*, Dutch translation, *Onbekend India*, 1955) that he was in the habit of seeing the Maharishi, a mystic or yogi of our own period, in his "light-body" and was able to be taught by him, whether or not he was physically close to him.⁴

Ernst Benz tells in his book *Asiatische Begegnungen* (1963) how he saw the words in the *āshrama* of another well-known Indian sage, the late Aurobindo Ghose: "It is not a crucified, but a glorified body that will save the world". He was told that this was not directed against Christianity, according to which the crucifixion on Good Friday is followed by the resurrection at Easter. The "aim" was, he was told, "the transfiguration",⁵ but in a more general sense.

Light also plays a very important part on the one hand and what Hamberger has called "heavenly corporeality" on the other both in the Mazdeism of ancient Persia and in the later forms of Parseeism. According to these ancient ideas, the *fravashis* or *feruers* were primordial images of man, but "more or less material", whereas the *amerta spentas* or archangels had rarefied bodies of light.⁶ Henri Corbin made a specialised study of Parseeism and has pointed out man's resurrection with a lightbody, a *caro spiritualis*, was taught by Sheikhs in the early nineteenth century, a doctrine that was influenced both by neo-Platonism and by Islam.⁷

There is a long tradition of belief in a radiant body or *augoeides sōma ochema* in Western classical antiquity. Rüsche was of the opinion that this belief was already present in Heraclitus' dry light or *augē (xerē)*⁸ and G. R. S. Mead investigated this tradition thoroughly in his

1 See above, pp. 127-128.

2 See above, Vol. II, pp. 132-133.

3 See B 211, XXVI, p. 211: "Mythes tibétains sur l'Homme Lumière".

4 *op. cit.*, p. 283; see also pp. 304, 320.

5 pp. 264-265.

6 See above, Vol. I, p. 119-120.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 113-114.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 31, Vol. III, p. 128.

treatise on "The Radiant Body".¹ In this, he draws attention to Plato's *Phaedrus* 250 C, in which the philosopher talks about the memory of a human state in which man had not yet become the victim of procreation by sexual intercourse. At that time, man was still a whole, lived in the company of the gods and saw the divine forms in pure clarity (*augē*) with unveiled eyes and filled with blessedness. Later, however, he fell into the grave (*sōma*) of the body of coarse matter (*sōma*), to which he is fastened like an oyster to its shell.²

I have discussed the radiant body or *augoeides sōma* in this volume and in the others of this work so many times that the reader must consult Mead to find the many places where this is mentioned by the later Platonists, up to and including one of the last, Damascius. The term also occurs—as *augoeides sōma*—in the philosophical writings of Galen³ and in the theological writings of the sixth century Eastern Christian, John Philoponus.⁴

There is good reason for regarding the *sōma teleion*, the perfect body in the Mithraic cult which was developed from Mazdeism as closely parallel to the radiant body of the Greeks.⁵

Similar ideas are also encountered in the gnostic teaching contained in the hermetic literature and the Chaldaean oracles. Dodds maintains that these ideas are also related to Paul's "imperishable body".⁶ The "garment of glory" referred to in gnostic works such as the *Pistis Sophia* is especially closely related to this.⁷

Clearly, then, there has throughout history been constant explicit reference to a *pneuma*, a garment or a subtle body with special qualities, in other words, to a sublime *pneuma*, in contrast to an etheric or aerial body which simply continues to exist.

It would be wrong not to mention another aspect of the sublime *pneuma* here, namely the light associated with certain religious figures. The first is the *kābhōdh*, the "glory" or gleam of light reflected on the face of Moses when he came down from Mount Sinai, the second the face of Jesus shining like the sun when he was transfigured on Mount Tabor,⁸ the third is the halo or nimbus.⁹

1 *The Quest* I, p. 705 ff; Chapter III of his B 99.

2 B 99, pp. 78-79.

3 See B 33, p. 316.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 103; see B 99, p. 88 ff.

5 B 33, p. 314; B 100, V, VI; B 78, p. 330 ff; see above, Vol. II, p. 48.

6 B 33, p. 308, note 1.

7 B 99, p. 124, 133; B 100, X; see above, pp. 18-19, 129.

8 See above, Vol. II, pp. 62, 70, Vol. III, pp. 128-129.

9 See above, p. 132.

I shall be dealing in greater detail with the theme of the glorified body in the following chapter and especially with the glorified body possessed by Christ as the first-born. To glorify is, of course, to praise and the glorified body is, as it were, above, all praise. It is therefore also the glorious body or *corpus gloriosum*. Although it is often used in an abstract sense,¹ the term glory (*doxē*) is, of course, a rendering of the Hebrew *kābhōdh* or gleam of light. The word "transfigured" which is often used in this context gives the sense of transcendent, exalted or sublime.

In conclusion, it is interesting to note that the theologian E. Peterson was of the opinion that Adam and Eve were not naked before the fall, but dressed in the garment of paradise.² This certainly points in the direction of a subtle body in Adam's case before the fall, bearing in mind the constant use of garment for body. This is also in accordance with the explanation that is quite often given, namely that the animal skins referred to in Gen. 3. 21 were really bodies of coarse matter, so that Adam and Eve may well have possessed different, more spiritual bodies before the fall. The idea that Adam may have possessed a "celestial garment" before the fall is also contained in the Cabbala.³

The same idea occurs in the writings of an authoress of the modern age, Antoinette Bourignon, who claimed that creation was originally in a "glorious state" and even though body and spirit are now covered with corruption, this state continues to exist in essence and will eventually come to the fore again.⁴

Victor Hugo assumed that at least some of the dead appeared in a "radiant form".⁵ Death may then bring man nearer to the sublime *pneuma*. A great deal of thought has been given to the glorified state in the Christian tradition and this theme has been discussed frequently in Christian literature. This brings us to the following chapter.

107 RESURRECTION

As I have already made clear, I prefer to avoid any discussion of dogmatic questions in this book.⁶ On the other hand, however, I have already involuntarily allowed my own religious point of view to emerge

1 See above, p. 142 note 2. One is also reminded of Phil. 3. 21: *soma tes doxes* ("glorious body").

2 See above, p. 18, note 2.

3 See above, Vol. II, pp. 63, 66.

4 *Oeuvres* XVII, p. 14 ff; see also B 97, p. 795.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 229.

6 See above, p. 82.

in this work¹ it and will be clear to the observant reader that my main interest is in mystical experience. It would, however, result in a serious omission in the task that I have set myself, that is, of reviewing the occurrence of the theme of fine materiality, if I were completely to bypass the whole question of divergent opinions concerning dogma and teaching in this context. I have not done this in other parts of this work and, with all respect for the convictions of those who think differently, I cannot very well do it now in the case of subjects to which an essential contribution is made by dogmatic theology. One of these subjects, resurrection, is dealt with in this chapter and another, the sacraments, in the following.

There are, however, certain difficulties. Most Christian denominations are in the habit of appealing to the Bible or, with the exception of certain texts, to the tradition of the Church. When I come to show which doctrines have, in my opinion, a hylic pluralistic flavour, it may seem as though I attribute a certain authority to them. To some degree they are, I believe, venerable, but whether they are consistent is another question. There is, of course, nothing new in this. There is often a "letter" for every opinion and it can hardly be part of my task to compose a single homogeneous pattern of hylic pluralism on the basis of the Bible and the tradition of the Church. When I come to deal with the question of a consistent theory of hylic pluralism, it will be seen that I feel personally obliged to reject certain forms of hylic pluralism.² Here, however, I am concerned with the phenomenological aspects of the subject. All that I can do—and this is in principle quite enough—is to point out certain hylic pluralistic tendencies, in this case those which occur especially in Christianity, and perhaps also to draw attention to other places in the Bible and elsewhere that are in conflict with them. What is more, I can only do this insofar as space allows me.

As for the theme of resurrection, the first task that confronts me is to draw attention, very briefly, to the wide range of meanings contained in this term. This is something that has been mentioned by all those concerned with this subject. In the northern hemisphere, nature begins to rise again in spring, in the month of April or thereabouts, when the light of the sun is triumphant over darkness. This is, of course, the time of Easter. It is also clearly part of the general principle of change or metamorphosis, in which the return of what is most desired brings hope, trust and courage. In connection with this theme of the

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 55.

2 See below, Section 113.

death and rebirth of nature, there are many myths describing the fall or death of whole worlds and especially of gods and their later rebirth.¹

Jesus' death and resurrection on the third day has clearly to be included within this general theme together with the resurrection of all mankind on his return, when the world will be redeemed from death. According to orthodox Christian teaching, Jesus' suffering, death and resurrection is a central, unique event, essential to the redemption of mankind. A similar theme of the resurrection of men from their graves is also to be found in other religions,² but what is special to Christianity is that Christ's second coming at the end of time brings about the resurrection of mankind.

There is no need for me to go into this any more deeply, but I am bound point to the link between Jesus' rising again on the third day by which he became the *first-born* of all who have risen again³ and of all men, although they will not rise again until the end of time. Christ is also the second Adam. Just as Adam fell and all men followed him in sin, so too is everything changed in Christ the Redeemer. This, then, is a brief résumé of the Christian doctrine. Where can we find evidence of hylic pluralism or fine materiality in it?

We saw, towards the end of the preceding section (§ 106), that some theologians have been of the opinion that, in paradise before the fall, Adam wore a garment of light, in other words, that he possessed a spiritual body of fine matter.⁴ According to several theologians and early Christian writers, moreover, a *pneuma* of fine matter which is transferred from the father at conception is active in the child and this could be traced back ultimately to the sperm of Adam.⁵

A great deal has, of course, has been written about the body with which Christ, the second Adam, rose again, thus putting an end to man's fall. As I have already indicated,⁶ ideas about Christ's glorified body go back predominantly to Paul's letters and far less to the rest of the New Testament and the gospels. One is inclined to wonder, however, whether Paul's experience on the road to Damascus (Acts 9. 3 ff), when the apostle had a blinding vision of Jesus, did not exert an enormous influence on all the later conceptions of the *corpus gloriosum* and, indirectly on the resurrection of mankind. Those who attach great importance to religious and mystical experience⁷ will inevitably

1 B 127, II, p. 320 ff; B 132, II, p. 400; B 2, p. 6; B 90, p. 94.

2 For example, in Mazdeism; see B 90, p. 95.

3 See 1 Cor. 15. 20; see also above, Vol. II, p. 72.

4 See above, Vol. II, pp. 63, 66, Vol. III p. 18, note 2, 149.

5 See above, Vol. II, pp. 76-77, 145, Vol. III, pp. 50-51.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 72. 7 See above, Vol. II, pp. 56, 130. (E. Benz).

be inclined to agree with this view. This does not mean, of course, that these experiences have always been correctly interpreted, even by the person who had them.

Certainly later Christian authors, especially the Church Fathers, formulated an entire theory about the qualities of Christ's resurrection body—the doctrine of the *dores* or bridal gifts which it received at the resurrection. (I have already discussed these in some detail.¹) What is interesting in the context of our special subject, however, is that there is an apparent conflict here between two points of view. The first is the literal point of view, which is supported by the fact that the grave was empty after the resurrection (Matt. 28.6; Luke 24.3). Jesus' physical body had apparently disappeared and, in the text according to which Jesus said later that he was not a spirit, he let himself be touched and ate food (Luke 24. 39, 42). This view would appear to be entirely in accordance with the literal interpretation of other ascensions. I am inclined to regard Elijah's ascension as an event involving fine materiality;² there can in any case be no doubt that this ascension, like Enoch's,³ was often interpreted in the purely physical sense. Mary's assumption can also be included within the same context.⁴

In addition to this, however, there is another view which is less literal and which, on closer inspection, undoubtedly points in the direction of hylic pluralism. According to this point of view, the *dores* or bridal gifts possess characteristics which are quite definitely not those of the ordinary body. The gift of clarity, for example, is very reminiscent of the light emitted by the light-bodies spoken of in other contexts. *Subtilitas*—fineness or the ability to penetrate through ordinary matter—is, of course, a typical quality of subtle bodies consisting of fine matter. The presence of these characteristics is supported not only in the letters of Paul, but also in the gospels—Jesus, for example, was able to pass through closed doors (John 20. 19). As far as emitting light is concerned, a striking example of this is the transfiguration on Mount Tabor,⁵ which several authors have regarded as an anticipation of Jesus' resurrection.⁶ On the other hand, of course, it was especially Paul who worked out the nature of the resurrection body and emphasised the exceptional nature of the "pneumatic" body in contrast to the nature

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 70-71.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 64; see also index.

3 Heb.11.5; see above, p. 82.

4 See B 179, XIII, p. 362.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 70.

6 See for example, L. Réau, *Iconographie de l'art chrétien*, II, p. 575.

of the "physical" body.¹ On the basis of Christ as the first born, he included Jesus' resurrection body and that of men under the same heading.

The special qualities of the risen Christ are also met with in iconography. Matthias Grünewald's famous painting of the resurrection, which was originally on the Isenheim altar and is now housed in a museum in Colmar, shows the risen Christ surrounded by light and an aura of brilliant colours.² One of the *dotes*, clarity, occurs frequently in the halo or nimbus³ which so often surrounds Jesus' head in art and also the heads of saints.

We must now consider the resurrection of men, something which was, according to Paul, closely connected with the resurrection of Christ. Very divergent views occur in connection with this theme of the resurrection of human beings, but in this case too there have been literal interpretations and others that are less literal. The literal interpretation has predominated in Western Christianity especially.⁴ I have already drawn attention, in Part I of this work,⁵ to some of the difficulties encountered here, for example, the question as to what happens to the flesh of those eaten by cannibals and to whom that flesh belongs. Another question that has proved difficult to answer is whether one rises again with a body of the age at which one died, that is, does one rise again as a child or as old person?

Most Christian authors have suggested a moderate solution to this problem and related questions of man's resurrection. The *dotes* or bridal gifts, as qualities both of Christ's risen body and of the resurrected bodies of men, have almost always come into play in this context and, as I have already said, these gifts of *claritas*, *subtilitas* and so on undoubtedly point in the direction of hylic pluralism. This is not a doctrine put forward by some obscure Christian sect—it is an official doctrine in Roman Catholic theology. It is discussed in some detail in the French *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*⁶ and in the German *Handbuch der katholischen Theologie* (Scheeben and Atzberger).⁷ Thomas Aquinas, for example, also accepted this doctrine,⁸ Ruysbroeck

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 72-73.

2 Plate 15; see also W. Nigg, B 232, p. 42; see also above, p. 120.

3 See index.

4 See for example, G.R.S. Mead, "The Resurrection-Body", B 99, p. 110 ff.

5 See above, Vol. II, pp. 30-31.

6 B 29, III, col. 1887.

7 B 147, IV, p. 933; see also above, Vol. II, p. 70-71; see also M. Schmaus, *Katholische Dogmatik* (B 150), 2, p. 83 ff.

8 See above, p. 101; see also Vol. I, p. 51-52.

referred to it¹ and it probably had a influence on the writings of Grotius² and on the painting of Rembrandt.³ We can safely assume that the idea was also of importance in Protestantism in general and in the movement that I discussed in Section 72 in particular. Lavater's ideas about the "body of eternity" were obviously closely connected with those of the Church Fathers.⁴ H. W. Rinck, the Protestant paster of Elberfeld, wrote explicitly about these gifts in his *Vom Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode* (1861), at the same time appealing to St. Paul.⁵ P. Althaus does not name them, but he does discuss, in his book *Die letzten Dinge*, a problem that is closely related to it. He maintains that the resurrection-body is totally different, thus rejecting the completely literal interpretation, but affirms also that the same person is still expressed in that body.⁶

We may therefore conclude that a significant number of Christian theologians were convinced that man's resurrection body possessed certain qualities which were closely connected with hylic pluralism.

It is also possible to say that what I have called psychohylism is not met with in this theme of resurrection in any special form. The psyche, soul or mind and its corporeal expression are closely related to each other. At death, this link is broken. But this, it is argued, cannot be the end—there must be immortality and this must take the form of a restoration of the body.⁷ The idea of expected salvation is also linked with this so that the resurrection is thought of as taking place in an exalted, glorious form, in other words, as the sublime *pneuma*.

This brings us to a remarkable fact. It is believed in many circles that there is also a resurrection or an overcoming of death that is not so exalted and so remote as the resurrection at the end of time and which satisfies the demands of psychohylism, the close association of soul and matter. The idea of "intermediate corporeality", which I have already discussed,⁸ comes at once to mind in this context, but other ideas go even further.

Quite apart from the question of hylic pluralism, there are in general two Christian points of view with regard to man's situation at death. The predominant view in Roman Catholicism is that the soul of man

1 *Werken* (1932), II, p. 93.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 212.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 240.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 108; his *Aussichten in die Ewigkeit*, eighth letter.

5 See his *Vom Zustande der Seele*, p. 208; see also above, Vol. II, pp. 73-74, 109.

6 See B 2, p. 115 ff, 119.

7 See B 127, II, p. 624.

8 See above, Vol. II, pp. 14, 106-107; see also Index and Vol. I, p. 31.

goes either to heaven or to purgatory or to hell at death.¹ Directly opposed to this orthodox Catholic doctrine, there is also the idea that does not in fact exist between death and the day of the general resurrection. The English sect known as the mortalists insisted that the soul as well as the body died.² Related to this view is hypnopsychism, which teaches that the soul sleeps between death and resurrection.³

In recent years, a very similar doctrine has emerged in Protestant circles, especially among Calvinists, despite violent resistance to it on the part of a group of theologians in the Calvinist reformed churches.⁴ This view can be expressed in popular terms as "I am afraid your little boy is not in heaven" or some similar phrase addressed by the clergyman to the bereaved mother. G. van der Leeuw (1890-1950), professor at Groningen University, was a firm protagonist of this point of view. In his book, "Immortality or Resurrection?" (*Onsterfelijkheid of Opstanding?*), published in 1933 (fourth edition in 1947), he insisted that there was no immortality or continued existence after death, only resurrection and one reason that he gave for supporting this view was that the soul could not be separated from the body (p. 31). Clearly, van der Leeuw's thinking is in accordance with the principles of psychohylicism, but his conclusion is negative.

It is, of course, possible to reject this view and to accept a concrete individual existence after death. (This is the position of the Roman Catholic Church.⁵) Those who do accept this continued existence after death, however, need not necessarily be hylic pluralists with regard to the period between dying and rising again. Thomas Aquinas and his followers, after all, believed that the souls of men, like the angels, were pure spiritual substances.⁶ Those Protestants who do not share van der Leeuw's opinion are also not necessarily hylic pluralists. Some of them are, however—those who believe in an "intermediate corporeality", in other words, that man certainly has a body between death and resurrection. According to these believers, this body is a finer body—an etheric body, although other terms have been used to designate it—but this finer body may not have attained the degree of spiritualisation or subtlety which we hope that our body will

1 See, for example, I. Klug, *Het katholieke Geloof*, p. 602 ff.

2 See, above, Vol. II, p. 224.

3 See, for example, B 27, p. 466.

4 See, for example, J.R. Wiskerke, *Leven tussen sterven en opstanding*, Goes, 1963.

5 There is a tendency among certain Roman Catholic authors to attribute a degree of autonomy to this continued existence, to claim, in other words, that the soul can continue to develop after death. One such thinker, whose conclusions have been officially repudiated, is A. Rosenberg, *Die Seelenreise* (B 135); see above, p. 81.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 94.

attain after the resurrection. The "intermediate body" therefore does not come under the heading of sublime *pneuma*, but under that of the psychological *pneuma*.¹ I need not discuss this any further here as I have already dealt with the subject in sufficient detail in Section 72 above ("A Trend within Protestantism").² I felt obliged to mention it in this context, however, because it leads up to the question of resurrection.

It is obvious that many different opinions about the resurrection have been expressed in the history of thought and I should like now to discuss some of these, especially if they are in some way connected with hylic pluralism. One opinion which was in its own way quite radical was that held by E. Swedenborg, who completely rejected the idea of a resurrection at the end of time. The resurrection, he believed, took place immediately after death—"death is therefore resurrection".³

R. Crookall, who summarised a number of spiritualist opinions in his *The Supreme Adventure* (B 201), was inclined to call the soul's recovery three days after death—a phenomenon which takes place according to many religions—a resurrection.⁴ He mentions several times subtle bodies—in other words, hylic pluralism—as a prevailing opinion in his sources.⁵ This does not, however, necessarily prevent a number of spiritualists from believing in a resurrection in a glorified body at the end of time.

I should also like to mention in this context that attempts have been made to interpret the resurrection of Jesus in a spiritualist way. G. Zorab has done this for example, in his book *Het opstandingsverhaal in het licht der parapsychologie* (1949). Just as Thurston was conscious of similarities between events in the lives of the saints and events in seances and so on,⁶ so too is it possible to look at biblical accounts in the same way. Zorab has pointed, for example, to the fact that it is possible to translate the term pneumatic or spiritual body, as used by St Paul, as fluid or astral body (p. 20), although I feel bound to point out that the distinction⁷ between the psychical and the pneumatic body is overlooked in this interpretation. Zorab also compares Jesus' appearances with those that have taken place in other spheres (p. 96 ff). On the whole, however, there is little evidence of hylic pluralism in Zorab's

1 See above, pp. 65-66, 68.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 105. ff and index, Vol. I, p. 31 ff.

3 B 193, p. 427.

4 B 201, p. 132 ff.

5 B 201, pp. 16, 19, 40, 146 *Passim*.

6 See above, pp. 114, 137.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 72 ff.

book. The same applies to M. C. van Mourik Broekman in his book *Parapsychologie en godsdienstig leven* (1938). This does not mean, however, that analogies between the content of biblical stories and subjects studied by parapsychologists do not occur. Parapsychology does, however, include more than the problem of hylic pluralism.

In books dealing with the Christian doctrine of the last things, what is generally discussed is the theme of eschatology outside the sphere of time, in other words, the experience here and now of the last, eternal things,¹ although authors who are more orthodox have always regarded consummation within time as more important. What is remarkable in this context is that the idea of the resurrection as an inner experience, independent of any event taking a place at later time, occurred quite early in the history of thought, namely in gnosticism. G. Quispel gradually came to the conclusion, in the course of his research, that the gnostics were convinced that Jesus certainly rose again,² but that man has no need to wait until the last judgement, but can share here and now in the resurrection. This is the case with Valentinus.³ What is more, this idea is closely in accordance with the thought of St Paul in Rom. 8. 10-11: "Christ is in you". Paul himself has also been called a gnostic in his own way.⁴

As we have already seen, Origen believed that men would rise again with bodies that were spherical in shape.⁵ Augustine also stated that the bodies of men after the resurrection would be like those of the angels, *qualia sunt angelorum corpora*.⁶ As we have discovered, some of his ideas are distinctly hylic pluralistic.

The Bogomils taught that there was no resurrection of the flesh, but that resurrection amounted to going to heaven, both in the case of Christ, who was crucified, but with a non-material body,⁷ and in the case of the believer, in that spiritual body.⁸

Oetinger was conscious of a gradual transition from the "interim state"—which can, of course, be compared with the "intermediate corporeality" of certain other Protestant thinkers—to the resurrection, teaching that an imperishable body was concealed within the natural

1 See, for example, P. Althaus, B 2, p. 2 on R. Bultmann; W. Künneth, *Theologie der Auferstehung* (1934), p. 14 ff (Karl Barth).

2 See, for example, the appearance to Paul on the road to Damascus.

3 B 245, p. 40 ff; G. Quispel, "De Opstanding, gnostisch ervaren", *Het Vaderland*, 13, IV, 1963; *De Resurrectione*, Part of the *Codex Jung*.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 76.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 82, 111.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 90.

7 They were therefore adherents of doceticism.

8 D. Obolensky, *The Bogomils* (1948); see above, Vol. II, p. 104.

body.¹ The Dutch theologian, J. H. Gunning jnr. held a similar opinion, namely that man carried the spiritual body of the resurrection within himself here on earth.² Fechner also connected his idea of a "further body" with Paul's pneumatic body.³ There is therefore no shortage of data in this sphere, and several of the views clearly tend in the direction of hylic pluralism.

Those who are in favour of a literal interpretation of the resurrection are inclined to base their arguments on texts which refer to a resurrection from graves, such as Matt. 27. 52. 53. These texts do not, however, refer to a resurrection at the last judgement, but to events that took place at the time of Jesus' death. Would it not perhaps be better to relate this rising from the grave to a surmounting of the limitations of the ordinary coarse body, the *sōma* which was, in Plato's view, a *sōma* or grave? The hylic pluralistic interpretation would seem to be the more moderate and rational in this case too.⁴

108 SACRAMENTS

To what extent is hylic pluralism expressed in the various ways in which the Christian sacraments have been and still are conceived? One only has to look around and pay attention to the important statements that have been made on this subject to come quite quickly to the conclusion that hylic pluralism is undoubtedly expressed in sacramental teaching. In his church history, *Geschiedenis der Kerk* (1942), H. Berkhof wrote among other things, about a view that was held in the post-apostolic period with which he personally disagreed: "Bread and wine were regarded as carrying the fluid of grace, as medicines with a physical effect".⁵ In his article on the "Eucharist" in the Dutch encyclopaedia (Winkler-Prins), Professor G. Philips says: "The supraterrrestrial bread is the glorified body of Jesus"⁶ and elsewhere in the same encyclopaedia he writes: "The glorified body of Christ himself is really present" in the sacrament.⁷ Fluid, of course, is a typically hylic pluralistic concept and, in the two preceding chapters, we have established that the theme of fine materiality of an especially high quality was present in most of the views expressed about the glorified body.

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 107.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 214.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 169.

4 See above, pp. 54, 71-73, 82.

5 p. 26.

6 B 179, VIII, p. 346.

7 B 179, XVI, p. 305.

Clearly, then, there is good reason for investigating the Church's sacramental teaching. The field is, of course, quite enormous and the sacraments have been interpreted in many different ways. With this attempt to gain the reader's sympathy, then, I shall undertake a short exploration of the territory.

To begin with, it is important to say something about the sacraments in general, quite apart from hylic pluralism and in this brief general introduction to the subject I have to acknowledge my debt to G. van der Leeuw's *Sakramentsstheologie*,¹ an extremely clear and penetrating study divided into three parts—an exegetical and historical part, a phenomenological section and a theological exposition. I have also chosen it for two other reasons. Firstly, the author's own point of view is more or less central. He does not incline to any of the more extreme opinions in sacramental theology. Secondly, as I have already pointed out,² van der Leeuw is not very attentive to the possibility of hylic pluralism, with the result that, whenever he refers to data or opinions which point in the direction of hylic pluralism, these facts and views may be regarded as more important and convincing than those of a firm protagonist of hylic pluralism.

As far as the wider or more general points of view to which I have referred are concerned, the following has to be taken into account. Jesus' crucifixion and resurrection is analogous to those of other gods.³ In this context, van der Leeuw mentions the case of Osiris⁴ and one might add to this the experiences of the Hindu god Prajapati, who also sacrificed himself.⁵ Van der Leeuw also includes a reference to the sacrificial meals of the Brahmins.⁶ There are also connections or similarities between the Christian Eucharist and ritual or sacramental meals in other religions, either pre-Christian, such as the Eleusinian mysteries, or else at the same time as the emergence of Christianity, such as Mithraism.⁷ These sacramental meals generally speaking form part of the phenomenological theme of theophagy, or the eating of a deity.⁸

Van der Leeuw stresses again and again that belief in sacraments also tends towards a pansacramentalism, according to which all events

1 1949; B 225.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 21.

3 See above, p. 150-151.

4 B 90, p. 94.

5 B 58, p. 35 ff.

6 B 225, p. 71.

7 B 225, p. 154, 165, 236; B 90, p. 343; E. Benz, *Geist und Leben der Ostkirche* (1957), p. 34 ff.

8 B 225, p. 152.

are seen as sacral.¹ The German romantic Novalis gave a poetical interpretation to this idea.² On the other hand, however, it frequently happens that belief in the sacraments is limited and a distinction is made between sacraments and sacramentals or secondary aspects and actions.³ In Christianity, baptism and the Eucharist or Holy Communion are the most important sacraments.⁴

The sacraments also tend to move in the direction of anticipation of the resurrection, with the inevitable accompaniment of the theme of the glorified body, and in the direction of the theme of the apocatastasis or restoration of all things with the coming of the Messiah,⁵ a theme to which I shall turn later in this work.⁶

In the theological part of his book, van der Leeuw observes that theology began with worship in christian circles,⁷ in other words, that Christianity is in essence not teaching, but participation in the divine life that is given to man *in myterio*.⁸ Experience, in other words, is superior in religion to interpretation.⁹

Now that I have made these necessary introductory remarks about the sacraments and sacramentalism I should like to discuss some of the opinions that occur in the Bible and elsewhere and some of the theories that have been offered in an attempt to explain the sacraments.

It is important, of course, to pay especial attention to the meaning of the terms used in sacramental theology. Van der Leeuw has defined sacrament as an elemental action performed by man in the consciousness of accomplishing something in a different sphere.¹⁰ However often the expression "different sphere" is used as a metaphor, it is advisable not to see it in its literal sense. The term "pneumatic" is a similar case in point. Odo Casel (1886-1948) formulated a doctrine of the sacraments which was received with considerable interest in the Roman Catholic Church. He called them "mysteries", as they are so often called in the Eastern Church, and his sacramental teaching is therefore known as the "mystery doctrine".¹¹ Van der Leeuw, who is very sympathetically inclined towards Casel's view, quotes him as saying:

1 B 225, p. 78, 134, 140, 180, 227.

2 B 225, p. 167; B 90, p. 348.

3 B 225, p. 333.

4 B 225, m p. 59.

5 1 Cor. 15. 28; Acts 3. 21; see also B 154, p. 71.

6 See Section 140 at the conclusion of this work.

7 B 225, p. 223.

8 B 225, p. 239.

9 See above, Vol. II, p. 56.

10 B 225, p. 136; see also p. 249. (the German translation, p. 194, has *Ausstrahlung*, radiation for the original Dutch *toepassing*, application).

11 B 179, V, p. 555.

"The pneumatic Lord is present in the mysteries".¹ Should this word "pneumatic" be regarded in this context as figurative or as meaning purely immaterial? Van der Leeuw himself uses the expression "concretely psychophysical process"² with regard to the sacraments. In the Eastern Church, early Christian ideas continued to prevail³ and the term *pneuma* was at that time thought to indicate fine materiality.⁴ I might also add here that, when the terms *pneuma* and "a different sphere" are used nowadays in connection with the sacraments, the underlying thought is not very far removed from the idea of hylic pluralism.

Many Christian thinkers believe that the Holy Spirit plays a part in the sacraments, though this role is differently interpreted. H. Leisegang has described this role as "the *pneuma* as a supraterrrestrial power pouring from God suddenly into the soul".⁵ This, of course, is precisely what happens according to the hylic pluralistic interpretation of the sacraments. The operation of the sacraments clearly has to be included under the heading of "sublime *pneuma*" as they are a very exalted form of *pneuma* and it will be remembered that the sublime *pneuma* has a tendency to descend.⁶

This hylic pluralistic interpretation is certainly a possible one. The texts which are customarily quoted in connection with the sacraments undoubtedly lend support to this interpretation. I have already drawn attention to the fact that the Holy Spirit, *to pneuma hagion* is often presented in the New Testament in a very concrete form. At a somewhat lower level, the manipulations used by the magnetisers with a view to healing are very reminiscent of this.⁷ The imposition of hands also plays a large part both in the administration of several aspects of various sacraments and in the texts in the New Testament which are generally quoted in connection with the sacraments. In 2 Tim. 1. 6, for example, Paul says that "the gift of God" is "within you through the laying on of my hands".⁸ Van der Leeuw's explanation of this

1 B 225, p. 237.

2 B 225, p. 224; see also p. 275.

3 B 225, p. 76; J.C.A. Fetter gives a *résumé* of the Eastern view in his book *De Russen en hun kerk*: "We know that we receive Christ, the Pneumatic (spiritual) body of Christ" (p. 192).

4 See above, Section 66; see also Vol. II, p. 102.

5 B 92, p. 113; van der Leeuw also quotes G. Verbeke's "splendid work", B 174; see B 225, p. 275. Verbeke, however, also stresses the *Pneuma* of fine matter again and again and, in connection with the New Testament, mentions many passages concerned with a personal and concrete *Pneuma*; see, for example, B 174, p. 393.

6 See above, p. 145.

7 See Vol. II, p. 69; this analogy also struck Baader, for example—see his *Werke*, VII, 26.

8 See also 1 Tim. 4. 14-16.

gift or *charisma* is that it is a "divine fluid, a gift of grace" and goes on to say: "Once again we are aware of the remarkably objective and subjective aspect of the New Testament idea of the sacraments. The *charisma* is concretely present in Timothy as the result of Paul's imposition of hands, but it also has to be maintained and stimulated".¹ This, of course, is one of the texts frequently quoted in support of the sacrament of ordination to the priesthood. Van der Leeuw, however, is of the opinion that ordination is a special application of the communication of the Holy Spirit that is made to every believer (*ibid.*). The imposition of hands, after all, plays a part in baptism² and other sacraments.

John 20. 22-23 is usually quoted to support absolution after confession: "When Jesus had said this, he breathed upon them, and said to them, 'Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven. . . .'" This breathing or blowing is, of course, strikingly reminiscent of the part played by breath, wind, blowing and so on—in an extended sense or not—in the case of the *pneuma* of fine matter (see also *pneuma* itself).³ It is also clearly intended as an example given by Jesus himself—in other words, according to those who believe in the effect of absolution, a concrete and apparently (fine) material force plays a part in the sacrament.

Van der Leeuw believes that baptism is real in its effects and not dependent on the attitude or disposition of the one being baptised or administering baptism.⁴ The person baptised has "put one Christ" like a garment (Gal. 3. 27).⁵ What is more, various Christian authors have, as we have seen, spoken about baptism as a *phōtismos*, an illumination in the literal sense.⁶ Baptism is, on the one hand, an illumination with water and, on the other hand, with fire, the fire of the Holy Spirit who, according to Luke 3. 22, descended at Jesus' baptism.

There is so much hylic pluralism to be found here that it is easy to understand why Berkhof and van der Leeuw referred to the views which were prevalent in very early Christianity and which were based so much on the scriptural texts as depicting the sacraments as "fluids of grace" and "divine fluids".⁷ This is very much in accordance both with the spirit of the times during the first centuries of Christianity, which were

1 B 225, pp. 124-125.

2 B 225, p. 104.

3 See Vol. II, p. 43.

4 B 225, p. 98.

5 B 225, p. 87.

6 See above, p. 128. In an extended sense, water can also be seen in this light; see above, p. 91-92.

7 See above, pp. 158.

deeply influenced by Stoic thought,¹ and with the personal, concrete *pneuma*, which has clearly to be thought of as hylic pluralistic and which is to be found in so many places in the New Testament.²

These views, which originated at the beginning of the Christian era, have persisted in various forms throughout the history of the Church. Before discussing any of the later developments of these views, however, I should like to draw attention to a theme of secondary importance which recurs again and again. This is the idea that the sacrament is *spiritual food*. I have already suggested that, if there are any higher or more rarefied bodies, these do not have to be present from the very beginning, but that they in all probably have to grow gradually. At the same time, I asked about the kind of food that would be required for these bodies, food, that is to say, in the hylic pluralistic sense. In discussing this question, I mentioned various passages or statements in which reference was made to unusual, spiritual food.³

I did not, however, go into one question very deeply, but saved it for this chapter, where it properly belonged—the question as to how far it is possible to regard partaking of the sacraments, and especially the Eucharist, in this light. It would in fact seem that this has often been done, although two factors must be set against it. On the one hand, the partaking of the host and the drinking of the consecrated wine undoubtedly tends to favour this comparison; on the other hand, the comparison is also made more obvious by the use, in the metaphorical sense, of the term “spiritual food”. But the early Christian idea of the sacrament goes further than this. The Roman Catholic author G. Philips, writing about Justin Martyr (second century after Christ),⁴ says that this writer, who was one of the first to describe the Christian rite in his *Apology*,⁵ claimed that we are nourished by the food that is blessed by the prayer of Christ’s words by being transformed.⁶ Philips adds that the Greek Fathers of the Church were particularly enthusiastic about this “food of immortality”.

The Council of Trent, Philips tells us, confirmed various aspects of this teaching and also declared that Christ “wanted this sacrament to be received as spiritual food for souls, by which they would be nourished and strengthened”.⁷ It is, of course, possible to say that this is, or is very close to imagery. Other Christians have, however, gone even

1 See Vol. II, p. 77 ff.

2 See Vol. II, p. 69.

3 See above, p. 93. ff.

4 B 179, VIII, p. 345.

5 See B 255, p. 66.

6 Van der Leeuw says “in the manner of change” (*ibid.*).

7 See B 179, VIII, p. 346.

further. The mystics—Tauler, for example—have written about *manducatio spiritualis*, “spiritual food”, something which they have regarded as higher than communion in the concrete.¹ Thurston has pointed to cases of Christians who have had such a “spiritual hunger” for communion that telekinetic phenomena have sometimes occurred—for example, the phenomenon of the host going through the air to the believer before the priest was able to administer it.²

Paracelsus³ was of the opinion that holy communion nourished and strengthened the spiritual body that was developing, with a view to the future life.⁴ Boehme said: “The soul eats Christ’s body and drinks his blood, which fills heaven, and it is from what the soul accepts and eats that its body grows”.⁵ Oetinger, who, as we have seen,⁶ was preoccupied with the idea of “spiritual corporeality”, also connected this with Christ’s “transfigured bodily presence”.⁷ In his view, Christ was present in a concentrated form in the sacraments as a bodily presence, although this presence was not—either in his opinion or in Boehme’s—absolutely tied to the sacraments. “We partake of Jesus both in and outside of the sacrament of the Eucharist”, Oetinger affirmed.⁸ It should also be noted, in this context, that contact with Christ outside the sacrament of the Eucharist is also stressed by Swedenborg. He experienced his vision of Christ after having received communion one Easter. Later, however, he began to doubt whether receiving communion was really necessary, because he received instruction directly.⁹

The idea that man’s inner body is bound to grow through contact with Christ is also found in the movement within Protestantism which I discussed earlier in this work, in Section 72, and with which the pneumatologists of the romantic period were closely associated. Oetinger, of course, belonged to this group. T. Kliefoth also mentioned, in his book on Christian eschatology (B 86), the theologian Splittgerber as saying that our hidden and indestructible essence “is filled more and more with heavenly power by the sacramental bond with Christ”.¹⁰ Delitzsch, according to Kliefoth, believed that “it is an effect of the

1 B 225, p. 164.

2 B 263, Chapter IV, p. 151.

3 See Vol. II, p. 133.

4 B 62, p. 60.

5 B 154, p. 73.

6 See Vol. II, p. 107.

7 Oetinger even went so far as to say that “the aim and purpose of the sacraments is spiritual corporeality”; see B 7, p. 444; see also Vol. II, p. 109 with regard to Baader.

8 B 7, pp. 410-413.

9 B 193, pp. 207, 210, 550.

10 B 86, p. 256.

sacramental gifts that bodies (Delitzsch accepted "a certain corporeality" of the soul) do not perish without any prospect of a restoration of their being".¹ A similar view was held by the younger Gunning who wrote that Christ, whose flesh we eat and whose blood we drink, dwells personally in us and creates a new man in us, not only spiritually but also corporeally.²

Similar ideas have also prevailed in recent centuries in Eastern Christianity. V. S. Soloviev (1853-1900)³ is very representative of this movement in Russia. In his earlier period, he was of the opinion that the "etheric body" was nourished by partaking of the sacraments, by which man was inwardly transfigured.⁴

Our investigation of this theme of growing and being fed by our partaking of the sacraments, especially holy communion, has brought us a stage nearer to the point where we can summarise our findings and ascertain how far the sacraments point towards hylic pluralism. Before going on to discuss a number of theories about the sacraments, insofar as they have a hylic pluralistic aspect, however, I should like to add one or two comments that are concerned with our subject.

The Cathari had what they called the *consolamentum*, which seems to have been a combination of sacraments, in which they received what could be called "suprasubstantial bread".⁵ In C. G. Jung's opinion, there is an analogy between the Mass and the "great work" of the alchemists, which undoubtedly had a distinctively mystical aspect.⁶ Jung spoke, for example, about the "parallels between the philosopher's stone and Christ",⁷ which also played an important part in Boehme's thought, and even Nicholas Melchior of Hermannstadt wrote about the "alchemistic form of the Mass".⁸

According to Jung, the alchemists were concerned with an "incorruptible substance", which, for Christians, assumes the form of the "transfigured resurrection-body", participation in communion anticipating this resurrection. As we have already seen, Fechner's hylic pluralistic theory of the "inner or further body" is more closely connected with Christian teaching and especially with Paul's "spiritual body"⁹ than

1 B 86, p. 256.

2 See his *Blikken in de Openbaring*, III, p. 19; see also Vol. II, p. 110.

3 See Vol. II, p. 105.

4 B 95, p. 126.

5 See S. Runciman, B 138, p. 139.

6 See Vol. II, p. 49-50.

7 B 78, pp. 469, 573; see Part I p. 247, Vol. II, p. 131.

8 B 78, p. 536; see also Oetinger (B 7, p. 407): "Only Christ has the true knowledge of how to refine".

9 See Vol. II, p. 169.

the younger Fichte's "soul-body". Fechner also spoke of a "transfigured body". It is therefore not surprising that he also had a theory about the sacraments. These, he believed, had always been regarded as an inexplicable mystery which non-believers had called superstitious and even absurd. After Fechner published his views, however, it became an "open mystery", one which he discussed in some detail in his *Zend-Avesta*. In his opinion, everything belonged to the body of Christ in the hereafter and, just as a dead person is present in our memory of him,¹ so too is Christ present for us and the priest's consecration forms the last link in this chain.²

To what extent and in what way have attempts been made to make what takes place in the sacraments, and especially the Eucharist, intelligible? I have already given emphasis to what is, in my opinion, an important notion—one with which van der Leeuw is also very much in sympathy—namely that the most prominent aspect is our participation in what in fact takes place, in the experience of many believers, in the cultic action in which Christ is believed to be really present.³ In other words, practical experience is superior to theory and precedes it in time. It is clear, then, that two things can be done in this context. We can, on the one hand, be content to accept this profoundly experienced, but hardly understood event. On the other hand, we can try to explain and analyse it.

It is precisely here, of course, where there is such profound disagreement between the Eastern and the Western Churches. Eastern Christians followed the teaching of the first period of Christianity, to which the description, an event which is profoundly experienced but hardly understood, can clearly be applied. It is quite possible therefore to say that the Eastern Church had a vague understanding of the Eucharist and was content with an, an *epiklesis* or invocation, instead of the clear words of the consecration used in the Western Church: "This is my body; this is my blood".⁴ It will be remembered too that the Eastern Church always thought of itself above all as a pneumatic Church.⁵ This attitude to the Eucharist, then, is very much in accordance with the Eastern Christian conviction that the pneumatic event is not limited exclusively to the sacraments proper, but is also found, for example, in the ikons of the Church. According to the Eastern

1 See above, p. 103.

2 B 42, II^o p. 415 ff.

3 See above, p. 160; see also B 225, p. 244.

4 B 225, p. 70, 244; E. Benz, *Geist und Leben der Ostkirche*, p. 35 ff.

5 B 225, p. 76, see also Vol. II, p. 102, 160.

Church, ikons have a sacramental significance¹ and the term used is not "sacraments", but rather "mysteries".² On the one hand, of course, this term points clearly to the fact that they are derived from, or at least connected with the Greek mysteries.³ On the other hand, however, it equally clearly emphasises how averse the Eastern Church is to analysing and precisely defining what takes place.

This tendency is also found in the Western Church, where Odo Casel's "mystery doctrine" of the sacraments has, in recent years, attracted a great deal of attention especially in the Roman Catholic Church, even "heralding a certain renewal of the liturgical movement and sacramental theology."⁴ It has quite correctly been said that Casel's teaching is very reminiscent of that of the Eastern Church.⁵ As I have already observed, van der Leeuw, who above all emphasises the *event* of the sacrament has a great deal of sympathy for this doctrine, which he regards as a conscious attempt to move away from modern, rationalist thinking, which he believes includes scholasticism, and to return to the biblical understanding of these questions.⁶

This is a fairly accurate summary of the contrast between the Eastern and the western Churches. Eastern theologians have always criticised the West of rationalism, even materialism in its search for clear explanations and precise formulations. The Western Church, possibly because it has adhered so closely to spirit of the Romans, has always seemed to the Eastern Christians to be too inclined towards juridicism. There is, for example, no parallel in Eastern Christianity to the typically Roman Catholic canon law or, of course, to the clear juridical formulation of the sacraments.⁷

As we have seen, Justin Martyr was one of the first to describe the rite of the Christian Eucharist,⁸ speaking of a change or transformation of bread and wine. This conviction that the bread and the wine were changed persisted in the West, culminating in the doctrine of transubstantiation, which was formulated, for example, by Thomas Aquinas and sanctioned by various councils, especially that of Trent.⁹ This doctrine seeks to explain what occurs at the consecration and to some

1 B 225, p. 218: art as a sacrament; see also E. Benz, *op. cit.*, p. 7 ff; see above, Vol. II, p. 102, Vol. III, p. 129 note 1.

2 See for example, E. Benz, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

3 See above, p. 160; E. Benz, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

4 B 179, V, p. 555.

5 B 225, p. 237.

6 B 225, p. 236.

7 See, for example, D. M. Prümmer, *Vademecum theologiae moralis* (1921) ff, p. 298 ff.

8 See above, p. 163; B 225, p. 66.

9 B 225, 72 ff, 244; B 90, p. 345.

extent succeeds in doing that. According to this teaching, nothing is changed in the outward form, the accidents, of the bread and the wine, but the substance is changed or transferred—transubstantiated—into another substance, the body and blood of Christ, which are really present in it. In receiving the sacrament, then, man comes into intimate contact with the body and blood of Christ—one is reminded here of his risen body, the glorified body with all its qualities which made Christ the first-born of the resurrected. This close contact also leads to inner growth.

This raises an interesting question. I have already discussed the implications of Thomas' teaching, namely that the soul is a purely spiritual substance and that it is simply the form of the body and his rejection of several forms, in other words, of the Augustinian view. According to this view, then, the continued existence of the soul is not easier to understand—as Gilson said, "God can preserve the soul without the body, but this is a miracle".¹

Here, however, we are confronted with the very opposite. The presence of Christ in the sacrament is often regarded simply as a miracle or at least as a mystery about which nothing more can be said. Thomas, on the other hand, fully approved of the tendency to formulate a theory that would make the whole question to some extent intelligible and even made his own contribution to this theory. A little thought however, will show that this is not so very surprising. Thomas, after all, made a very sharp distinction between the areas of revelation and of reason, thus leaving the way open for reason or the "natural light". He had confidence in human knowledge and in man's care for objective truth.² This does not mean that the two tendencies were not able to cross in his thought. I am of the opinion that his teaching that the soul had only one form is regrettable and lacking in proof, yet, in his explanation of the Christian Eucharist, he yielded to Western temptation, a tendency that is also present within the Western Church and not only within the secular society of the West, to elucidate and to rationalise everything.³ ⁴

¹ See Vol. II, p. 98.

² B 140, p. 222.

³ A very similar contrast is to be found in the philosophy of Descartes. His anthropological dualism is seriously questioned by many scholars today, but it cannot be disputed that he is one of the leaders of modern thought in Europe. (See Section 120 below).

⁴ On the other hand, Peter Olivi asserted that the sacrament of the Eucharist can be understood more easily in the light of the Augustinian tradition, according to which there are several forms and several matters. See B. Jansen, "Die Lehre Olivis über das Verhältnis von Leib und Seele", *Franz. Studien*, 1918, p. 238; see also Vol. II, p. 88, note 1.

The theory of transubstantiation has been the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, especially since the Council of Trent. The great advantage of this doctrine is that it makes the the "perfect union of man with Christ" to some extent intelligible. Outwardly, in the so-called accidents, nothing is changed—the bread remains bread and the wine remains wine. Inwardly, however, in the substance of the bread and the wine, there is a change. They are, as it were, linked to Christ with his glorified body and in this way an intimate union can be achieved between him and man. A number of mystics have experienced this in a very real and concrete way in their reception of communion.

In addition to the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation we must also consider the Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation.² This teaching was also known to the scholastics and it is, in fact, not so very different from transubstantiation. According to Luther, the substances of bread and wine are not completely changed into the body and blood of Christ, but the latter are added. This is, of course, a realistic conception of the Eucharist, whereas Calvin's view was more nominalistic. Van der Leeuw is closer to Luther than to Calvin.

What is particularly interesting in connection with our subject, is that the doctrine of consubstantiation is also an attempt to explain and understand the Eucharist. To this extent, Lutheranism is closer to Roman Catholicism in its official teaching than to the mystery doctrine of the Eastern Church and of Odo Casel. It is often regarded as reflecting the scholastic aspect of Luther as a theologian.

Both of these explanations, then, tell us something about what lies behind ordinary matter as perceived by the senses. We only have to go one step beyond this and what lies behind the appearance is subtle matter. This ought not to surprise us, because Christ's glorified body, with which man comes into contact in and through communion, also has hylic pluralistic qualities—for example, the *dotes* or bridal gifts.³

The question which we are bound to ask now is this—is there any theory or group of Christians among whom this point of view has been more fully developed? This question can be answered at once in the affirmative—this idea is undoubtedly present in the sacramental teaching of the Liberal Catholic Church.

The Liberal Catholics are a small and not very widespread community of Christians and the book in which one of the founders of this Church,

1 See Prümmer, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

2 B 179 VI, p 359; Berkhof, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-171; B 225, p. 65 ff.

3 See above, p. 152.

C.W. Leadbeater, has set out this doctrine, *The Science of the Sacraments*,¹ is not as well-known as it should be. It is, however, full of hylic pluralism. This is hardly surprising, since Leadbeater (1847-1934) was a theosophist from quite an early age until the end of his long life and a great deal is heard of hylic pluralism—fine bodies, higher spheres and so on—in modern occultism.² What is more, Leadbeater claimed to be a clairvoyant and, generally speaking, clairvoyants are convinced hylic pluralists, even if they do not call themselves by this name. What is of particular importance to us in this chapter on the sacraments, however, is that Leadbeater applies all this to Christianity and especially to the Christian sacraments.

In his preface to *The Science of the Sacraments*, Leadbeater says that "there is all around us a vast unseen world; unseen by most of us, not necessarily invisible".³ It is in this world that Leadbeater believed the background to the sacraments was to be found. Quite early in his life, he was aware, when he was at Benediction in an Italian village, of a powerful light radiating from the Blessed Sacrament and affecting the whole environment. Similar phenomena have been observed at the elevation of the Host after its consecration.⁴

Leadbeater discusses in considerable detail what takes place at Holy Mass. Something is built up or edified in the subtle world that surrounds us. (We are reminded here of the original meaning of the word "edify" as making or building a house.⁵) This is, Leadbeater believed, a eucharistic form of Church of finer matter which goes further than the physical Church. Among other things, it rises higher. At various stages of Holy Mass, forces from above come down into this structure and the thoughts (thought-forms⁶) and feelings of devotion of those present assisting at Mass are united with these forces. The climax of the Mass is, of course, the consecration of the Host. It is at this point that the divine life pours downwards and the bread becomes the Host by means of an ardent connection with the Lord Christ himself.⁷

Leadbeater makes various aspects of this doctrine clear in diagram 7 in his book. Leadbeater also explains at some length what he believes takes place at the consecration, thus elaborating and exemplifying the

1 1920, B 224.

2 See above, Section 83.

3 B 224, p. 9.

4 B 224, pp. 490-491.

5 See above, p. 97.

6 B 224, p. 22.

7 B 224, p. 179 ff. One of the prayers in the liturgy of the Liberal Catholic Church begins: "Thou, who art present here today on thousands of altars and art still one and indivisible".

doctrine of transubstantiation.¹ The need to explain, which has always been present in Roman Catholicism, was, as it were, taken further by Leadbeater. Does a miracle occur? he asks, but at once replies "no"—although it is certainly "an achievement beyond our physical capacity", it is not an infringement of the laws of nature² because it comes within the eternal and unchanging laws of God.³ There is, Leadbeater insists, transubstantiation in that one substance is "replaced" by another. What takes place is most impressive since "a far fuller divine life" than existed before is expressed at the consecration. There is, then, a "real Presence" and the sacrament is "truly a vehicle of Christ".⁴ Various aspects of the consecration are described in detail by Leadbeater, who makes use of many hylic pluralistic concepts. He speaks, for example, of "channels" of power⁵ and believes that angels with subtle bodies play a part.⁶ A "radiance" emanates from the Host and he also refers to "The Soul and its Vestures".⁷ A real power is contained in the blessings.⁸ It is clear, then, that Leadbeater provides a detailed description of the descent of the sublime *pneuma*.⁹

The Western tendency to look for a clear explanation is certainly fulfilled here. There are, however, people who regard this as too clear and too rationalistic. Those who, together with Odo Casel and the theologians of the Eastern Church, believe that what takes place in the sacraments is above all a mystery will inevitably find Leadbeater's explanation difficult to accept. How can devotion be directed towards a mechanism of this type? I am nonetheless of the opinion that they are not mutually exclusive. The doctor, for example, can calmly examine his wife medically and then, at another time, simply love her more. These are simply two different attitudes and, although I agree that they tend to be mutually exclusive, both have equally a right to exist. The first attitude is an attitude of knowing, of what is known in India as *jñāna-yoga*. The second is an attitude of devotion or *bhakti-yoga*.¹⁰ The gamma standpoint is, I think, most closely representative of the

1 Other visionaries, such as G. Hodson, have spoken of this *Inner Side of Church Worship* (1930). *Mutatis mutandis*, the same applies to the background of the worship of the Christian community that came about under the influence of anthroposophy (see Vol. II, p. 184-185) and Rudolf Steiner.

2 Van der Leeuw believes that the causality of nature must of necessity be infringed here; see B 225, p. 138.

3 B 224, p. 181.

4 B 224, pp. 182, 187.

5 B 224, pp. 174, 304.

6 B 224, Index; see also above, p. 31.

7 B 224, p. 528, Appendix.

8 B 224, p. 470.

9 See above, p. 146.

10 See Vol. II, p. 84, note 1.

first attitude, whereas the delta standpoint is more representative of the second. I shall be speaking of the constant polarity between these two standpoints later on in this work.¹

In conclusion, I should like to make the following comment. In a previous chapter I referred to belief in a magnetism of places, which is regarded as different from personal or so called "animal" magnetism.² Leadbeater has also written about the "tremendous magnetism" with which high Church worship and everything that is used in it is charged. This is something that is personally *experienced* by quite a large number of people, who testify to the fact that something is "there" in many Catholic churches, especially old ones. This is something that is not found in other Christian Churches and cannot be explained simply as associations.³ The experience, moreover, becomes much more intense and profound at the climaxes of the sacraments.

109 DIFFERENTIATION AND OBJECTIVISATION

The previous two chapters have been strongly marked by Christianity, so strongly in fact that it is possible to ask whether they really belong to the sections under the heading of "Cross-Sections" (90 ff) and would not have been better following Section 72. On the other hand, however, it cannot be denied that the subjects dealt with in these chapters are of a general nature⁴ and, in any case, the chapters that follow and form the conclusion to this whole part entitled "Cross-Sections"⁵ also cover the whole field of hylic pluralism.

It is hardly necessary to say that we have to use our ability to make distinctions and watch out for homonyms, for words with two entirely different meanings. All the same, confusing situations can still arise. If, for example, we say that Groningen is not far from Halberstadt, the statement will cause surprise, because the German town is far less well known than the Dutch university town, Groningen. The same applies to P. Althaus' simple statement: "Fichte, for example, says explicitly, "we always remain in a body, as surely as we are finite

1 See below, Section 135.

2 See above, p. 46 f.

3 This experience is not necessarily restricted to Christianity. In his book *Asiatische Begegnungen* (B 191), Benz has written about the impressions made on him by a gathering in the Ashrama of the late Aurobindo Ghose at Pondicherry: "Any visitor with a sense of religious and spiritual atmosphere would find it difficult to escape from this experience" (p. 275).

4 For the theme of sacraments in connection with Buddhism, see, for example, E. Benz, *Asiatische Begegnungen* (B 191), p. 11 ff.

5 See Vol. II, p. 17; Vol. III, p. 1. ff.

beings”¹. We assume that Althaus is referring to J. G. Fichte, the father, here, but, because the psychohylic character of the statement point is more to the son, I. H. Fichte, there is an element of doubt.

These are just two examples of a very general kind. In connection with hylic pluralism, there are many very treacherous, even fatal cases of identification where a clear distinction should in fact be made. This all the more important because there is a powerful inclination, in any attempt to define meanings more precisely, to reject completely everything that cannot be included under that particular heading. The main reason for this tendency is, I think, a desire to simplify, to clarify as much as possible and to define in positive terms what is obvious. Unfortunately, this gives rise to the danger onesidedness and, in some respects at least, of throwing the baby away with the bathwater.

This process has certainly been very much at work in the case of hylic pluralism. The great benefit derived from differentiating very clearly will be seen if I take a number of cases of terms which show signs of this confusion and discuss them in some detail.

In the first place, there are those terms which are undeniably ambiguous. Nowadays, there is not much inclination to confuse the term “heaven” meaning “sky” with “heaven” as the home of the blessed. We are, however, not sufficiently aware of the fact that these were identical in the minds of the ancients, who regarded the zone of the heavenly bodies as a perfect region, compared with which the “sub-lunary” world was very disappointing.² On the one hand, however, the exploration of space by astronomers has shown us that the same natural laws prevail at a great distance from the earth as those prevailing on the earth itself. As a result of our knowledge of astronomy, that distant region of heavenly bodies has to a great extent been deprived of its mystery and glory. It has also become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to believe that it is the abode of the blessed. This, then, is a clear case of onesidedness, in the sense referred to above. On the other hand, however, when the ancients said that the souls of the dead stayed for a time on the moon,³ did they really have the moon literally in mind or something else which they did not differentiate from the moon, but which we might?

What is the situation with regard to the ancient *elements*? Did the ancients mean by earth, water, fire and air precisely what we mean by them, or rather our states of aggregation of solid, fluid and gaseous

¹ B 2, p. 106.

² See, Vol. II, p. 12.

³ See, for example, Posidonius (see B 174, p. 129); Plutarch, *De Facie*, c. 25 p. 940 B.

matter? They distinguished between two species of air, *aēr* and *aithēr*¹—did they perhaps also perceive a different, extended form of water and so on? Of course, they did not, in that case, differentiate enough between different species of the ancient elements and this has resulted in modern scholars becoming very one-sided and thinking that the ancients meant nothing more than ordinary water, air and so on, which would, after all, have been a rather childish and incomprehensible doctrine. If, however, we turn to the ancient elements in a different civilisation—the Indian, for example—it is evident that a clear distinction was made between coarse and fine cosmic elements, *mahā-bhūtas* and *sūkṣma-bhūtas*, with the result that extension was a fact there.² According to the Indian view, the whole of our world forms the cosmic element earth (including water in the narrower sense) and a whole region of the invisible world forms the cosmic element water. This points clearly enough to a background or perspective of hylic pluralism, possibly of the kind envisaged by Thales, who believed that water was the primordial matter.

This brings us to the use of the concept of *cloud*. What did the ancients mean by this—simply a rain cloud or perhaps something else, a being surrounded at a different level?³

There are similarly several ambiguous terms in the sphere of physiology and psychology. “Breath” (air in the lungs) is often used in connection with the soul—the “breath-soul” is an example of this.⁴ Was this simply a case of childish materialism in people who were incapable of keeping the physical or physiological aspect distinct from the psychical or psychological reality? If hylic pluralism is right and the soul is, as classical thinkers in the West claim (the *lepton sōma*) and Indian philosophers insist (the *sūkṣma-śarira*), expressed by (fine) materiality, then it is also probable that more was meant by the concept “breath” than the merely physical or physiological aspect. It is just that insufficient distinction has been made.

The whole question of this physiological aspect is very difficult. The doctrine of the three species of *spiritus*,⁵ which was for so many centuries regarded as the doctrine of the nervous system, can no longer be accepted today. But surely a distinction has also to be made here, between the purely physiological processes in the modern sense, which have been

1 See Part I, p. 21.

2 See Part I, p. 226. Vol. II, p. 13, 26.

3 See above, Part I, p. 150.

4 See Part I, p. 72, 77. Vol. II, p. 8, 20.

5 See Vol. II, p. 134-135, and the Index.

known now for about century, and other processes, preceding or following these, in the "etheric body",¹ of which relatively little is known? In the East, however, a fully elaborated doctrine exists, namely the theory of the seven *chakras*. The Indian philosophers explicitly called these *chakras* subtle, that is to say, they regarded them as functioning at a level that was higher than that of coarse matter.²

The terms *spiritus*, *pneuma* spirit and *ātman* are, of course, extremely ambiguous³ and we have to ask ourselves whether a material or an immaterial reality is indicated here. Apart from the fact that "immaterial" here, *ahulon*, is often used in a merely relative sense,⁴ both materiality and immateriality are meaningful in this context. The immaterial aspect is certainly not denied vehemently.⁵ On the other hand, however, it would be going too far to claim that the entire psychical and spiritual aspect can be absorbed in the immateriality. It is clear from all that has been said in this work that, throughout the history of thought, there has always been a very widespread view that the psychical aspect also has a material aspect, quite frequently an aspect of fine matter. It certainly seems to be very one-sided to insist so firmly on immateriality that the fine materiality of the soul and of the psychical aspect altogether is rejected and denied completely.

The situation with regard to the terms "soul" and "spirit" is also unsatisfactory. These terms are often used interchangeably⁶ and all too frequently lumped together. They are above all not differentiated by modern thinkers, with the result that the earlier trichotomy has been replaced by a dichotomy.⁷ This would appear to reflect the positivistic tendency to simplify that is so prevalent in the modern era.⁸

On the other hand, Plato did not make sufficient distinction between the whole of the eidetic, the purely abstract ideas or intentions, and the whole of the hylic, the realisation of abstractions in time. This gave rise to a certain lack of clarity in his theory of *anamnesis*, the results of which persisted until the Middle Ages.⁹

1 In the sense of "etheric double" (see Vol. II, p. 9-10. of our physiological *pneuma*; see also B 118.

2 See Part I, p. 228, Vol. II, p. 9; see also B 118, pp. 22, 54.

3 See above, Part I, p. 14, 161-162; Vol. II, p. 8.

4 See above, p. Vol. II, p. 8.

5 Even the Stoics accepted the existence of immateriality in some respects; see E. Bréhier, "La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme", *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie*, XXII.

6 See Part I, p. 16.

7 See above, Section 92.

8 See Vol. II, p. 121-122, 151-152.

9 See Vol. II, p. 36, 96, Vol. III, 29-30.

Another ambiguous term is "heart".¹ Modern man makes a distinction between heart in the purely physiological sense and having an emotional involvement in something ("his heart is in his work").² Has this distinction always been made? Was it perhaps also made in the past, before the significance of the astral aspect of the emotions—the heart-*chakram*, for example³—was lost?

Anyone who refuses to accept the phenomenon of witches riding on broomsticks and ascensions into heaven such as Elijah's is usually not aware of the possibility of an excursion of the soul out of the ordinary body and of a journey of the subtle body into a different sphere.⁴ He would also undoubtedly be blind to a resurrection in a finer body instead of an appearance from the grave.⁵

Parapsychologists speak about ESP, *extra*-sensory perception, frequently overlooking the fact that *other* senses perhaps exist which might possibly be able to explain the existence of paranormal phenomena.⁶

In many of the cases mentioned here, one is bound to conclude, the possibility of fine materiality or of hylic pluralism has been completely overlooked. I have drawn attention again and again in this work to this neglect in the sphere of metaphysics, to the fact that everything that points in the direction of hylic pluralism has been interpreted in one of two ways. On the one hand, it has been dismissed simply as materialism, with the result that one reads again and again of the materialism of the Stoics,⁷ the "materialistic psychology" of the Fathers of the Christian Church⁸ and the materialism of almost all of Indian philosophy.⁹ On the other hand, there has been a tendency to speak of "dualistic" materialism in these cases and thus to differentiate to some extent at least.

I, however, have gone further than this and distinguished three points of view.¹⁰ In other words, I am convinced that there are three standpoints, the beta, gamma and delta standpoints, where hylic pluralism occurs, in addition to the alpha standpoint or monistic materialism

1 See above, p. 63, 93.

2 For the question as to whether a distinction has been made with regard to the heart, see J. H. van den Berg, *Het menselijk lichaam*, I pp. 54-55.

3 B 116, p. 31.

4 See above, p. 82.

5 See above, p. 153.

6 See above, p. 60-61.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 43.

8 See Part I, p. 6; see also Vol. II, p. 77.

9 See Part I, p. 182, Vol. II, p. 4, 26.

10 See above, Part I, Section 2, p. 6; see Vol. II, p. 5 ff.

and the epsilon standpoint, according to which fine materiality is rejected.

The first of these three standpoints which embraces a form or species of fine materiality or hylic pluralism, the beta standpoint, presents matter itself as the highest reality and is therefore the standpoint of dualistic materialism. According to the second view, the gamma standpoint, the whole of creation the whole plurality of the universe, is material or consists of fine matter, but something immaterial is regarded as existing above that materiality. The delta standpoint postulates not only an immaterial reality which transcends the plurality of creation, but also an immaterial aspect of the soul or the psychical element in addition to an aspect consisting of fine matter. Since no names appeared to exist for these more subtle distinctions, I used the first letters of the Greek alphabet. This differentiation has, however, made it abundantly clear that not everyone who accepts an aspect of the soul consisting of fine matter or everyone who thinks that the whole plurality of creation consists of (fine) matter is necessarily a materialist. Insofar as he accepts something that transcends matter, he does *not* accept the materialistic point of view and it is not possible to call him simply a "materialistic psychologist". This differentiation has also made it quite clear what a very large number of individual thinkers and philosophical movements have really been teaching, with the result that it is no longer possible to reject their theories *en bloc* in the light of contemporary norms.

There is, however, another way of making a distinction which is especially closely connected with the subject of this work. Generally speaking, we may say that, in *not* differentiating, a kind of joining together or merging takes place, which is later replaced by a form of taking apart. It is to some extent obvious that the younger and less developed the mind is, the less it will be able to distinguish between what is internal and what has to be attributed to something external. It is a well-known fact that an infant only distinguishes and co-ordinates the data provided by the different senses later. At first, the data provided by, for example, the sense of touch can hardly be differentiated from those coming via the sense of sight. A man who was born blind but who recovers his sight is faced with a similar problem. It would not be exaggerated to say that child's first impressions form a single whole, the child being unable to distinguish between discomfort or satisfaction in its own body and the absence or presence of its mother. A similar assumption can also be made in respect of the lower animals—organisms which live, for example, in water, and which simply

experience changes in the temperature of the water without being in any sense conscious of them, simply reacting in the sense of "the temperature of my environment is lower, so I feel cold".¹

At a later stage of its development, the child does learn to distinguish its mother and the mother of others even at a distance. Lower animals also learn to react to danger and to prey. This is evidently a process of learning how to differentiate, one aspect of which is that one's own body and what takes place within it is no longer confused with what takes place in the outside world. I do not want to go into such epistemological questions as where our knowledge of the outside world comes from in great detail here, but will only touch on one aspect of the theory of knowledge. It is this. It is certainly true to say that no process of *reasoning* takes place—what *interrupts* the course of the contents of my consciousness undoubtedly comes from the outside world.² To differentiate in this way between what is interior and what comes from outside is a primary process. Nonetheless, the distinction is in one way or another connected with the interruption of the conscious process.³

There is nothing particularly new about this, but one is bound to ask in this context whether the entire situation cannot perhaps be repeated in the extended sense. A distinction is customarily made between an inner and an outward perception. Memory is clearly an inner perception—the various stages and the conclusion of a process of reasoning or a calculation can be called to mind later.

Over and against this whole group of inner perceptions, there is the other group of what Heymans has called "freely arising ideas".⁴ Ideas or images arise in us which are not the consequence of what has immediately preceded them and are not ordinary external perceptions of things in our ordinary environment. These may be recollections from so long ago in the past that they have become to a great extent alien to us. They are therefore completely strange ideas which strike us as quite new and surprising. To explain this phenomenon we would have to explore the whole realm of individual and collective consciousness. In this context, however, it is enough to accept that they strike us as strange and that they interrupt the ordinary course of our

1 B 114, p. 299 ff.

2 B 68, p. 168.

3 They are connected whether this is regarded as an *unconscious* judgement or not (see B 237, p. 148). A cyclist or a motorist who estimates a distance wrongly in traffic is, in my opinion, making a rapid—and sometimes fatal—error of judgement.

4 See above, p. 58. see also B 68, p. 112.

consciousness. We should, however, also seriously consider whether, as in the case of infants, these circumstances are not bound to lead us to attribute them to something outside ourselves, in other words, to an origin elsewhere. Strictly speaking, there are two possibilities here. The first is that this phenomenon is entirely concerned with our own unconscious mind. In this context, Heymans has assumed that our unconscious ideas—the ideas that are not at the moment in our central or normal consciousness, but still form part of our deposit of ideas—are *not* a kind of disposition. They do not, in other words, simply flare up when they are touched. On the contrary, they continue to live an existence of their own even outside our central consciousness and, living in a state, as it were, of conflict with each other, tend to return of their own accord to the central consciousness, which is in itself to some extent restricted.¹

The second possibility is that not only ideas from our own unconscious or subconscious mind reach us in this way, as ideas arising from what is momentarily not conscious, but also ideas which come from the consciousness of other persons. Heymans believed that this was a distinct possibility by which the phenomenon of telepathy could be explained. In this context, he also drew attention to the fact that the same circumstances—for example, a low level of consciousness due to sleep or hypnosis—seem to help both the occurrence of a person's own unconscious ideas and that of telepathic impressions.² I shall be returning to this question when I come to talk about the explanatory theories advanced by parapsychologists.³

In our present context, however, one aspect of this subject is important. In both cases there are many transitions. It is for example, often impossible to say how far back a memory goes, whether an idea that comes to mind is really a memory or not and, whenever telepathic impressions occur to a given person, whether an idea coming to him is a telepathic impression or not. On the one hand, there is no doubt that certain telepathic impressions, called “true hallucinations” (*hallucinations véridiques*) as opposed to hallucinations that are “thoroughbred”, are received. In crisis telepathy, the recipient gains knowledge of certain situations, the content of which is confirmed later.⁴ On the other hand, how many of these impressions are received

1 See, for example, B 69, II, p. 72.

2 See B 68, p. 331; B 69, I, p. 358 ff. In his attempt to explain this phenomenon, Heymans' “main idea” is this theory of the occurrence of ideas.

3 See below, Section 123.

4 See above, p. 102.

by people who are open and receptive to them but which are not recognised as such? It is a well-known fact that the message contained in crisis telepathy is very often distorted or in a symbolic form when it reaches the consciousness of the recipient.¹

We can, however, elaborate on this theme and ask whether such a thing as literal "in-spiration", in the sense of "breathing into", perhaps exists. The word "inspiration", after all, contains the root *spirare*, to blow or breathe, and is therefore connected with *spiritus* or *pneuma*, which have in turn often been used in connection with fine matter. The poet and the prophet often feel that they are borne up by a spirit that is greater and more powerful than they are. Is there perhaps really a question in what happens here, of something that comes from outside? Preachers and prophets have often felt that they were inspired by the Holy Spirit, to whom such concrete effects have from time to time been attributed.² It is quite certain that religious people regularly feel that they are influenced by something outside themselves, something that is greater and purer than anything of which they are themselves capable. (See, for example, the sublime *pneuma* in this connection.)

What is the situation with regard to the poet? Is it perhaps true that, if certain inventions have been made at very much the same time, but in different places, they were all, as it were, "in the air"? In other words, all kinds of subtle nuances are to be found here and it is very difficult to decide in any one case whether there has in fact been an influence from outside or not. On the other hand, however, very many people have claimed that they have quite clearly received impressions from outside and were able to recognise them as such. By this, I do not mean that people have experienced a case of crisis telepathy once in their life, under very special circumstances and therefore make this claim. On the contrary, I am thinking here of those who claim to have had such experiences quite frequently or regularly and are therefore known as clairvoyants. As I have already observed, their evidence cannot be entirely disregarded, as is so often done,³ although a great deal of thought has to be given to the evaluation of such experiences.

It would seem, then, that there are various kinds of transitions. At one end of the scale, some people never receive impressions from outside and the only ideas that reach their central consciousness are those that come from their own subconscious mind. (It is, of course, possible, that they are constantly bombarded by telepathic influences and, as

1 See, for example, B 267, p. 71.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 69.

3 See above, p. 79.

when a whole range of radio waves pass through them, they are aware of some element of these influences.¹) In the middle of this scale there are those who are aware of something every now and then and, at the other end, those who regularly receive many unusual impressions. These include trained clairvoyants and yogis.

At one definite point or area of this scale² is situated sensitivity to the "magnetism" of places, of churches and so on.³ Benz has called this, rather offhandedly, the possession of a "sense of religious and spiritual atmosphere".⁴ It is clear that this is by no means rare, like the "sense" of what may be the atmosphere or a person's "aura",⁵ an intuitive judgement which is close to ordinary human knowledge, but nonetheless transcends it.

In other words, what occurs is a certain sense of *touch* with regard to all these things. The person who is consciously aware of this undoubtedly *differentiates* between what comes from himself (for example, the association in a church of religious feelings and judgement of people on the basis of various data) and what comes to him from outside. He also *objectivises*, in other words, it is experienced by him as a subject, but he knows that it does not come from him and that it relates to an objective, a situation outside himself. This objectivisation is obviously of fundamental importance to parapsychology and to fine materiality.

In ordinary, everyday life, the sense of touch never stands alone, but is always linked with the other senses and their qualities. It is above all the sense of sight which, in connection with certain qualities of the sense of touch or movement, enables us to see things as objects, independent of us and each other. In other words, it is the sense of sight above all that objectivises. This ability to see things independently of each other causes *space* to come about, either in the narrower sense as the place of certain objects or in the much more general sense defined by Bolland as "the conceivability of existing nature is known, in its immediate abstraction, as space".⁶ It is to be expected that this feeling or touching in the unusual sense is connected with a seeing of spatial relationships, generalised to another space which is sometimes called "inner space". I shall be dealing with such questions

1 This is reminiscent of H. Bergson's theory that the brains function as a kind of sieve or brake, preventing other impressions which are not biologically desirable from reaching the individual; see B 196, p. 306; B 265, XI, p. 279 ff.

2 See B 114, p. 303-304.

3 See above, p. 46-47.

4 B 191, p. 275; see above, p. 172 note 3.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 236.

6 *De Boeken der Spreuken* (1919), I, p. 277.

of spatiality or extensiveness and of space in general in this unusual context in the next chapter.

Here, however, we must consider some other aspects of this special form of objectivisation. (There is therefore also an ordinary form of learning how to objectivise, as in the case of the infant). When I wrote in Section 101 about the extension of sensory qualities, I did not confine myself to extensions of the sense of touch, but also discussed many other extensions. Insofar as certain persons have been convinced that they have *perceived* these qualities, that is, unusual odours or sounds¹ or a "supraterrestrial" light,² they have also, insofar as they have done this consciously, differentiated between these and similar ordinary qualities of the senses. They have also, insofar as they have been *very* conscious of certain aspects and have insisted on their existence, objectivised.

This objectivisation can apparently go a long way or it can go less far. It is quite possible that, in earlier and more "primitive" periods of his existence, man was more inclined to regard the psyche and psychological contents as objective and as existing on their own than he has been in more recent times.³ The well-known classical scholar B. Snell has said that Homer regarded the psyche as a "half objective organ".⁴ Both Democritus, who accepted the existence of a kind of perception that was different from ordinary perceptions, and Epicurus believed that the gods expressed themselves, in dreams for instance, and appeared to man by means of *eidōla* or little images.⁵ They imagined, however, that these *eidōla*, like telepathic impressions, were something that came from outside and were therefore essentially independent of the psyche which received them. It has been said both of Indian philosophy—the Sāṅkhya, for example⁶—and of the Stoic philosophy,⁷ that they were inclined to regard all kinds of factors as "material" or objective potencies". (Both systems have also been to some extent criticised because of this.) This has, in fact, sometimes gone too far, in that abstract factors, such as the year, have also been regarded as things, but it is also possible that thinkers who belonged to these schools were able to make distinctions of a kind that contemporary man is no longer capable of making. As we have seen, Heymans referred to separate contents

1 See above, pp. 112, 116.

2 See above, p. 121.

3 See above, Part I, p. 82.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 23.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 31, 42.

6 See above, Part I, p. 210.

7 B 52, p. 445; see also above, Part I, p. 172.

of the consciousness as factors which continued to exist in time and said that they were not to be found in the central consciousness and might even be in conflict with each other in their attempt to return to that central zone.¹ In the brochure in which he discusses whether the concept of energy was applicable in psychology. He has elaborated this idea further, using concepts which, he has to admit, are very much in accordance with physical concepts.² This too is a form of objectivisation and something of this kind is also encountered in W. Whately Carrington's concept "psychons".³ I have already drawn attention to the similarity between Whately Carrington's psychons and Heymans' independent contents of the consciousness.⁴ The consequence of this psychological theory is that the psyche is seen to be only relatively cut off⁵ and in no sense complete, as is often suggested.⁶ It is also quite consistent on Heymans' part to regard this as a declaration of telepathy.⁷

There is, then, no lack of attempts to understand psychical factors as objective, independent realities even in the present century. Something of this kind is evident in H. H. Price's foreword to Tyrrell's *Apparitions* (B 266), in which he remarks in connection with Tyrrell's theory of the "Producer" and the "Stage Carpenter" in the question of apparitions: "From its point of view even thoughts and feelings are in some degree environmental",⁸ like the ordinary body, which is, of course, even more "environmental".

This idea is even more fully worked out in modern occultism, in which there is explicit reference to "*thought-forms*" which can be perceived by the clairvoyant as independent factors,⁹ just as the clairvoyant

1 See above, p. 178-179.

2 B 69, II, p. 325; see also above, Vol. II, p. 188.

3 See his *Telepathy* (1945).

4 See B 169, XLIII, p. 265.

5 It is not enclosed by normal perception or what we should have would be the "monad without a window"; see B 69, I, p. 343.

6 See, for example, P. Kohnstamm; see B 237 p. 189, note 4.

7 See above, p. 178.

8 B 266, p. 12.

9 See above, Vol. II, p. 182; Vol. III, pp. 69, 103; see also B 116, Chapter VII. It is possible to come to a rather mischievous conclusion about this. The radical positivists are convinced that what cannot be verified, by which they mean what cannot be perceived, cannot be true. For this reason, many positivists refuse to attach any great significance to values and norms. Heymans, however believed that ethical (and logical) laws were also empirical laws, even going so far as to say that as in chemistry, a third matter can be obtained from the combination of only two different matters, the conclusion follows automatically as soon as premises are brought together in the human mind (*Gesetze und Elemente*, p. 64; cf. p. 40). If hylic pluralism is right, then, it is feasible that a clairvoyant should perceive an ethical or a logical judgement coming about as the result of contact between two thought-forms. This would, of course, obviously satisfy the demand of the positivists! All this really amounts to an extension of their physicalism (see my article, B 243, p. 208 ff). It does not, of course, mean that everything has been said on the subject of laws or norms.

is also able to perceive concrete emotions expressed by certain colours.¹

This brings us to the concept of *psychical things*. I have already noted that this theme was developed by W. Haas (b. 1883) in his book *Die psychische Dingwelt* (1921; B 61),² although he is an almost isolated figure in this sphere of research, having as predecessors only Troxler³ and Czolbe.⁴

Czolbe believed that "sensations and feelings are objectively contained in space in the world".⁵ Haas, on the other hand, elaborated certain aspects of this idea in some detail and formulated the remarkable statement: "We are in the psychical aspect—it is not in us".⁶ This means, we must learn to differentiate, within what is usually known as our mind, our consciousness, our psychical aspect, the sphere of inner perception, between ourself, that is, our psychical body, and its environment, that is, what is outside our psychical body.

This, of course, is precisely what the clairvoyant has to begin with—he has to learn how to distinguish between what belongs to him, his own psychical activity, the thoughts and feelings which he himself produces and projects (and what at once assumes independent forms in the plastic matter of the environment?) and what come to him from outside.⁸

This is clearly an exercise in overcoming illusions! On the other hand, it may be better to describe it as a process of judging apparitions which may well have an objective foundation, but with a form and shape which are clearly dependent on the background of the one who claims to have them.⁹ This is moreover obviously concerned with a differentiation in the special sense of hylic pluralism or fine materiality. On the one hand, an "objectivisation" undoubtedly occurs, a seeing as objective forms of what is usually regarded as purely subjective. On the other hand the content of those images or forms (*eidōla*) is judged or criticised and this can lead to a necessary de-projection.¹⁰

All these psychical things can be generalised as a "world of psychical things" (the title of W.S. Haas' book), but the proper place for this

1 See above, p. 120; see B 116, Chapter III.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 207 and index.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 137.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 174.

5 B 38, p. 113.

6 B 61, p. 42; see also above, Vol. II, p. 208.

7 See above, p. 69.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 208.

9 See above, p. 108.

10 For this phenomenon, see my *De wijsgerige Projectie* (1958), p. 13; see also above, Vol. I, p. 210-211.

is Section 111 ("Cosmic pluralism"). Here, however, I should like to draw attention to the fact that the *dividing line* between what is thought, in this context, to belong to the ego, to be the strictly subjective element and the objective or objectivised element, in other words, what is regarded as independent is *capable of moving*. This fact has several interesting aspects.

In the first place, the ideas held by insane people, their hallucinations, have clearly to be included among the illusory projections into this plastic matter. It is a well known fact that insane people often complain that they are spied on by all kinds of beings, even through walls. It cannot be ruled out that there may be a real perception of subtle influences here.¹ It is, however, probable that they do not have enough resistance to these influences—to some extent, they lack normal man's protection from these impressions, in that he is cut off from them. (I have already hinted at this in this chapter.²)

In addition, we must consider another aspect of this question. Attention has frequently been drawn to a psychological similarity between medieval man, who believed that he was tempted by devils or demons or at least experienced something very similar, and modern man who is tormented by his complexes and seeks to be freed from them with the help of psycho-analysis. These complexes acquire, in his mind, a certain independence or objectivity. We may therefore ask, quite legitimately, whether medieval man, or for that matter anyone at all, may perhaps have gone a stage further with this objectivisation, with the result that certain tendencies have assumed the form of independent beings in his experience.

K.H.E. de Jong has pointed out various passages in Augustine which deal with these questions. Among other things, Augustine says that man's imagination is capable of depicting many different kinds of objects in thought and dreams and that these, with wonderful speed assume forms which resemble bodies.³ According to Augustine, man's capacity to project is at work here and, when this happens, he is no longer quite sure what he himself has produced and what is objective. These forms resembling bodies can, however, become so objective that the Church father believed that sexual intercourse between demons and human beings could not be entirely ruled out.⁴ This argument certainly helps to clarify, at least to some extent, the

1 The psychiatrist H.J. Urban of Innsbruck has taken this possibility into account.

2 See above, p. 181, note 1.

3 See *De Civitate Dei*, XVIII, 18 ff; K. H. E. de Jong, *De zwarte magie* (1938), p. 75.

4 See de Jong, p. 80; *De Civitate Dei*, XV, 23.

widespread belief in the Middle Ages in *incubi* and *succubi*. It is to some degree obvious that these spiritual partners are related to psycho-analytical complexes and to the ideas of eidetics in the sense of Jaensch. All this is, of course, connected with questions of objectivisation, albeit in the minds of psychologically disturbed or abnormal men.

Turning to the normal, healthy sphere, we may ask whether a far-reaching objectivisation is perhaps also possible *in principle*. According to the gamma standpoint, this would seem to be so, in that all the multiplicity of creation is regarded as consisting in principle of matter or of fine matter, although the deity transcends it—*nisi Deus ipse*.¹ This matter must in principle also be perceptible and capable of objectivisation and, what is more, this must be possible, as we shall see later, in the next chapter, in another space or in other spaces. This does not mean, however, that this is not a theoretical standpoint and, what is more, a standpoint which is inexorably consistent.

Something else can, however, be contrasted with this gamma standpoint. The empirical subjects or infrasubjects have a only merely partial, fragmentary knowledge.² For them, there is always a non-objectivised psychical "fillet" left over, which I have, in another work, called the lasting "relatively psychical element".³ The borderline between what is subjective and interior and not objectivised and what is objectivised and recognised as things in space is therefore in principle capable of moving, even infinitely and its in practice moved again and again, especially in the case of mystics and occultists. On the other hand, however, as long as the pluriformity of creation lasts, there always continue to be subjects which are *infra* subjects. These infrasubjects have a limited knowledge and a limited capacity for making distinctions. They also have a lasting interior quality which is not completely objectivised and from which they continue to *act*.

110 SPACIOUSNESS AND SPACE

I have again and again spoken in this work of subtle bodies, of the "soul-body", the meta-organism and so on. The word body at once brings the idea of "extensiveness" to mind—"body" and "extensiveness" or "space" are directly related, the one is the complement of the other. The obvious question that arises in this context is therefore in what

¹ See Part I, p. 36.

² B 114, *passim*.

³ B 114, § 47.

is this rarefied body contained, in what framework, and, in the case of an "excursion" from the ordinary body, where does the "free soul" go to? As I have said several times in this book already—at the very beginning of this work¹ and again in the recapitulatory chapter at the beginning of the historical summaries²—this study is primarily anthropological and psychological. On the other hand, it is not possible to ignore the question of space, spatiality and extensiveness altogether.

As far as possible, I shall deal separately in this section with the aspect of spatiality or extensiveness of the human soul and with space, which is, in this case, a different, second space, as such and generalised. I shall discuss the first question first and, in so doing, be concerned with a question of an anthropological or psychological nature which is not far removed from the central theme of this whole work.

It is to some extent quite obvious from the hylic pluralistic point of view that the soul possesses spatial characteristics or extensiveness. As soon as the subject begins to see things as different, that is, as separated from each other, then space is at once present. The idea that we form of things on the basis of our sense of touch is bound to be to some extent defective, but as soon as the sense of sight begins to play a part, perspective is made present. This applies to our ordinary sense of touch and in the second case to our ordinary sense of sight as well as to the extended sense of touch,³ with which clairvoyance is connected.

But what is space? It is a subject to which a great deal of thought has been given and one is inclined to conclude by saying of space what Augustine said of time—so long as no one asks me about it, I know what it is, but as soon as I have to explain it, I don't know any more. Nonetheless, it is fairly clear that seeing things separately and concretely is essential to space and that there is an important distinction between concrete, graphic geometry and analytical geometry. The difficulty with space is that it is a general or abstract concept and Bolland's definition is not without merit, although the question that at once arises is what does he mean by "nature" in that definition.⁴ He probably means external nature, what is in front of us, in contrast to the inward, subjective element. It is, however, not profitable to go too deeply into the purely philosophical meaning of the concept of space here.

1 See above, Part I, p. 3, 13.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 11-12.

3 See above, pp. 87, 180.

4 See above, p. 182.

It is hardly surprising that, in objectivisation, which sometimes goes so far that the clairvoyant sees forms of thoughts and emotions in front of him,¹ these thought-forms are seen and thought of as spatial and as being contained in a space. All kinds of preliminary stages of this as well as transitions to it occur both practically, in the various experiences themselves, and theoretically, in the theories that have been formulated about it. I propose now to review the situation and at the same time also to consider the views of a number of opponents of the spatiality of the soul or of the psychical aspect.

At the outset, however, it is important to distinguish between two factors—between the concept of space, including the concept of a part of space, of a definite place, and space or place itself. Perhaps the best way of making this distinction clear is by saying that, in my opinion, the whole of history forms a part of what can be called the “eidetic”.² The history of man must always be, as it were, a selection from this great eidetic relationship, but there is nonetheless as an ideal, although not real whole of all that has happened (happens and will happen), in which all particular details are included, although they may never be determined. If a definition is in accordance with a fragment of this, this definition contains the truth about it.³ All the same. the real event is quite different from this ideal whole of the event. It is noticeable that the wholes of the ideal and the real event thus coincide, where as the contrast between them is typically a contrast for the infrasubjects with their defective knowledge and limited activity. This can be admitted,⁴ but this contrast certainly applies to the infrasubjects and within the plurality of creation, this contrast, that is, between the ideal and the real or between the eidetic and the hylic. It applies, however, not only to fragments of history (to individual man at a certain period of time), but also to space. Space(possibly extended by other spaces), as an abstract whole, is quite different from concrete space, within which an individual or infrasubject is present at a certain point. Similarly, the idea or intention of a certain space, for example, the idea of the Netherlands, as well as the idea of a certain space which we perceive in the concrete is quite different from, for example, the Netherlands as such as a part of the world space or a certain spot where a shed, for example, is placed at a certain period in history.

1 See above, p. 183.

2 See above, p. 35-36 and index.

3 See my article “Over de éne waarheid en de grenzen van het scepticisme”, B 243, p. 201.

4 B 114, § 60.

This rather long digression was necessary because misunderstandings arise at once—misunderstandings that are at least partly connected with what I have called Plato's mistake¹—as soon as the spatiality of the psyche or of the psychical aspect is discussed. It is, in my opinion, quite obvious that the content, the eidetic content, of an idea which contains space elements is quite different from the question as to whether that idea can possibly be perceived in a different space by a clairvoyant.² This would in fact amount to perceiving an idea about space (for example, an ordinary garden) as part of another space in which the thought-form is contained. It may be said that even this clairvoyant perception can of necessity to be able to be perceived in another space and so on *ad infinitum*. I would admit this, but at the same time would point out that it does amount to a hopeless *regressus ad infinitum*. I believe that the perceptive subject, which is not itself objectivised and can be seen as spatial, functions everywhere. At the same time, however, I also believe that this only applies to the one suprasubject which is in fact present and active in and behind every infrasubject and its perceptions (and actions) and yet is never completely absorbed in it.³ The concrete, infrasubjective element of every individual, however, could in principle, I believe, always be objectivised and regarded as both spatial and material.⁴

To conclude, then, my view is that, taking such theoretical presuppositions as one's point of departure, it is far better to situate all the opinions concerning the spatiality or the non-spatiality of the soul without falling into the usual confusion.

We must now do what I proposed to do earlier on in this section—review the situation.

As far as practical experiences are concerned, it can be said that that inner experiences are sometimes felt to be movements. In the case of a welling up, for example, of emotion or something similar, does not something in fact come up? Or anger—does this too go out from us like something that we pour out over someone?⁵ This, then, is clearly one of the those transitions to which I have referred so often, when a change is experienced as a change of place.

Attention must also be drawn to the fact that the mystics and others who had excursions and who were transferred into a different state of

1 See the index.

2 See above, p. 35-36, 183.

3 B 114, pp. 136, 140, 482.

4 B 115, p. 62.

5 See, for example, Balzac, above, Vol. II, p. 229.

consciousness were conscious of a different spatial environment, of the "third heaven" or of something very similar. This, however, is a subject which rightly belongs not to this chapter, but to the following one.

What other opinions have there been with regard to a spatiality of the psychical aspect? Chuang-tzu, for example, said "only *tao* has no size".¹ There is, in other words, a transcendence of many things, but there is nothing in the world which does not have size, that is, extensiveness.

With regard to Indian thought, Gonda has said of the doctrine of the purusas or spirits in various schools of philosophy; "The idea of spacelessness does not occur in Indian thought".² (although the one *Atman* of the Vedanta system must be regarded as an exception). I do not propose to go into details here, but it will be obvious that the soul was clearly regarded as being of a certain size in those instances in which it was called a "thumbling".³

In classical antiquity, Speusippus said explicitly that the soul had extensiveness.⁴ The followers of Aristotle, such as Strato, regarded "all psychical activities" as movements.⁵

Later, in the Middle Ages, William of Ockham (1270-1347) believed that the "sensitive soul", the central factor of the three factors of the soul, possessed both extensiveness and limits.⁶ This is, of course, very much in accordance with the way of thinking of the period, which tended towards a trichotomy of the soul, an idea which gained ground considerably at the time of the Renaissance.⁷ Not everyone at this time, however, declared this explicitly. Long before this, it should be noted, Tertullian had regarded the soul as extensive and as limited at the same time.⁸

In the modern era, especially in the eighteenth century, there was a great deal of discussion about whether matter was also able to think. In the same context, J. C. Hennings, for example, (1731-1815), asked "whether the soul could have extensiveness".⁹ Voltaire, for example,

1 See above, Part I, p. 288.

2 B 58, p. 139.

3 See above, Part I, p. 164, and the index under "mannikin". Very similar to this Indian "thumbling" is the Western *eidolon* of the soul, which was, in the Middle Ages for example, always represented as very small.

4 See above, Part I, p. 47; see also Vol. II, p. 35.

5 B 155, p. 160; B 184, p. 647.

6 B 128, p. 119.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 232.

8 B 155, p. 373.

9 B 65, p. 225.

1694-1778), came to the conclusion that the soul was extensive and thought,¹ although he was not a materialist.

This was, of course, the time when materialism was first beginning to make itself felt and the question as to how thoughts came about if—as so many were inclined to believe—the real emphasis had to be placed in the brains, which were material, became even more urgent in the nineteenth century. The monistic materialists made the phenomenological mistake of asserting that it really was the brains which thought, although we have no direct knowledge of this. Less and less interest was taken in those two centuries in dualistic materialism or, more correctly, in hylic pluralism and my explanation was, of course, quite unknown.² Thus, all kinds of affirmations were made in those centuries which were not particularly clear and which fitted less and less well into the pattern of thought of the period, with the exception of romanticism. According to Rüdiger and his follower Crusius, the soul was in possession of extensiveness, but it was not material.³ Bolzano believed that the soul was to be found in space.⁴ Other thinkers who were in favour of the spatiality or extensiveness of the soul are quite commonly met with in the nineteenth century. Among these are F. Groos,⁵ F. Überweg, who is well known for other reasons,⁶ the Dutchman H. M. Duparc who is so little known in the Netherlands⁷ and several writers who lived at a later period. These include S. Alexander, who said that “the mind is extended in space-time”,⁸ and F. Giese, with his doctrine of thought-waves.⁹

On the one hand, there were figures in the nineteenth century such as Überweg and H. Czolbe, the title of whose book, “Characteristics of an Extensional Theory of Knowledge” (*Grundzüge einer extensionalen Erkenntnistheorie*) speaks for itself.¹⁰ These two thinkers stood, as it were, with one foot in the materialism of the nineteenth century, thus providing F. A. Lange with a reason for including them in his history of materialism (*Geschichte des Materialismus*).¹¹ On the other hand, however, it is important not to overlook the other wing, as it were,

1 B 128, p. 173.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 3-4, and below, Section 136.

3 See above, Part I, p. 47; see also Vol. II, p. 146.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 172.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 137.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 173-174.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 214.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 204.

9 See above, Vol. II, p. 192.

10 See above, Vol. II, p. 174.

11 B 89, II, index.

which was a continuation of the Protestant movement that I discussed in Section 72, culminating in the philosophy of romanticism. As far as the Protestant tendency discussed in Section 72 is concerned, Oetinger, for example, was of the opinion that "spiritual corporeality" could also be called "spiritual spatiality".¹

In the context of our particular subject, the younger Fichte is very representative of the philosophers of the romantic movement and I should like to discuss his position briefly here. He came, for example, to the conclusion that the "embodiment of the soul" entailed a spatiality of the soul² and said that "everything that is real (the most spiritual and the most material) has its spatiality (embodiment)".³ He also affirmed that space and time were original and could "not be abstracted from the consciousness".⁴ In other words, he extended what I have called the psychohyilism of the fine material aspect to include spatiality.

The ideas of the romantic philosophers were revived partly under the influence of the occult movements that I have discussed in Section 83. W. Haas, for example, spoke about the spatiality of the "world of psychical things". This is not developed in the beginning, at least as far as the perceiving subject is concerned (p.14), but this comes about gradually, with the result that it becomes eventually clear that "the psychical world is as much a temporal and spatial world as the physical world" (p.37 ff), through which psychical things only assume form properly for the subject. A contemporary philosopher, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, has expressed the opinion that "the soul has its own most distinctive and indeed psychical "spatiality".⁵

Although it is very frequently overlooked, it is not necessary to seek very far for theologians, psychologists and philosophers who attribute spatiality to the psychical element. On the other hand, however, there is also no lack of opponents of this point of view, in the first place those who accept a spatial element in connection with the soul, but still regard the soul itself as immaterial. This was, for example, the opinion of Plotinus.⁶ All the same, this thinker did speak, as we have already seen, about the "*pneuma* around the soul".⁷ Augustine too regarded the soul as "unextended",⁸ although quite a number of hylic

1 B 135, p. 129.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 170.

3 *Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer* (1834), second edition, 1855, p. 111.

4 *Zur Seelenfrage*, p. xxi.

5 *Die Zeit*, 1954, B 200, p. 111; see also above, Vol. II, p. 35.

6 B 155, p. 319; B 174, p. 358.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 51.

8 B 155, II, p. 383.

pluralistic notions occur in his writings.¹ How are we to account for this? The answer is that it is a case of what I have called the delta standpoint²—the soul itself being regarded as immaterial, but expressing itself materiality, that is, as fine matter.

There is, however, an interesting variety of the delta standpoint—I called it the delta standpoint in Part I of this work³—which only goes halfway, fine materiality going too far for those who adhere to this point of view, but spatiality being admitted. This was, for examples the standpoint of Rüdiger and Crusius, who believed that extensiveness, had to be attributed to the soul, which was, in their opinion, not material.⁴ The same doctrine is encountered again and again with regard to the angels. This is obviously connected with the idea of a *materia spiritualis*, which is present as a foundation, but has not developed into a body of fine matter.⁵ However this may be, it was thought that the angels had to be able to move and change place, although, unless they appeared as messengers and then assumed an ordinary material body, it went too far to think that they had bodies. Scheeben and Atzberger's manual of Catholic theology stated that angels were immaterial but were able to move in space.⁶ The well-known Dutch Protestant theologian, Abraham Kuyper, also believed this, thinking that the angels of God were immaterial, uncorporeal, but at the same time tied to place.⁷

The delta standpoint is clearly inconsistent, but there are many consistent opponents of the spatiality of the soul and of spatiality in connection with the soul. Thomas Aquinas regarded the souls of men and of the angels as purely spiritual substances. One of René Descartes' typical teachings was his anthropological dualism, that the soul and the body were quite different, the body being material and extensive, the soul neither material nor extensive. The epsilon standpoint, as I have called it,⁸ has no place for fine materiality, except in the form of the *spiritus animales*, which were in any case included by Descartes within the corporeal aspect of this dualism.⁹ What cannot be contested is that Descartes was fundamentally opposed both to hylic pluralism and to the spatiality of the soul.

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 87 ff, 91.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 6.

3 See Part I, above, p. 47.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 146; B 184, II, p. 389; B 76, p. 9; B 141, p. 291.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 91, 114.

6 B 29, I, col. 1225.

7 *De Engelen Gods* (1902), p. 48.

8 See Part I, above, p. 47 ff; see also Vol. II, p. 121, ff.

9 See above, Vol. II, p. 126.

In his own way, Immanuel Kant continued this dualism.¹ He taught that it is not possible for us to know how things in themselves are. Space and time, according to Kant's subjective idealism, are experimental forms, with the help of which the subject assimilates the data of experience that come from outside. As I have often enough pointed out in this work, this point of view is not at all favourable to hylic pluralism and the subjective idealist usually either rejects fine materiality altogether because of his standpoint or is at least blind to it, like Schopenhauer.²

Another thinker who accepted this point of view and elaborated it clearly and consistently in connection with occultism and parapsychology was Leo Polak (1880-1941). He maintained that a spirit existing in space or leaving the body was as absurd as, for example, mind-reading. This kind of notion could, he insisted, be refuted "with apodeictic, a priori positiveness, the positiveness of the doctrine of knowledge" because of the fact that the spiritual was not spatial and space was ideal.³ My argument against Polak's theory, published elsewhere, is based on the conviction that this only applies when seen from the particular point of view of Polak's theory of knowledge. In my opinion, it is not the individual or infrasubject for whom space is ideal. This is only the case for the one suprasubject embracing everything in itself.⁴ Space exists quite independently of the infrasubject and spatial qualities exist in connection with things. If this is the case, spatiality can be extended, if necessary, to the psyche which, like the ordinary body, belongs to the world of plurality. It is, however, necessary to say that, as far as the infrasubject is concerned, if the things of the psyche are to be seen as independent elements and as spatial, we have to differentiate and to objectivise in the way in which I defined this in the previous chapter. It must also be admitted that there is something in the subject that can never be fully objectivised and that the infrasubject has, to this extent, a share in the one suprasubject which is present behind all the infrasubjects.⁵ On the other hand, what has the character of plurality and takes this to the infrasubject can be objectivised and regarded as spatial.⁶ There is also an abstract, purely ideal content or intention of things, which is, as a part of the whole

1 See Part I, p. 54; see also Vol. II, p. 152.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 153-154.

3 See his *Kennisleer contra materie-realisme*, 1912, pp. 79, 334.

4 B 115, p. 47 ff, 51, 61; B 114, p. 297 and elsewhere.

5 B 114, p. 137, for example.

6 B 115, p. 62.

of the eidetic aspect in itself, also not spatial.¹ Both Kant and Polak, however, draw a false dividing line between what is spatial and consists of fine matter and what is not: they do this with regard to the infrasubject and not with regard to the suprasubject as contrasted with the whole plurality of the created world. If this is done, then no notice has to be taken or criticism of fine materiality and apatality.

In the fairly recent past, an interesting discussion about "The Extension of Mind" was conducted in the pages of the *Journal of the English Society for Psychical Research*. This debate has, of course, a direct bearing on our subject in this chapter. The idea of the "extension of mind" was defended by J. R. Smythies as "A New Theoretical Basis for Psi Phenomena".² In one of the following numbers of the journal commentaries were included, contributed, by various readers, and these were in turn followed by a "reply" from Smythies.³

This detailed defence of the idea of extensiveness in the case of the mind or spirit and the discussion surrounding it is interesting enough in itself, but certain aspects of it leave me unsatisfied. For instance, Smythies refers to "perceptual space", that is, space in perception. He asks, in connection with this, how we would be able to visualise a triangle if the mind were not extended (p. 486). In my view, this is a very typical example of the sort of confusion that is found in Smythies' thinking and that of others. Of course the content or intention of a triangle, another spatial figure or a piece of space is in itself eidetic and not spatial, quite apart from the question as to whether the idea that we have of it in time—the defective idea—can be perceived by a clairvoyant in a different space as a spatial image, like the pictures in our space in a camera or on a screen. Other examples of vagueness also occur in Smythies' argument and it is rather surprising that none of the commentators criticise Smythies on the basis of the meaning of immateriality, as Leo Polak undoubtedly would have done. The critic who was most opposed to Smythies' thesis, A.G.N. Flew (p. 547 ff), defended neurophysiology, but I am convinced that this has little to do with the problem. The other critics were not so very much opposed to Smythies. H. H. Price was in the main in favour of his thesis, saying that the Sāṅkhya philosophers taught "this idea of a spatially extended psychical mechanism" centuries ago, although they were convinced that the Self was contrasted to it (p. 537 ff).⁴

1 See index under these words.

2 B 221, XXXVI, No. 666, p. 477 ff.

3 *ibid.*, No. 668, p. 537 ff.

4 See above, Vol. II, p. 15 (C. D. Broad); p. 195 (F. W. H. Myers) and p. 105 (G.N.M. Tyrrell).

All the same, what Smythies was defending was undoubtedly of a hyllic pluralistic nature. This is clear from many of his statements—"mind has a whereness" and three spatial dimensions (p. 592), "the *psyche* may consist of an organised material entity located in higher dimensional space" (p. 501), "Psychical space is filled with mind-stuff, part of which forms a signalling mechanism between the brain and the observer" (p. 569). All this may possibly be true, but Smythies does not distinguish clearly between the parts played by spatiality and the spirit.

We are almost automatically led from the spatiality of the *psyche*, the soul, the mind or special aspects of the *psyche* to the concept of a second or different space. Smythies, in this context, speaks of "psychical space" and one encounters generalisations of this kind quite frequently. H. Conrad-Martius, for instance, was of the opinion that Plato's world-soul, in the *Timaeus*, cannot be understood without reference to a spatial background.¹ The same question has to be asked explicitly in the case of the neo-Platonists as well. In his article in *Augustinus Magister*, P. Blanchard wrote about Augustine's "interior space". According to him, this concept is also met with in Bernard of Clairvaux and Teresa of Avila.² Malebranche (1638-1715) spoke about "intelligible extensiveness".³ One is bound to ask in this context whether Malebranche meant "space as intention" (see above, p. 195) when he spoke about "intelligible extensiveness" or a real second space or whether he meant both, without differentiation.⁴

The concept "interior space of the world" is encountered in the writings of certain German authors. Schelling moves towards it in his dialogue "Clara",⁵ Rilke mentioned it in his poetry⁶ and the psychologist G. R. Heyer wrote about this "interior space of the world" and even called one of his books "psychical spaces" (*Seelenräume*).⁷

It is noticeable that these are very often no more than hesitant beginnings, the full extent and meaning of which is not always clear. It is therefore all the more important to examine and analyse them side by side; if this is done, it may lead to a consistent and unified doctrine.

If we think of space as such, we end by discussing cosmology. If, on the other hand, we consider a second, different space alongside our

1 *Die Zeit*, pp. 110-111.

2 B 190, I, p. 535 ff.

3 B 141, p. 170; B 41, p. 137.

4 See the statement made by H. Bergson (*Matière et Mémoire*, 1896, p. 245) quoted above, Vol. II, p. 203, note 5.

5 *Werke* (1861), IX, p. 94.

6 See above, Vol. II, p. 231.

7 See above, Vol. II, p. 191.

own, ordinary space, or even several different spaces, we become at once concerned with cosmological pluralism. This is the question that I propose to deal with in the following section.

111 COSMIC PLURALISM

I have drawn attention several times in this work to the fact that my intention has above all been to deal with the psychological and anthropological aspects of the question of fine materiality or hylic pluralism, in other words, with the whole subject in the context of the human soul. At the same time, however, I have also from time to time been obliged to point out that the cosmic or cosmological aspect of the subject could not be completely ignored, although I did not intend to go into that aspect at all deeply.¹ It was in fact a very wise restriction on the extent of the work as a whole. If I had not imposed this limitation on myself, the work would have been very much longer.

There is, however, another, perhaps more important reason for not dealing at length with the cosmological aspect of the subject—this is the fact that it is surrounded by a great deal more vagueness and speculation than the psychological and anthropological aspects of hylic pluralism. Although it is customary to use a number of nuances, statements made about the subtle body are on the whole fairly concrete. In the case of another world or of several other worlds, on the other hand, it is common to revert to wild generalisations. The usual reaction to this kind of statement on the part of contemporary man is to relegate these abodes of the gods, places of the blessed or of the damned and so on to the realm of fables and myths, precisely because so many details have been given and are believed in—or were believed in—in connection with these places.

The best approach to this cosmological aspect of the subject, then, would therefore seem to be to keep to subtle bodies and ask the following questions—within what framework do these subtle bodies exist and, if there are excursions, where do these free souls go? The concept of a body brings us almost automatically to the concept of a space, a second space.² Our ordinary space is itself a generalisation, a normal and indispensable generalisation, like the generalisation we make of *the* world, *the* universe and so on. If there is any truth in hylic pluralism with regard to the psyche, in other words, in the psyche's being accompanied by something consisting of fine matter, psychohylism, then it is obvious

¹ See above, Vol. II, p. 12-13, 186-187.

² See above, p. 186.

that these ordinary generalisations about space, world and universe have to be extended to cover wider concepts. If this is done, space as such would include another space apart from our ordinary space and possibly even several other spaces. The world would also not be completely included within the physical world that is known to us, but would have to be extended to include a different world or even several other worlds of a different kind, possibly or even probably continuous with our own ordinary world, but clearly different and if an extension, then an extension in an unexpected direction (or in unexpected directions). Finally, what the universe really is cannot be so easily established as we thought or might have thought, because it is bound to include *all* extensions.

All these generalisations may to some extent be quite obvious, but it is not part of my task to discuss in detail all the ways in which they have been worked out. This is the task of those who specialise in the history of comparative religion and in cultural anthropology, studies which are more concerned with cosmogonies and cosmologies. What I propose to do in this chapter especially is to draw attention to certain aspects of this extension of space and the world. In so doing, I shall try to relate this to what has been said before and point out a number of tendencies in this transition from hylic pluralism with regard to the human soul—Psychohylicism—to a hylic pluralistic cosmology or, to use a shorter term, to a cosmic pluralism.

In the foregoing chapter, I pointed out that, if we take the "objectivisation" of the psychical element at all seriously, we are automatically bound to accept a *spatial* view of the psychical element. This was clear from a number of examples. This spatial aspect of the psychical element in turn leads us to the idea of one or more different spaces, an extension of our ordinary concept of space. I mentioned several examples of this in the previous chapter, such as Augustine's "interior space", discussed by Blanchard, and the "interior space of the world" that occurs in the writings of Rilke and Heyer¹ as well as Smythie's interest in the concept of "psychical space". It is possible to quote further examples, bearing in mind that "different space" very easily and almost automatically becomes "different world." At the same time, the idea that comes irresistibly to mind in this context is that man spends his continued existence after death (if he has any continued existence) in this different space or world.

The first case which is worth mentioning in this context is that of the American philosopher W. E. Hocking (1873-1966), who wrote

¹ See above, p. 186-187.

about the concept of "plural spaces" in his "The meaning of Immortality".¹

Several approaches in the same direction can be found in the work of the Oxford philosopher, H.H. Price,² whose speech as president of the English Society for Psychical Research in 1939 was entitled "Haunting and the Psychical Ether".³ Whether they are perceived as apparitions or as ghosts which are associated with a particular place, spirits certainly seem, however, subjectively, to come from something that is not entirely private, something which Price called the "Psychic atmosphere" or, with C.A.Mace, the "Psychic ether".

Elsewhere, in a paper entitled "Survival and the Idea of Another World",⁴ Price dealt especially with the idea that another world is involved in this case, pointing out related conceptions in Whately Caringtons *Telepathy* (1945), in C.J. Ducasse's *Nature, Mind and Death* (1951) and in the Hindu *Kamaloka* (p.3). It cannot, Price insists, be simply a question of a "world of mental images"—such "images" undoubtedly play their part, as well as "delusions", but, Price convinced, the whole is "semi-public" (p.16). This strange world is nonetheless subject to causal laws, Price believed, not the laws of Physics, it is true, but those of Freudian Psychology (p.24). If worlds of this kind do in fact exist, it is obvious that we now live in them "with some stratum of our being" (p.25).

Hornell Hart,⁵ the American Professor who was especially interested in cases of excursion, held very similar ideas. "That a world exists which is invisible to our physical senses, and which is yet a realm of objective experience and of social contacts between conscious personalities, is a conclusion which emerges out of two well-established facts". These facts are telepathy and a special kind of dream—"vivid dreams",⁶ often "shared" by more than one person. This is why, in Hart's opinion, "the astral world" is "a logical necessity".⁷

These authors have clearly approached the problem from the parapsychological and philosophical point of view. Others have approached it from the experience of mediums and spiritualists that come to us via reports which cannot always be verified. As I have already said,⁸

1 1957; see the detailed summary in *Tomorrow* (B 264), VI, 1, p. 93 ff; especially p. 121 ff.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 202.

3 B 244, XLV, Part 160; see also the summary in B 264, V, 3, p. 107 ff.

4 B 244, L, Part 182.

5 See above, Vol. II, p. 200.

6 See above, Vol. II, pp. 199, 76.

7 B 214, p. 236.

8 See above, Vol. II, p. 181.

R. Crookall has done considerable research into the themes and concepts that recur again and again in reports of this kind and has written: "if, as is said, there are (ethereal) *bodies*, then presumably there are realms (worlds, spheres, planes, conditions, or "mansions") to correspond"¹. This, Crookall believes, can be concluded from the reports.

The rather earlier author, Emil Mattiesen (1875-1939),² held similar views to those of Crookall, accepting as his point of departure that some credence must be given to reports of this kind. With typically German thoroughness, he went into all the available material in considerable detail. Most parapsychologists are of the opinion that Mattiesen accepted too much as already proved, but, generally speaking, have great respect for the clarity and the seriousness of his writing. It is possible to speak of a phenomenology of spiritualism in his case, although "phenomenology" was not so fashionable a term then as it is now. In one of his summaries, for example, he states that he "has been assured with great unanimity that the world of spirits consists of 'planes', 'spheres' or 'levels'".³ He also speaks, however, of "difficulties with regard to the world beyond",⁴ for example, that this other world, according to the reports, resembles our world very much. On the other hand, he also draws attention to the plasticity of matter at that other level.⁵

Mattiesen also makes a very important statement, in which he uses a word with far-reaching implications.⁶ "It is only when we have, in the future, a true 'science of the beyond' that attempts will be made to assimilate more or less the *whole* of the matter available and at the same time to begin examining and 'criticising' individual sources. My attempts to do this constitute no more than a small beginning".⁷

Mattiesen speaks of a "science of the beyond", a study based on scientific principles of the other world. If there is any truth at all in all these propositions, then clearly it can only be examined, in the long run, within the framework of a new branch of science. I have given this new science the provisional name of "cosmic pluralism" and hylic pluralism with regard to the human soul, psychohylicism, ought logically to form a part of cosmic pluralism.

1 B 201, p. 146; cf. p. 48.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 181.

3 B 98, III, p. 371; see also B 249, p. 136.

4 B 98, III, p. 338 ff.

5 B 98, index under "Ideoplastic"; see also above, p. 69. ff.

6 B 98, III, p. 339; see also Part I, p. 13.

7 This "small beginning" is contained in the 1280 pages of his three volumes on personal survival after death (B 98) and the 825 pages of his book on "man beyond" (B 97). Mattiesen followed the usual method of German philosophy, approaching the subject itself via lengthy "attempts", "introductions" and "essays".

Another author, Alfons Rosenberg,¹ also had a high ideal of this new science of cosmic pluralism and declared, in his book *Die Seelenreise* (1952; B 135), his belief in the soul's journey after death.² In the same book, he also said explicitly that a "uranography" or a "geography of the beyond" was highly desirable (p. 100). Elsewhere, he said that the "saint of Protestantism", J. F. Oberlin, was so certain of the existence of the beyond in this geographical sense that he designed maps of the beyond and examined the Alsatian peasants of his parish about it.³

It is clear, then, that these statements about the desirability of a scientific study of the beyond and a very self-assured speculation about the beyond are closely related to each other and also to the earlier cosmologies with their elaborated theories about the spheres and so on—precisely the subject that I wished not to discuss in detail. Any discussion of psychohylism, however, brings one very near to this subject. P. Deussen, for example, in his history of philosophy, gave the title of "The Extension (*vikshepa*) of the Fine Body and of the Fine World" to his discussion of a movement in Indian philosophy,⁴ thus clearly linking the subtle body with a subtle world.

Modern occultism—see above, Section 83—has a detailed theory of "higher planes".⁵ This theory is in fact so well known that most people in Western Europe at least have heard of the "astral world"⁶ and that the abode of the dead in that astral world has from time to time been used as a theme in certain films.

E.R. Dodds, the well-known classical scholar, has observed that Proclus' term, *to platos*, "breadth", which he used, for example, in the phrase *en tō psuchikō platei*, is "the literal equivalent of the 'planes' of modern theosophy."⁷

This raises an important question. Was Another world or were other worlds also known to man in classical antiquity? In general, it cannot be denied that this was the case, but a second question arises almost at once. To what extent was this belief linked with psychohylistic ideas of that period and does it bear any relationship to the ideas prevalent in later periods? Dodds himself is convinced of a similarity here. What was the situation, for example, with regard

1 See index.

2 See above, p. 81.

3 B 134, p. 234; see also above, Vol. II, p. 212; B 239, p. 9.

4 My italics; B 28, I, 3, p. 628; see also above, Part I, p. 226.

5 B 116, Chap. XVI; B 119, Chap. XXVII.

6 See also the critical review by C.H. van Os, "De astrale wereld" (B 265, 1949 p. 22 ff) and "De ijlere gebieden" (B 227, 1956, p. 145 ff).

7 B 33, p. 303; see also above, Vol. II, p. 54.

to *ta noēta*, Plotinus' intelligible world,¹ a concept which, surprisingly enough, recurs in Kant's theory of the *mundus intelligibilis*?² In my opinion, a good measure of cosmic pluralism can be found in Plotinus' *ta noēta*—we only have to think of his concept *hulē noētē* or intelligible matter³ in this context. Generally speaking, too, cosmic pluralism can also be found in the neo-Platonists' "world-soul". It is, however, impossible for me to go into this question more deeply here—I must confine myself to the comment that, probably unlike the more lucid and systematic Proclus, Plotinus, was here to a great extent guilty of Plato's "mistake",⁴ with the consequence that his intelligible world was confused and dualistic.

It is moreover clear that, apart from the *lokas* of Buddhism,⁵ the Christian conceptions of heaven, hell and purgatory are very closely related to this idea of another world or of other worlds. I do not propose to discuss this question in detail here, but must confine myself to one remark—Roman Catholic theologians are very reluctant to accept such ideas as those put forward by Alfons Rosenberg, but they do explicitly call heaven, hell and so on "places".⁶ The ascensions that are a feature of religious literature⁷ must also lead somewhere. There are also the frequent cases of assumption into heaven during the life of the person concerned. The importance of Paul's experience of being "caught up into the third heaven" (2 Cor. 12. 2) cannot be underestimated or ignored.⁸ A similar ascension is reported to have taken place in the case of Mohammed.⁹ The chief interest of these reports of ascensions as far as our particular subject is concerned is the contrast between the experience itself and the dogmatic content. Plotinus' ecstasies¹⁰ are also clearly related to this question.

It is well known that the theme of heaven, hell and purgatory occurs in the writings of Dante, Milton and the Dutch poet Vondel and that many different aspects are mingled in this theme in the case of each author—the mythical and fantastic aspects and the psychological and mystical aspects can all be separated in analysis.¹¹ The cosmological

1 B 176, III, p. 459 ff.

2 B 238, p. 7; see also above, Vol. II, p. 154.

3 B 176, III, p. 487.

4 See index.

5 See above, Part I, pp. 246, 267.

6 See, for example, B 147, III, p. 825; B 150, p. 473 (cf. B 135, p. 100); B 29, II, col. 2474.

7 See above, p. 81.

8 See above, Vol. II, pp. 77, 80-81.

9 See above, Vol. II p. 113.

10 See *Enn.* VI, 9, 11, 1. 23.

11 See above, Vol. II, p. 220.

aspect, which is also present in the work of these and similar authors, cannot be ignored either. There can be no doubt that Dante, for example, believed in the reality of other worlds.

With regard to heaven and hell, one often hears the comment in the case of hell, it is no doubt intended as a reassurance—that they are not so much places as states of consciousness. After death, one is left to one's own thoughts; this situation may be pleasant or unpleasant. I should like, however, to draw attention to the fact that modern psychology and the theory of other spatial worlds are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is said that matter in other worlds is especially malleable or plastic and that all kinds of projections are possible.¹ It is possible therefore to imagine oneself to be in an environment which one has expected (either feared or hoped for). This environment, however—in which one stays or one does not stay for a fairly long time—may have, at least partly, a real basis. It is precisely by means of the process of objectivisation which I have already described² that one gradually becomes aware of the real environment and gets rid of projections which are either too powerful or too one-sided.

Aldous Huxley (1894-1963) conducted a number of tests on himself with the help of the drug mescaline, in which he was aware of the presence of images which had a very strong affinity with traditional ideas. He described these experiences in his book *Heaven and Hell*.³

In discussing cosmic pluralism, I cannot avoid saying something about the ancient elements, even though these have been mentioned several times already in this work.⁴ It is beyond dispute that the Indian philosophers distinguished between coarser and finer elements, *mahā-bhūtas* and *sūkṣma-bhūtas* or *tanmātras*.⁵ In the context of cosmic pluralism, the following scheme is a fairly obvious one:

I	{	earth	II	{	earth	III	{	earth	IV	{	earth	V	{	earth
		water			water			water			water			water
		air			air			air			air			air
		fire			fire			fire			fine			fine
		ether			ether			ether			ether			ether

1 See above, p. 69.

2 See above, p. 184.

3 See *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 53.

4 See, for example, above, Vol. II, pp. 13, 173, and index.

5 See above, Part I, p. 226. f.

Our ordinary world is classified under I and, in this category, "water" is our ordinary water or rather the state of aggregation of fluidity. Categories II, III, IV, and V, on the other hand, are those of other, finer worlds. It is, moreover, quite clear that the Indian philosophers had something of this kind in mind, though it is less certain whether the above scheme can also be applied to the concept of the ancient elements that was prevalent in the West. If something of this kind did play a part in Western thought, we can at least be certain that no very clear differentiation was made. All the same, it is to some extent evident that the Ionian natural philosophers were not so naive that they assumed that the whole world was derived from water in the case of Thales, from air in the case of Anaximenes or from any of the elements under category I.

Something else that is also quite evident is that the later ancient thinkers, to whom the theme of a descent through the spheres was so well known, made a clear distinction between this world and other worlds. Whenever they made use, in this context, for example, in their astrology and so on, of the concepts of the ancient elements, what is more, they also distinguished between water, for example, here in the ordinary sense and water in the wider sense. Aristotle gave the fifth element, ether, a central place as the *quint-essentia*¹ and this in itself indicates an extension. The Eastern counterpart to ether is, of course, *ākāśa*.

A possible interpretation of Gen.1 is that there are two accounts of the creation of the earth—the first in Gen.1. 1 and the second in Gen. 1.10. In the Septuagint, the first case, in Gen. 1.2, refers to the earth which was invisible (*aoratos*). According to Verbeke, Philo of Alexandria interpreted this in the following way: "For Philo, the invisible earth was the suprasensible Idea of the terrestrial element".² This is also quite clearly an extension of the ordinary elements.

The same can also be said of the Greek idea of *Okeanos* or the ocean. Onians has, for example, observed that this is really the "primal or cosmic" *psyche*. "The conception of *Okeanos* has no basis in observation."³ This, one might add, is precisely because various things were thought to take place at a different level.

Kissling has said: "Porphyrus made the light of the Republic myth the *ochēma* of the world soul (cf. Proclus In Rem publ.II 196)".⁴

¹ See above, Vol. II, p. 59.

² B 174, p. 239.

³ B 233, p. 26 249; see also Gen. 1. 2, 7.

⁴ B 85, p. 326; for the cosmic chariot, see for example, above, Part I, p. 13 f, 288.

Rüsché has also said of Plotinus that the world-soul possessed a pneumatic body.¹

It is abundantly clear, then, that what we have here is a cosmic hylic pluralism. R. Eisler has, in his very detailed book (B 210) done considerable research into the concepts of the "clock of the world" and the "tent of heaven".² "Clock" reminds us at once of the *chitōnes* of individual human-beings made of fine matter and "tent" of Paul, the tent maker who, in 2 Cor. 5.1, contrasts the heavenly abode with the earthly tent or tabernacle,³ used here in a cosmic context.

This is also the case whenever the whole world is referred to as God's body. In Indian philosophy, for example, there is reference to *Ívara*, the creative, less absolute deity, who had the whole of nature or *prakṛti* as *upādhi*.⁴ Insofar as this world has several divisions, the deity also has a body of fine matter.

The *trikāya* doctrine of the Buddhists teaches that the Buddha has three *kāyas* or bodies, the third of which, the *dharmakāya*, being regarded as completely cosmic.⁵ Similarly, there is also the idea of the Christian Church as the body of Christ.

I cannot go any more deeply into any of these views here, nor can I discuss in detail the familiar idea in classical antiquity of the ascent and descent of the soul through the spheres.⁶ It cannot be disputed that these spheres were regarded, for example, by Proclus, as worlds consisting of fine matter and Proclus believed that the soul and its *ochēmata* or *chitōnes* of fine matter ascended or descended through them.⁷

I feel bound to draw attention to the fact that the ladder *hē klimax* is often used as an image to indicate communication between different worlds or spheres. One of the best known uses of this image is in Gen. 28. 12 (see Plate 9)—the ladder in Jacob's dream.⁸ R. Eisler has collected a number of references to the ladder image.⁹ It is also hardly necessary to say that the theme of the ladder is also used as a metaphor for the growth and redemption of the soul, for example, in St John Climacus, *The Ladder of Divine Ascent*.¹⁰ If Kierkegaard

1 B 137, pp. 53-54.

2 See above, pp. 17, 20.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 73.

4 See above, Part I, pp. 224-225.

5 See above, Part I, pp. 244-245.

6 See index.

7 See above, p. 16.

8 See above, p. 26.

9 B 210, p. 299.

10 London, 1959. The author lived in the sixth or seventh century.

were to call himself "John Climacus", we should not look for hylic pluralism lurking behind this name.

I should also mention in this chapter that it has often been said that the other world is connected with a space of more than three dimensions and that there may perhaps also be even more worlds with even more dimensions. This is clearly different from the view held by Einstein-Minkowski, according to which time acted as a fourth dimension.

A rather popular article written by Fechner is entitled "Space has Four Dimensions" ("Der Raum hat vier Dimensionen").¹ In a post-script written in 1875, Fechner pointed out that his colleague in Leipzig J. C. F. Zöllner,² wanted to use this to explain certain unusual phenomena, such as apports at spiritualistic séances. (I shall be returning to this question later when I deal with the theories put forward in explanation of parapsychological phenomena.³)

Among modern occultists, C. W. Leadbeater has said very positively that a space of several dimensions—more than four even—is associated with the higher planes. He adds, however, that consciousness of a fourth dimension in space does not depend directly on the development of astral clairvoyance.⁴ Is this perhaps because a power of distinguishing and perceiving such worlds has to be developed especially? These worlds are perhaps always present around us, our own ordinary world, the world that we know, being no more than an "extract" taken from a much greater whole, of which we are not conscious because of our limited capacity for perception.

As I said at the beginning of this chapter, a consideration of cosmic pluralism brings us into contact with problems which bring us farther and farther away from our ordinary experience. There is, however, every reason to assume that, if there is any truth in hylic pluralism, fine materiality will also be found cosmically or cosmologically.

112 THE SPREAD OF HYLIC PLURALISM

We have now reached the end of Volume III of this work and at the same time of the summaries contained in Volumes II and III. These summaries have been divided into two volumes because they automatically fall into two categories—the historical summaries (Sections 53-89) of Volume II and the phenomenological cross-sections (Sections 90-112)

1 1846; included in his *Kleine Schriften* (1913), p. 172 ff.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 175.

3 See below, Section 123.

4 *The Inner Life* (1911), II, Chap. XI; B 79^a, II, p. 397 ff; B 116, Chap. XVIII.

of Volume III. The historical summaries were quite short in that they only needed to refer to the parts of "The History of Hylic Pluralism" which I dealt with in Volume I (Sections 20-50).

I had, however, collected a great deal of material, which was to have been published in the Dutch volumes III, IV and V (Dutch chapters 51-200), dealing respectively with hylic pluralism in Greece and Rome, in Israel, Christianity and Islam and in the modern era, but these chapters had not even been written in a form suitable for publication.¹ In the meantime, then, I felt obliged to provide at least a survey in summary form of two volumes and these have been translated into English as Volumes II and III of the English edition (Chapters 55-112). Of these two volumes, the first, Volume II, summarises the historical matter originally to be published in the Dutch volumes III, IV and V (chapters 50-200). This English Volume II contains chapters 55-89 (205-239 in the Dutch original). As for the phenomenological cross-sections or summaries (Chapters 90-112; 240-262 in the Dutch edition), these too could not be omitted in my opinion because they were essential to any discussion of the *quaestio iuris* of hylic pluralism which follows in Volume IV of the English edition (Chapter 113 ff).² In any case, even if the Dutch Volumes III, IV and V had already been published, it would have been necessary to include these phenomenological summaries in the last part of the Dutch work and in its English translation, the part dealing with the "Sense of Hylic Pluralism". These summaries are, of course, quite detailed, but they are indispensable and lead up to the final volume, the English Volume IV.

I should like to conclude this present volume, and therefore the whole of these summaries, with a consideration of the spread of hylic pluralism. Generally speaking, it can be said with confidence that all that is contained so far in these summaries to some extent answers this question, but the question can, of course, be asked more specifically—in what forms has hylic pluralism occurred in the history of human thought? An answer to this more precisely expressed question will indirectly throw light on the spread of hylic pluralism in general.

I was firmly of the opinion that, if the material was to be properly ordered and arranged, it was necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, three forms of *pneuma* consisting of fine matter³ —the physiological,

1 These volumes will alas never be written or translated now, since the author died on 21st December 1970 before the volumes already published in Dutch had been completely translated into English.

2 See above, p. 2.

3 See above, Part I, p. 19 ff; see also above, Vol. II, p. 9. ff.

the psychological and the sublime *pneuma*—and, on the other, six metaphysical standpoints with regard to hylic pluralism or fine materiality in connection with the soul. A survey of these three species of *pneuma* will be found in Chapters 96, 99 and 106 respectively of the phenomenological cross-sections contained in this volume (III). I have not yet provided a survey of the six metaphysical standpoints. It might have been possible to do this in this chapter, without attempting to be exhaustive in my treatment of the subject, but I have decided not to do so, firstly, because I have dealt in some detail with these six standpoints already in separate chapters in the first part of this work (Part I, Volume I, Chapters 11-16) and secondly because it would be necessary to do a great deal of further research into sources and to verify the material prepared for the Dutch Volumes III, IV and V even further in order to provide a relatively complete survey of these standpoints. I am conscious of the fact that I have had to say far too often in this work so far that particular statements made by certain authors point to the fact that they have to be classified under what I have called the gamma standpoint, whereas other statements point in the direction of the delta standpoint. Further study is required, possibly published in the form of dissertations or separate papers, in this field.¹

Here, however, I must say something about the spread of the six metaphysical standpoints. Firstly, the first and the last of these standpoints—the alpha standpoint, monistic materialism, and the last, the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism—cannot be associated with hylic pluralism since those who hold these views reject fine materiality in connection with the soul.²

The other four standpoints, however, all contain hylic pluralism. The really essential aspect of this question, however, is that it draws attention to the fact that there are no less than four different forms of hylic pluralism, only one of which has a name—the third of my metaphysical standpoints, the beta standpoint. This is dualistic materialism, according to which everything is matter, although in addition to ordinary matter, there is also finer matter. The other three

¹ See index.

² I feel bound to point to one important exception here. This is the theory which is held by many monistic materialists and by many anthropological dualists, in other words, by many who adhere both to the alpha and to the epsilon standpoints. The theory to which I am referring is that of the *spiritus animales et vitales*, which has to be included within the category of the physiological *pneuma*. (See Part I, p. 23-24; see also above, Vol. II, pp. 216, 134-135, 65.) These thinkers, however, regard the *spiritus animales* as forming part of the ordinary body, so that their attitude towards hylic pluralism remains unchanged.

meta physical standpoints have no name, I have consequently felt obliged to refer to them simply by Greek letters and to call them the gamma, delta and zeta standpoints.

According to the gamma standpoint everything that exists in the plurality of creation is matter or fine matter, but *above* this there is something that is transcendental or immaterial. According to the delta standpoint, there is, apart from the transcendent element, also a being *within* the plurality that is immaterial—the soul—although this is expressed as fine matter, for example, by means of an *ochēma*. Finally, according to the zeta standpoint, there is no being that is simply material—all matter is only appearance, but within it a distinction has to be made between what is ordinary apparent matter and apparent fine matter.

One advantage of classifying the standpoints in this scale is that it shows quite clearly the increasing spiritualisation from one extreme, the alpha standpoint, according to which nothing exists except matter, to the other, the zeta standpoint, according to which there is no matter at all, but only an appearance of matter. On several occasions throughout this work, I have stressed that everything which exists in the plurality of creation, either matter or fine matter, and which I have called the *hylic* element has to be distinguished from the whole of the *eidetic* aspect, the whole of the eidetic or abstract relationships, the eidetic contents or intentions.¹ These eidetic relationships therefore belong to the multiplicity of creation—because they consist of a multiplicity of aspects—but they do *not exist* in time and space. They certainly play a part within the plurality of creation as a whole, because there is a constant correlativism between the eidetic and the hylic elements in that plurality or multiplicity.² In itself, however, it is valuable to keep the eidetic relationships and the hylic relationships quite separate, in order to avoid all kinds of confusion and indeed, to avoid making the sort of mistake that Plato made.³

Why, then, is it that these four forms of hylic pluralism have been so often overlooked? There are two probable reasons for this. The first is that there is a general aversion to a materialism which affirms that there is nothing higher than matter. Again and again, one encounters references to the “materialistic” psychology of the neo-Platonists with their *ochēmata* and *chitōnes*, of the Fathers of the Christian

1 See above, p. 36 and index.

2 See above, p. 36, 100; see also B 114, 60.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 35; see also index.

Church, of almost all the Indian philosophers¹ and of so many modern occultists. There may, on the other hand, be no explicit reference to this or it may simply be by-passed or ignored, just because hylic pluralism is identified with dualistic materialism or the beta standpoint. Even though hardly any conscious distinction has been made between monistic and dualistic materialism, the latter has certainly been known. (The Stoics were clearly materialists in the religious sense,² but they were not monistic materialists in the sense in which this was understood by Vogt, Büchner or Moleschott.³). The other three forms of hylic pluralism have simply not been known. Dualistic materialism has been regarded as "primitive"; the philosopher must be constantly on his guard against being criticised on this account.

The second probable reason for hylic pluralism having been so often overlooked is this. All these so-called "primitive" philosophies ignored the essential difference between the physical and the psychical aspects⁴ and neglected the immaterial element, either of the transcendent deity or of the immaterial or eidetic relationships. There has therefore been what might be called a positive spiritualisation, but the tendency has been to race ahead and formulate the "pregnant dualism"⁵ that is embodied in Descartes' anthropological dualism or the epsilon standpoint. Descartes and those who think like him have, it is well known, made a sharp division between the material and the spatial aspect on the one hand and the spiritual and immaterial aspect on the other. This one-sided attitude has tended to predominate since the time of Descartes in the West. All the same, the psychical and the immaterial aspects do not have to be thought of as identical. As we have seen, many thinkers have been convinced—and the same conviction has even prevailed in whole movements of thought—that the psychical and other aspects may also have a material side (that is, of fine matter). What is more, immateriality may also come into its own in different way, for example, in eidetic relationships.

The historical diffusion of hylic pluralism in its various forms is also apparent from this phenomenological treatment. The enormous influence of Cartesian dualism—and psychophysical parallelism is also

1 It would seem as though the well-known scholar S. Radhakrishnan was embarrassed by this undeniable aspect of Indian Philosophy. In his *Indian Philosophy* (B 124, I p 400), he slides very lightly over this question (see above, Part I, pp. 180-181). He does not discuss at all the idea that this doctrine does not necessarily imply materialism; see above, Vol. II, p. 4.

2 See above, Vol. II, p. 43.

3 See above, Vol. II, p. 138.

4 See above, Part I, pp. 83, 101, 166, 225, 271; Vol. II, p. 18-19.

5 See above, Vol. II, pp. 152, 11.

a form of dualism—¹in the thought of the modern age has resulted in the idea of fine materiality in connection with the soul being almost tabu. At the same time, in connection with this, together with the influence of the Enlightenment and its positivistic tendency, the other world (or the other worlds) have become less and less real in the mind of modern man. This is despite the influence of the Protestant thinkers discussed above in Section 72 and of the romantics (Section 82), who disagreed with these ideas, and the opposition to them on the part of modern occultists (Section 83), parapsychologists (Section 85) and others.

Cartesianism, then, as outlined in Section 76, was clearly influenced by the thought of Thomas Aquinas (Section 70) and has a direct effect on the ideas of Immanuel Kant (Section 80)—together, these can be regarded as the principal opponents of hylic pluralism. In other and earlier civilisations, however, there was a more open attitude towards fine materiality. It never disappeared, for instance, in Indian and Chinese thought (See Volume I of this work—Hylic Pluralism in India and China), although full justice was certainly done to the immaterial aspect in India.² In general, however, and especially in more primitive societies and in the early stages of Western thought, the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism, which was, in Stoic thinking, for example, not open to the reality of transcendent immateriality, predominated. A change was brought about in this both by Platonism and by Jewish and Christian thinking.

Because of this "mistake", Plato did not distinguish sufficiently between the eidetic and the fine material aspects with the result that there developed a tendency to assume too great a dualism within being—this can be regarded as the beginning of the movement that culminated in Cartesianism. Fine materiality certainly occurs in the old and New Testaments in the form of ideas that are reminiscent of the beta standpoint and at the same time we also find in Scripture the concept of a truly transcendent and therefore immaterial deity. It is questionable whether Verbeke was right to claim that the Old and New Testaments played such a decisive part in overcoming the tendency to spiritualisation,³ because a number of early Christian writers, especially Tertullian, were—as Verbeke knew very well—very much influenced by Stoic thought and by the beta standpoint (see my chapter 66). All the same, a standpoint that was at least partly new comes

1 See above, Vol. II, p. 127.

2 See above, Part I, p. 210 and index.

3 See B 174, p. 538 ff.

to light in the writings of many early Christian authors, according to whom the whole of creation was material, that is, it consisted of fine matter, but God transcended his material creation. This standpoint is the one which I have called the gamma standpoint. Augustine went a stage further in that he believed that, although there was a wide variety of fine materiality, the soul, as well as the deity, was immaterial. This is my delta standpoint. Because he was strongly influenced by neo-Platonism, however, it seems more likely to me that he constructed his theory of the soul more on the basis of these ancient neo-Platonistic ideas than on the Old and New Testaments. We may conclude therefore that hylic pluralism remained an important and accepted idea up to and including the period when Augustinian thought prevailed (it should not in this context be forgotten that Augustine taught a Pluriformity of the soul; see Section 69) and indeed up to the Thomistic period.

I do not propose to list the various individual thinkers whose standpoint is one of the four hylic pluralistic ones and whose thought is in this respect linked, despite their separation in time.

Their names appear again and again throughout this work. I hope that the material that I have assembled here will convince the reader that hylic pluralism in general has, throughout the history of thought, been a very widespread movement, despite its neglect in recent centuries, whatever the situation may be with regard to its truth.

Let me conclude this Volume with the following comment. The *Privatdozent* or teacher who is not an officially appointed member of the academic staff of a German university has to write a *Habilitations-schrift* or special thesis before he can qualify for an official appointment. This must be a relatively new field of study about which a great deal of material can be found. It is therefore not easy to find such a subject. There is not a great deal of choice in the field of philosophy. Hylic pluralism, however, is precisely such a subject—the theme is very widespread throughout the history of human thought and it is relatively unexplored, because it has been so neglected in recent centuries. The reason why hardly anyone has ventured to undertake this study—with the exception of W. Haas¹—is clear enough, of course—the lasting effect of Cartesian dualism, an almost exaggerated positivism and an aversion to anything that is reminiscent of occultism.

In the following volume, we shall be above all concerned with the *truth* of hylic pluralism.

1 See the index.